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Abstract 
This paper is a collective endeavour to depart from the traditional view that a clear-cut separation of 
powers between the European Union and its Member States is one of the main features and one of the 
main safeguards of the European quasi-federalism. On the one hand, it is an effort to show the deep 
intertwining of EU and national powers in the actual course of European integration. On the other 
hand, it is an attempt to discover new legal and political safeguards to the development of EU 
federalism. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Loïc Azoulai 
This Working Paper is the outcome of a workshop held at the EUI on June 14th, 2011 on the initiative 
of two researchers of the Law Department, Lena Boucon and François-Xavier Millet, with my support 
and in the presence of several EUI researchers and of Bruce Ackerman, professor of Law and Political 
Science at Yale University, Bruno de Witte, professor of European Law at Maastricht University and 
part-time professor at the EUI Robert Schuman Centre and Miguel Poiares Maduro, professor of 
European law at the EUI. It has been given a title which might sound like a slogan: Deconstructing EU 
Federalism… This was meant not only to bring the “French theory touch” into a project mainly 
oriented at investigating EU federalism in a comparative context, but also reflects a thoughtful 
working hypothesis.  
A Working Hypothesis 
As formulated by the two initiators of our meeting, the workshop was aimed at challenging the so-
called traditional view that “a clear-cut separation of powers between the European Union and its 
Member States is supposed to be one of the main safeguards of federalism”. Federalism refers to a 
mode of political organization where two distinct levels of governance – the federal/supranational and 
the national – coexist and are protected. Under a federalist mode of organization, the main issue is 
how to differentiate intrinsically interdependent political and legal orders. A traditional response 
resides in the allocation of powers. Federal law and federal courts seek to enforce mechanisms 
whereby the efficiency of the federal structure is ensured while “core” state powers are protected from 
federal influence and state interests are incorporated in federal political institutions. It is submitted 
that, in deploying such mechanisms, the EU has failed to protect the autonomy of national powers. 
The picture is one of the deep intertwining of EU and national powers. Therefore, if European 
federalism is to be safeguarded, new mechanisms should be sought.  
The catalogue of competences and the new procedures introduced by the Lisbon treaty (such as the 
introduction of subsidiarity review by national parliaments or the existence of opts-outs procedures in 
the area of freedom, security and justice) are not the solution; they are rather part of the problem. The 
activation of these clauses inevitably creates the suspicion that the dynamics of European integration 
and the sense of a loyal membership to the Union are endangered. As argued by A. Kocharov, the new 
subsidiarity review procedure tends to “reverse the presumption in favour of Union action”, 1  but the 
same can be said of the procedures examined by A. Engel. Ex-ante methods aimed at setting clear-cut 
frontiers to the EU enumerated powers have proven to be ineffective in protecting the Member States’ 
legitimate scope of action. An alternative approach could look to techniques of differentiation 
developed in the course of the exercise of EU and state powers. As a matter of fact, fundamental state 
interests are better protected ex-post, through a variety of techniques – for example by introducing the 
disruptive concept of “constitutional identity” in the framework of the interpretation of EU law, by 
varying the degree of the proportionality test applied to states’ justifications or even by acknowledging 
the very ambiguity of the language developed by the legal and political actors in European integration. 
The time is ripe to recognize, systematize and evaluate each of these practices and discourses. 
It is this hypothesis that the papers included in this volume develop, each with its own style and 
inflection. It was discussed at length during our lively workshop. It is now submitted to the readers. In 
                                                     
1
 See Anna Kocharov’s paper. 
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what follows, I would like to illustrate the value of it by paradoxically departing from one of its 
premises.  
How Traditional is the Division of Powers Approach? 
One of the merits of the approach proposed in this volume is to bring out a theme which has been 
underdeveloped in EU legal studies and practices. The approach drawn in allocation of powers terms 
is not as “traditional” as it might have been assumed in the presentation of our workshop. As has been 
noted, “Until the end of the 1990s, there had been astonishingly little research on the system of the 
Communities’ competences. Legal literature on competence issues had almost exclusively focused on 
Article 235 EEC Treaty”.2 Arguably, this lack of conceptualization is due to the structure of the EC 
treaty which did not specify the categories of competences conferred on the Community. The 
European Community was supposed to operate on the basis of the broad objectives and the specific 
provisions provided for by the treaty.3 EC competences were derived from a list of aims and means 
allocated to the Community and on the basis of the link that may be established between a purported 
action and the achievement of the common/internal market.4 EC action was certainly not justified on 
the basis of a specific subject matter having been entrusted to the Community.  
This may not be the only explanatory factor however. Intertwined with the EC’s appeal for aims and 
treaty objectives to foster “positive integration” are the legal doctrines “constitutionalizing” certain 
provisions of the Treaty. These are provisions promoting “negative integration”, that is, forbidding 
national measures and practices incompatible with the EU’s objectives, particularly free movement 
and competition law. Given that the treaty was not merely an international agreement among 
sovereign states, treaty provisions serving the objective to establish a common market had to be 
construed broadly and authoritatively, in a similar fashion to constitutional provisions within a 
national legal order. As a result of the functioning of the common market being of direct concern to 
the peoples of Europe, those rules could be converted into rights directly conferred on individuals. The 
centrality of the language of rights has superseded the language of the division of powers in the realm 
of EU law. EU rights have two distinctive features. First, they are functionally broad in their scope and 
not sector-specific5. The protection of these rights is supposedly triggered by any cross-border 
situation that relates to the establishment of the common market. When successfully invoked, the 
application of treaty-based individual rights is largely indifferent to the delineation of competences 
between the EU and its Member states. In fact, the reach of EU “constitutional” law extends well 
beyond the range of EU legislative competences. 6 Second, EU rights are reflected in specific 
obligations imposed on Member states. The overarching language of rights forces Member States to 
justify their actions in terms of policy interests or fundamental rights. Justifications based on the 
protection of a “core” national competence are banned from the realm of EU constitutional law. As 
has constantly been held by the Court, the purpose of the justification process “is not to reserve 
certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States; it merely allows national legislation 
to derogate from [free movement provisions] to the extent that this and remains justified to achieve [a 
                                                     
2
 A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast, The Federal Order of Competences, in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (2009) Hart Publishing, 275. 
3
 See R. Schütze, The European Community’s Federal order of Competences – A Retrospective Analysis, in M. Dougan é S. 
Currie (eds.), 50 years of the European Treaties – Looking back and thinking forwards (2009) Hart Publishing, 63. 
4
 K. Lenaerts & P. Van Nuffel, European Union Law (2011) Sweet & Maxwell, n° 7-013. 
5
 See See S. Weatherill, Competence and Legitimacy, in C. Barnard & O. Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union 
Law, (2009) Hart Publishing), (2009) at 24 and Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen 
[2006] (§ 34).  
6
 Consider, by way of illustration, Case C-415/93 Bosman, Case C-415/93 [1995]. 
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legitimate objective]”.7 As a result of the process of constitutionalization, the issue of the division of 
competences seems to have been removed from the interpretation of EU law. Referring to the 
mainstream case-law of the Court, one can hardly escape the conclusion that “There simply is no 
nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community”.8  
The Return of Federal Competences Theory 
In this context, it may come as a surprise to observe a return to the theory of the federal order of 
competence. The political and social context of distrust towards further integration and federalization 
of Europe is certainly favourable to such return. In truth, it is a return only in appearance. Some early 
decisions of the Court were already framed in these terms. The famous ERTA judgment illustrates how 
arguments based on competences may arise as an unexpected resource in the resolution of a case. In 
this decision pronounced in March 1971, the Court developed the “implied powers doctrine” 
according to which the powers vested in the Community to implement a common policy must 
necessarily extend throughout the international order through the acknowledgement of an exclusive 
competence to assume contractual obligations towards third countries. As has been accurately noted 
by P. Eeckhout, “The Court could easily have adopted a different approach”, one based on the rule of 
primacy of EU norms over the international law obligations of Member States.9 The Court, instead, 
chose to base its ruling on a model of allocation of powers, so as to avoid potential conflicts of EU 
norms and international obligations assumed by Member States. In July 1974, the Court issued the 
Casagrande judgment. 10 The problem was totally different from the one raised in ERTA, and yet, the 
Court used the same line of argument. The question was whether it was legitimate for Member States 
to refuse to award an educational grant to the child of a European migrant worker. In response to the 
argument put forward by the German authorities that education policy is within the exclusive powers 
of Member States, the Court developed a new doctrine akin, though different, to the US Supreme 
Court “doctrine of pre-emption”. It stated that the fact that the exercise of the Community’s powers 
affects areas which do not fall within the scope of the Community’s competences should not be held 
as limiting those powers, especially where there is the necessity of enforcing one of the main 
objectives of EU law (here the principle of non-discrimination between nationals and migrant workers 
and their families). Again, this case could have been settled on different grounds, referring to the 
primacy of the general principles of EU law, as occurred in later decisions. However, this again would 
have amounted to the acknowledgement of a conflict between EU and national law. It seemed more 
appropriate to the Court to present the solution in terms of the legitimate exercise of a Community 
competence. Both decisions were instrumentally justified by the necessity of ensuring the 
implementation of the EU’s objectives. Both referred to the allocation of powers to the EU, avoiding 
the language of the constitutionalization of EU law. Both entailed the “absorption” of national powers 
and national measures into the broadened scope of the Community’s competences.11 In these cases, in 
resolving the conflict of jurisdiction question, the balance tipped clearly in favour of EU federal 
competences. Implicit in the reasoning are structural arguments that the EU forms a “coherent whole” 
– a federation – and that Member States are committed to the common interests that the federation 
represents, even in areas that come within the scope of their “retained” powers.  
                                                     
7 Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] § 32. 
8 K. Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism, (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law, at 220. 
9 P. Eeckhout, Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond, in M. Poiares Maduro & L. Azoulai (eds.) The past and Future of EU 
Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (2010) Hart Publishing, at 219. 
10 Case 9/74, Casagrande [1974]. 
11 On the idea of absorption, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” And 
Other Essays on European Integration (1999) Cambridge University Press, at 47. 
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The current assertion of the federal competences theory in political and legal discourse is obviously of 
a totally different kind. It is meant to favour a more balanced allocation of powers. It argues for the 
necessity of protecting sensitive national interests and the integrity of the different political 
communities of which the Union is composed, whilst at the same time promoting the efficiency of the 
process of integration. The new article 4 inserted in the Treaty on European Union by the Lisbon 
Treaty, in its different dimensions, illustrates this point perfectly. Article 4 speaks a new language, the 
language of “Respect”. It embeds three kinds or respect. First, the respect for the competences not 
conferred upon the Union, which are to remain with the Member States, provided however that, thanks 
to the “flexibility clause” maintained in the treaty (article 352 TFEU [former 308 EC]), there is no 
imperative call for the Union to take action.12 Second, the respect for the national identities of Member 
States which, read in conjunction with the preamble and article 2 of the treaty, creates a complex 
picture whereby the EU respects the national identities of Member States provided that Member States 
are respectful of the fundamental values of the EU.13 Third, the respect for Member States’ essential 
functions that the Court has somewhat echoed and anticipated in its case-law referring to Member 
States’ “retained powers”.14 By the 2000s, when developing its case-law expanding the scope of 
application of EU law to areas of “retained powers”, the Court started to recognise state justifications 
based on Member States’ competences in their national territories. The impingement of EU law on 
core states competences is thus compensated by the acknowledgment of the essential functions of 
States as autonomous political actors and guarantors of national collective goods and assets. 
Moreover, this has led the Court to develop new techniques of assessment by relaxing the standard of 
scrutiny and the proportionality test in sensitive areas.15  
“Ambiguity” and “contestedness”, the basic characteristics of EU federalism according to Dennis-
Jonathan Mann, are everywhere in these formulations.16 Part of the deconstruction work is to analyse 
the context in which this shift in language and methods has occurred. How have the concepts of 
competences, allocation of competences and respect for national competences/identities been 
legitimized and built as a discourse directly applicable to EU legal problems, next to the long-standing 
prevailing discourse on the constitutionalization of EU law? What are the assumptions conveyed by 
this discourse? What difference does it make to approach European federalism and European 
integration through mechanisms of coordination/competition/contestation of powers? It would be 
mistaken to move too quickly from the “old-fashioned” division of powers doctrine to the “new” 
safeguards to EU federalism. Much of the discussion on these new safeguards, indeed highly 
promising, might well be seen as a “return” and a by-product of the division of powers doctrine which 
proved to be less than “traditional” and in fact rather new in the realm of EU law. Deconstruction has a 
disruptive effect on well-structured discourses, including on discourses which claim to be 
deconstructive.
                                                     
12
 Article 352 TFEU requires the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, to take appropriate measures to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties if 
those Treaties have not provided the necessary powers. 
13
 See the contribution of François-Xavier Millet. 
14
 See Lena Boucon’s paper in this volume. 
15
 See Jacob Öberg’s contribution. 
16
 See Dennis-Jonathan Mann’s analysis. 
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SUBSIDIARITY AFTER LISBON: FEDERALISM WITHOUT A PURPOSE? 
 
Anna Kocharov 
 
A Rascal-Monkey, Donkey, Billy Goat and Bear 
      Agreed in a Quartet to share. 
 They found some scores, viola, bass, two violins 
     And sat down in a lea beneath a linden tree 
     To charm the world with art. 
 They struck their strings, and sawed with all their heart. 
 No luck. “Arrete, my fellows, stop!” shouts Monkey, “Wait! 
 How can the music play when you're not sitting straight? 
 You, Bearie, opposite viola move your bass, 
       As primo, I'll sit opposite secundo's face 
       And then some music will take place. 
       We'll make the hills and forests dance!” 
       They took their seats and started the Quartet, 
       And once again it came to nyet. 
       “Hold on! I know the secret!”  
Shouts Donkey, “It is bound to come out fine 
              If everyone sits in a line.” 
 They followed Donkey's plan and settled in a row; 
    But even so, the music would not go.  
 More fiercely than before they argued then 
                     About who should be sitting where. 
A nightingale, in passing, chanced the noise to hear.  
At once, they turned to her to solve their problem. 
They pleaded, “Please, spare us some time 
To make of our quartet a paradigm: 
We have our instruments and scores, 
                    Just tell us how to sit!” 
“For making music, you must have the knack 
        And ears more musical than yours,” 
        The nightingale comes back, 
        “And you, my friends, no matter your positions,  
        Will never be musicians!” 
 
Ivan Andreevich Krylov, The Quartet (1811) 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the division of powers between the Union and Member States in the field of 
common immigration policy, discussing the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the 
framework of fluid objective-setting. Subsidiarity review by national parliaments could make a crucial 
contribution to policy development if this review goes to the substance of the proposed legislative acts. 
The new procedure reverses the presumption in favor of Union action, inverting the division of powers 
between the national and Union levels. 
 
Keywords 
Division of powers, Common immigration policy, Subsidiarity 
 
Three Visions of Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity, just like the competence over immigration, was introduced into the EC / EU Treaties 
with the Maastricht Treaty reform in 1993; the Amsterdam Treaty both extended competence over 
immigration policy and added a protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarily; finally, 
both subsidiarity and competence over immigration were amended significantly in the Lisbon Treaty: 
EU immigration law moved in its entirety under the qualified-majority voting with full involvement of 
the EP and full powers of the ECJ, while subsidiarity review was extended to include national 
parliaments. This parallel is not a mere coincidence. As Union competences expanded into the new 
policy fields, including immigration, and as more policy areas became subject to the qualified-
majority voting thereby introducing the risk of individual Member States being outvoted in the 
Council, Member States wanted to ensure that shared competences of the Union would still leave 
space for national action. This section outlines three primary functions of subsidiarity in EU law, 
which can be summarized as follows: 
i. A counter-majoritarian instrument to balance (a) the expansion of Union competences and (b) the 
passage to qualified-majority voting; 
ii. An instrument of legitimacy (and legitimation) of Union law through (a) consultations with 
stakeholders beyond the European institutions and (b) (comparative) institutional analysis; 
iii. A policy-development instrument in as much as subsidiarity analysis requires clear identification 
of policy objectives and problems to be addressed. 
The primary function of subsidiarity is to determine whether a given regulatory action falling within 
the area of shared competences is to be adopted on Union or Member State levels.  Article 5 EC 
Amsterdam, transposed nearly word-to-word into Article 5 TEU Lisbon, institutes a presumption in 
favor of action at a lower level of authority17: 
[…] in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level18, but can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 
However, the Protocol on subsidiarity attached to the Lisbon Treaty19 introduces a new procedure for 
rebutting compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, which counterbalances the presumption in 
favor of Member State action. Under this procedure: 
                                                     
17
 See also second paragraph of Article 1 TEU. 
18
 This phrase has been added in Lisbon, italics by author. 
19
 Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
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Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight weeks from 
the date of transmission of a draft legislative act [...] send to the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the 
draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.20 
Whenever, as a result of this procedure, the majority of national parliaments take the position that the 
proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the proposal must be reviewed.21 The 
institution proposing the draft does not have to amend or withdraw it but must, in any case, reason its 
action in terms of subsidiarity. It strikes that rebutting an alleged compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity is not easily done, as the time (eight weeks) is short while the number of parliaments that 
need to issue a reasoned opinion is high. The balance struck by this procedure depends on the quality 
of the reasoning of the institutions and the willingness of the ECJ to engage into substantive 
subsidiarity review.22 The ECJ is given jurisdiction in actions for infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity.23 However, considering that to this day the ECJ did not strike down a single measure for 
non-compliance with subsidiarity as such,24 this change in the procedure could amount to a reversal in 
the competence presumption in favor of Union action. 
Independently of whether the presumption favors Union or Member State action, subsidiarity institutes 
a nexus between the inability of the Member States, acting individually, to achieve the policy 
objective of the proposed legislative act25 on the one hand and legality of Union action on the other. 
Grounding the legality of Union action (the existence of Union competence) in its objectives indicates 
that the focus of subsidiarity test is not on the action itself – the legislator has broad discretion as to the 
choice of policy goals – but on the problem which EU regulation is tailored to solve. Subsidiarity 
analysis thus forces the legislator to clearly articulate the problem addressed by legislative intervention 
and the reason(s) why the Union would be best equipped to offer a solution. Without specifying the 
reason for having a Union policy in the first place, subsidiarity test is impossible. Subsidiarity can thus 
be viewed both as a tool of policy development and as contributing to the functioning of the law itself: 
to enhance the predictability in human relations through rationalizing – and thus reasoning – rules. 
Both these functions are facilitated by Protocol No 2: its Article 2 stipulates an obligation of the 
Commission to “consult widely” before proposing legislative acts, which should ideally lead to better 
policy-development, while Article 5 of the Protocol sets out an obligation for the Commission to make 
“a detailed statement” that would explain how the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Unfortunately, Article 5 later reiterates the old protocol on subsidiarity with reference to qualitative 
and quantitative indicators without mentioning that these should be applied to the problem that is 
being solved: an obvious observation? 
How to determine which problems a Member State can regulate itself and which require joint (Union) 
action? Two examples ensue. First, an individual Member State cannot address problems, the effective 
solution of which requires jurisdictional reach beyond its own territory.26 Regulating the use of 
                                                     
20
 Article 6 Protocol number 2 
21
 Article 7(3) Protocol number 2: after Lisbon, all CIP measures are adopted by ordinary legislative procedure. 
22
 This will be examined below. 
23
 Article 8 Protocol No 2. Also limits on the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the CIP matters, ex-Article 68 EC, was removed with 
Lisbon. 
24
 Some authors note that the Court “effectively equates the test of subsidiarity with the test of competence thus removing all 
independent legal value from the former”, see Takis Tridimas, The Rule of Reason and its Relation to Proportionality 
and Subsidiarity in Annette Schrauwen (ed.) Rule of Reason: Rethinking another Classic of European Legal Doctrine, 
Europa Law Publishing 2005. 
25
 Protocol No. 30 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(10.11.1997) OJ C340, p. 105 
26
 G. A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and in the United States, 94 
COLUMBIA L. REV., p. 381 (1994); R. P. Alford, Subsidiarity and Competition: Decentralized Enforcement of EU 
Competition Laws, 27 CORNELL INT. L. J., p. 272 (1994) citing M. Wilke and H. Wallace, SUBSIDIARITY: APPROACHES TO 
POWER-SHARING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990) Royal Institute of Int. Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 27 
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international waterways or the protection of rare animal species who migrate across national borders 
constitute the most immediate examples of problems that cannot be regulated by a state acting alone. 
Second, when the national political process fails to represent the interests of stakeholders located 
outside the national democratic structures (e.g. because they are nationals of another Member State 
and thus cannot vote), the regulatory acts affecting those interests need to be shifted to Union level in 
order to ensure balanced representation of all Union citizens (as opposed to nationals of only one 
Member State) – and therefore to enhance their acceptance of the enacted rules. A classical example 
would be restrictions on inter-state trade posed by a protectionist tariff enacted by state A, which 
benefits producers of state A and damages producers of state B, as well as the consumers of state A; a 
joint action is needed because producers of state B and consumers of state A are under-represented in 
state A’s political process, making it impossible for state A to overcome the bias towards its 
producers.27 Beyond an issue of market efficiency, this is a matter of the acceptance of the rules 
enacted by state A by the producers of state B, i.e. by different categories of Union citizens. In both 
cases the Member States cannot offer a solution by acting individually: there is a “collective action 
problem”.28  
A more controversial question is whether the Union should intervene in wholly internal situations, i.e. 
to secure the proper representation of consumers in state A. While the intentions for this could be most 
noble,29 intervention of the EU into internal situations undermines democratic systems of the Member 
States, on which the Union institutions are in turn based: claiming that the governments of Member 
States cannot represent and legislate for their peoples questions the legitimacy of all Union action 
because the Union acts through the Council, where the national governments are represented, and 
through the EP, the members of which are elected at national levels. It is thus impossible to claim that 
the Union may intervene “to correct” purely internal situations without automatically undermining the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union itself: if the national governments do not represent their peoples 
acting individually then how can they represent their peoples acting collectively? In line with this 
reasoning, the ECJ has repeatedly ruled that in situations involving transborder elements, intervention 
at Union level is required to protect the interests of individuals and businesses – yet, the Court 
repeatedly refused to interfere in purely internal situations.30 By identifying whether the case has the 
so-called “Community dimension”, the Court is implicitly engaging in ex post subsidiarity review by 
answering the same question as the one posed to the legislator during the ex ante subsidiarity 
assessment: whether the problem at issue requires Union action (has a “Community dimension”) or 
whether it can be deferred to the national level. 
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An Abridged Biography of Common Immigration Policy 
Two rounds of Treaty reform shaped the development of immigration as a separate branch of EU law. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a separate legal basis for regulating third-country nationals 
(TCNs) under a new Treaty Title, the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).31 Article 63 EC 
empowered the Council to adopt: 
[...]  
3. measures on immigration policy within the following areas: 
 (a) conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States 
of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion, 
[…] 
4. measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are 
legally resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States. 
This open-ended wording provided a broad legal base and immediately stirred many interpretations.32 
TCNs could now be regulated in EC law without any link to the internal market.33 The 
“communitarization” of immigration policy was done only half-heartedly. Not only did the new Treaty 
Title contain reservations on national competence34, exemption from the Community method for 
adoption of secondary acts35 and a limitation on the jurisdiction of the ECJ36 but the formulation of the 
Treaty Articles themselves strikingly differed from previous provisions of the Treaties and the external 
agreements relative to regulating the individual: they did not contain rights for the individuals (nor 
made any mention of them) but for the states, acting together (Article 63 EC) or separately 
(penultimate paragraph of Article 63 EC and Article 64 EC), to regulate the individual. It was not a 
deregulating or liberalizing power but a legal basis to introduce regulation, whether liberalizing or not. 
The Lisbon Treaty finalized the shaping of EU immigration policy and distinguished it not only from 
the internal market but also from the common policy on asylum, subsidiarity and temporary 
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protection.37 From being a flanking measure to the abolition of internal borders, immigration is now a 
separate Union policy, the common immigration policy (CIP),38 a wording reminiscent of the CAP and 
the CCP. Will the new policy be just as far-reaching? 
The CIP is a shared competence of the Union and Member States, and the potential powers of the EU 
under this policy were expanded. Replacing Article 63(3) and (4) EC, Article 79 TFEU provides for 
joint powers of the Council and the EP, acting by co-decision procedure, to legislate in the following 
areas: 
(a) “the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member States of long-
term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification; 
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, 
including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member 
States”39 
The Union’s powers now comprise not only “standards on procedures” for the issue of residence 
permits as former Article 63(3)(a) EC, but also other matters related to the issue of permits, i.e. 
conditions for their acquisition.40 “Freedom” of movement and residence across the Union is expressly 
mentioned, although not directly enforceable. On the other hand, the Treaty makes an express 
reservation as regards access to economic activities by TCNs41: 
“This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of 
third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, 
whether employed or self-employed.”42 
This phrase limits the legal base and the scope of the new common policy, while at the same time 
clearly differentiating the CIP from the internal market, where Member States lost their powers to 
regulate migration of workers. However, in other aspects of the CIP regulation the divide between 
Union and Member State competences is not set in the Treaties directly (by en express limit on 
competences) nor indirectly (by directing the exercise of powers towards any specific finalité). This 
poses a new challenge for subsidiarity assessment and for drawing the dividing line between the Union 
and Member State powers. 
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CIP: What’s the Problem? 
The AFSJ – and the CIP under it – is vitiated from birth by an unprecedented lack of objectives, 
making it stand out from other EU competences as “singularly less specific”43. Indeed, neither in the 
immigration chapter, nor in Title IV EC which contained it, could there be found any problems to be 
resolved by Community action in the field of immigration policy. Although the AFSJ was linked to 
the common Community goals listed in Article 2 EC, de facto EU immigration law did not follow 
these objectives but was rather shaped by the political compromise in the Council, which still acted in 
this area by unanimity.44 The Lisbon Treaty reform did not address this ambiguity. Article 79 TFEU 
re-states the major objectives of EU immigration policy as formulated by the European Council over 
the preceding decade. The Union’s immigration policy should ensure “efficient management of 
migration flows”45, “fair treatment” of legally resident TCNs46, and prevent illegal immigration.47 It is 
not apparent from these objectives why transfer powers to the European level. Does Article 79 TFEU 
imply that national immigration policies are so interrelated that individual Member States are not 
capable to manage immigration and regulate rights of TCNs? Have they not been doing this up until 
the Amsterdam Treaty – and even now?48 
The absence of objectives per se is not a problem for the purposes of subsidiarity review if this review 
is construed as a collective action problem or “structural bias in democratic process”.49 Objectives 
serve to identify which problem or bias the EU legislative measure is tailored to solve. Absence of 
objectives in the Treaty simply means that the problems to be solved by EU immigration law should 
be defined on a rolling basis by the European Council and by the legislator when drafting EU 
directives. The former is a requirement under the new Treaty, which is a mere restatement of previous 
practice.50 The latter is a requirement under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, attached to the Lisbon Treaty, which states that (a) the Commission 
should consult widely before proposing legislation and give reasons for its proposals51 and (b) draft 
legislative acts should be accompanied by a detailed justification with regard to the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.52 Beyond a mere procedural obligation, in the areas of shared 
competences characterized by the absence of problem-defining objectives, these requirements should 
ensure that both national parliaments and the ECJ are in the position to identify the problem that gives 
rise to EU regulatory competence. It would be tempting to conclude from this that the Treaty simply 
relegates identification of goals to lower and more flexible level instead of fixing them in the Treaty. 
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This lower level is itself layered and includes, first, the European Council, second, the EU institutions, 
third, the national parliaments, and lastly the ECJ when reviewing adopted acts. 
Since the introduction of competence over immigration in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council and the 
Commission developed three strings of objectives to justify compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity:  
a. Establishment of a common policy – mobility between Member States – internal market; 
b. Schengen and abolition of internal borders – fight against illegal migration – effective 
cooperation with third countries; 
c. Fair treatment of third-country nationals – distortion of migratory flows – international 
competitiveness. 
These objectives shape EU immigration policy and serve to determine the competence split during 
subsidiarity review. We shall now examine how this works in practice.53 For the sake of space and 
sharpness of argument, I will focus exclusively on legal immigration, although the CIP includes also 
the fight against illegal immigration. 
Establishment of a Common Policy – Internal Market 
Although apparently circular, the argument that the convergence of national immigration policies per 
se is a precondition for EU immigration policy has been extensively used to justify EU immigration 
law.54 When attesting compliance with the principle of subsidiarity of the first EU proposal on legal 
immigration, the objective of “harmonization of legal framework at Community level” was not 
qualified further.55 On examination of the legal basis for the proposal, the European Parliament 
followed case law of the ECJ,56 concluding that generic harmonization fell outside Community powers 
and was contrary to the principle of subsidiarity: 
The differences noted by the Commission between the Member States' rules [in the area of 
immigration policy] do not in themselves prove any need for harmonisation. Only the Member 
States can guarantee the flexibility geared to the national, regional and sectoral requirements of the 
labour market. [A]pproximation of legislation would be necessary only if any third-country 
national admitted to a Member State were permitted to work in any Member State.57 
Alternatively, the Council opinioned on that occasion that the provisions concerning access to and 
conditions of employment of TCNs who reside legally in the territory of the EC could be adopted only 
                                                     
53
 National parliaments do review subsidiarity of the CIP measures despite what could be inferred from Article 69 TFEU, 
which provides: “National Parliaments ensure that the proposals and legislative initiatives submitted under Chapters 4 
and 5 comply with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements laid down by the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” This Article is one of the general provisions relating to 
the entire AFSJ. The powers to regulate immigration are contained in the Chapter 2 of this Title. It is thus logical to ask 
whether, by reasoning a contrario, the Treaty drafters implied that, as regards other Chapters of Title V TFEU, including 
the immigration chapter, national parliaments do not exercise subsidiarity review. 
54
 F. Pastore, Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure, and Current Evolution of the EU Entry Control System, in 
EUROPE’S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, p. 122 (N. Walker ed. 2004 Oxford). Harmonization is even more 
meaningless when not all the Member States participate (UK, Ireland, and Denmark opted out from EC measures on legal 
immigration) and those who do are allowed to maintain their national systems alongside the new common rules (ex multis 
Article 13 Directive 2003/109/EC). 
55
 Recital 14, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final. Recital 6 mentioned the 
objective of reinforcing competitiveness of the Community to recruit third-country workers globally but did not contain 
any transnational elements. 
56
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco advertising 
57
 Report of the European Parliament on the Commission proposal for adoption of a Council directive on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities 
(23 January 2003) A5-0010/2003 final, PE 311.015, p. 39 
Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Federalism without a Purpose? 
15 
on the basis of Article 137(1)(g) EC inasmuch as they did not imply a right for such persons to 
circulate freely within the Community.58 Arguing a contrario, according to the Council legal service, 
for a directive to be adopted under the CIP, there must be an element of mobility of TCNs between 
Member States. 
The Commission introduced the element of mobility in the Long-Term Residents Directive. In 
addition to integration59 and a generic call for harmonization,60 the new objective consisted in 
determining the “terms for the exercise of rights of residence in other Member States” which would 
“contribute to the effective attainment of an internal market” and “constitute a major factor of mobility 
on the Union's employment market”. The European Parliament, notwithstanding its opinion on the 
2001 Proposal, completely ignored the new transnational element and refused to examine subsidiarity, 
stating merely that this principle “need not be brought into play here, since by definition common 
measures need only be adopted at Community level”.61 Thus, according to the European Parliament, 
the principle of subsidiarity was no longer applicable to EU immigration law! The European 
Parliament retained this position when considering proposal for the Family Reunification Directive, 
altogether failing to examine Community competence and making no mention of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.62 The situation, however, was not much different from the 2001 
Proposal: transnational aspects and mobility are absent from the directive, while its main objective is 
the “integration of third-country nationals in the Member State”, clearly confining action to pure 
national level.63 Once again, the directive justifies subsidiarity by an abstract call for harmonization 
without explaining further which common action problem the directive would solve.64 
National parliaments have exhibited a varying degree of diligence in subsidiarity review of the CIP 
directives. Some, notably Italy, Portugal and Spain, invariably support the argument in favor of a 
common policy without much effort to examine its substance.65  These parliaments agree with the 
Commission that the demand for some types of workers is shared across Member States, which in 
itself points to the necessity of Union action. One parliament, instead of examining subsidiarity, even 
suggests that failing to act under Article 79 TFEU “would contradict provisions and objectives of the 
Treaty”.66 Others, such as Germany, Latvia and Lithuania, engage in substantive review of the 
provisions of the Proposals without, however, finding subsidiarity concerns.67 In their review of the 
Proposal on for a Directive on Seasonal Workers, France, Austria, and the UK point to the 
insufficiency of the Commission’s statements on the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity both 
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in terms of reasoning68 and in terms of data69 on which this reasoning is based. These national 
parliaments point at the inconsistency between, on the one hand, the statements of the Council 
acknowledging differences between the national labor markets,70 recognized through Article 79(5) 
TFEU, and the assumption of the Commission that some categories of workers are equally in demand 
across Member States.71 Surprisingly, no institution noted that “[s]ince Member States alone (without 
co-ordination or a central institution) can never achieve the best balance in terms of uniformity, it is 
not legitimate to review the exercise of regulatory powers accorded to them under the Treaty by means 
of a uniformity test.”72 
Abolition of Internal Borders and Fight against Illegal Migration 
This is perhaps the only objective one could infer from the text of EC Treaty itself, as amended in 
Amsterdam: EU immigration policy was somehow tied to the abolition of internal borders.73 Ex-
Article 61 EC announced the establishing of “an area of freedom, security and justice” which was not 
defined further anywhere in the Treaty. The first part of ex-Article 61 EC made reference to 
Community measures on asylum, free travel area, and crossing of external borders74 in conjunction 
with the “measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of persons in accordance with Article 14”. 
Ex-Article 14 EC provided for the progressive establishment of the internal market as an area without 
internal borders in which free movement of persons is ensured in accordance with the EC Treaty. Did 
this mean that the AFSJ should counterbalance the side-effects of the abolition of internal borders or, 
on the contrary, incorporate TCNs into the free movement of persons?  
The first article of new Title V TFEU “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, successor to Title IV 
EC, proclaims that the Union as a whole – as opposed to merely the Schengen area – shall constitute 
an AFSJ.75 However, the second point of this article links EU immigration policy to the absence of 
internal border controls – and thus back to the Schengen space.76 Legal immigration remains corollary 
to the abolition of internal borders, which would be a logical conclusion if there were free movement 
for residence of TCNs in the EU: this would necessitate EU regulation of the first entry into the 
Schengen space and the legal status of migrants. Were TCNs allowed to move freely between Member 
States and choose the state of residence to their liking, this would be a classical collective action 
problem of the free-movement-of-workers type. Whether this problem should be resolved by common 
admission rules or by mutual recognition is another question.77 However, TCNs do not enjoy free 
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movement rights in EU law,78 making collective action problem not readily apparent. Without EU-
wide right of residence, an immigrant crossing an internal border from one Member State to the other 
and residing there without authorization for longer than three months falls into illegality and thus 
under the rules on illegal immigration. This, however, does not explain how regulating legal migration 
can solve the problem of illegal migration (other than by legalization of irregular migrants), as 
suggested by the Council and the Commission.79  
When examining subsidiarity under Protocol 2, the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese parliaments, 
simply restated the assumed link between abolition of internal borders and legal immigration without 
going into the merits of this assumption.80 Italian Senate bluntly stated that the directive on intra-
corporate transferees belongs to the body of law regulating illegal migration, not mentioning the 
reasons leading to this conclusion.81 Austrian, Dutch, Polish and UK parliaments, on the other hand, 
question suitability of a directive on legal immigration to solve the problem of illegal immigration.82 
In its reply to this concern, the Commission reiterated that “the Schengen area without internal borders 
requires common minimum rules in order to reduce the risk of overstaying and irregular entries that 
may be caused by lax and diverse rules on the admission of seasonal workers” without further 
explanation.83 The Commission then advanced an additional argument of external relations, stating 
that “remov[ing] obstacles to legal migration” would “strengthen[...] the commitment of third 
countries to tackling irregular migration”.84 While the Italian and Spanish parliaments accepted this 
argument unquestionably,85 the parliaments in opposition to the proposal missed the opportunity to 
examine this statement in more detail. The Polish parliament does not mention it altogether, the 
Austrian and Dutch parliaments merely state the insufficiency of this argument, alone, to justify 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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subsidiarity,86 while the UK House of Commons points to the fact that Article 79(5) TFEU prevents 
the Union offer legal immigration venues in negotiations with third states in as much as admission of 
third-country workers falls under the exclusive competence of Member States. Both the national 
parliaments and the Commission fail to appreciate the inadequacy of an internal directive that 
regulates all TCNs independently of their nationality as a bargaining tool in negotiations with third 
states, which are interested in obtaining special concessions for their own nationals only. 
Distortion of Migratory Flows and Fair Treatment of TCNs 
Another alleged EU-level problem requiring joint action is the necessity to “establish a level playing 
field within the EU”.87 This is a double-edged objective tainted by a profound internal contradiction. 
The “level playing field” concerns elimination of competition between Member States88 in terms of (1) 
lowering production costs by exploiting third-country workers and, vice versa, (2) attracting the best 
third-country workers by offering them more rights. 
Elimination of exploitation of third-country workers resulting from their unequal rights with Union 
citizens – and thus elimination of “unfair” competition between the two89 by guaranteeing “fair 
treatment” of TCNs – would eliminate the unfair competition between Member States’ manufacturers 
some of whom could otherwise reduce costs by employing TCN workers with lower rights.90 This is a 
classical internal market problem that requires collective supranational action, which satisfies 
subsidiarity test. However, this would only be the case in the circumstances where EU law ensures an 
adequate level of rights for third-country workers, which, according to many national parliaments91 
and scholars,92 is not the case. Indeed, only equal treatment as a directly effective right can eliminate 
competition between the producers based on lower working conditions for TCNs; fair (as opposed to 
equal) treatment established by means of a directive (and thus with no direct horizontal effect) does 
not allow for effective redress by third-country workers against their employers. 
Although a minimum set of rights may prove beneficial to individual immigrants in some 
circumstances,93 the mere fact that a measure is perceived as overall beneficial for the immigrant 
cannot substitute the need to justify the transfer of powers further away from Union citizens. In terms 
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of comparative institutional analysis, “[i]f the interests regulated by a national measure are equal in the 
different Member States, then there is no suspicion of over-representation of national interests or 
under-representation of the interests of nationals of other Member-States”94 and Member States are 
well suited to regulate the matter. It could even be argued that by setting minimum rights of third-
country workers below those of Union citizens EU law implicitly authorizes rather than curbs potential 
dumping which may result from the employment of third-country workers on this level of rights. 
Acknowledging Union competence where it is exceeded for measures that are perceived as beneficial 
undermines credibility of the European institutions should they wish to challenge EU act the day it is 
perceived as unwanted.95 For the directives on legal immigration, only the UK House of Commons 
considered these arguments.96 
Elimination of competition between Member States refers to a situation where different national entry 
and residence conditions for third-country workers cause competition between the national 
immigration systems (for best qualified workers), which competition distorts TCNs’ migration 
choices; this, according to the Commission, triggers the need for a common EU admission system.97 It 
is not difficult to find contradictions between seeking to raise the rights of TCNs on the one hand and 
avoiding the competition between Member States which results in granting TCNs more rights, on the 
other.98 These two problems are mutually exclusive so one cannot help wondering how a single 
instrument can aim to solve both. Competition between national immigration systems also loops back 
to the opposite concern, that of becoming a magnet for TCNs who have been admitted by other 
Member States, which could result from too attractive conditions for “unwanted” TCNs (welfare 
shopping); this is effectively the second string of objectives linked to the abolition of internal borders, 
analyzed above. 
Elimination of competition between Member States internally should be distinguished from joining 
forces externally to compete with traditional immigration countries for “wanted” immigrant workers.99 
The Commission presents this objective as a deregulation issue, whereby “the obstacles encountered 
[...] in relation to the complexity and diversity of [national] rules” could act as a deterrent in the 
capacity of the EU to attract third-country workers and business.100 This would be the logic similar to 
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EU action in the field of external relations101 as happened already prior to the introduction of Title IV 
EC in the context of worker provisions in mixed external agreements, when TCNs were regulated in 
EC law without any need for them to move between Member States.102 The need to ensure that the 
Community acts as a single entity on the international arena is a strong supranational element that calls 
for a joint action even in situations purely internal to one Member State. This is perhaps the strongest 
argument in favor of Union action, provided that this action does introduce uniform admission 
procedures without too many optional clauses. Some national parliaments mention this argument in 
their subsidiarity review of the proposal on intra-corporate transferees without, however, going into its 
detailed assessment.103 Others highlight the problem of attracting skilled workers as a major issue yet 
doubt whether EU immigration law offers added value in this regard.104 Either way, this objective does 
not seem to receive the prominence it deserves. 
Discussion: Federalism through Subsidiarity? 
This analysis is illustrative of the difficulty with the subsidiarity review experienced by the European 
institutions in the absence of problem-defining policy objectives. Not only did the institutions fail to 
examine subsidiarity in a coherent manner, but they exhibited an overall lack of understanding of what 
should be examined. This could be partially due to the widespread perception of subsidiarity as a 
counter-majoritarian instrument at the disposal of the Member States who are outvoted in the 
Council105 – and hence the reluctance of the institutions to venture into the concept, especially in the 
presence of common accord to pass a certain directive. However, this vision ignores the essence of 
subsidiarity as a principle protecting the proximity of the legislator to the citizen, democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of the legislative process,106 as well as the potential of this principle to 
contribute to policy development. 
The passage to qualified majority voting for all CIP measures made in the Lisbon Treaty cannot be 
expected to perform a miraculous cure to the CIP’s lack of purpose. If anything, the European 
Parliament may be less likely to question subsidiarity of the CIP measures now that it can influence 
their content. From this perspective, national parliaments could turn out more suited to conduct 
substantive subsidiarity review and thus make a crucial contribution to the development of EU law and 
strengthening its legitimacy. Well-reasoned opinions on subsidiarity could help the European 
institutions develop a coherent policy with a clear European added value. The EU institutions need to 
take this review seriously and properly address the concerns expressed by national parliaments by 
clarifying the Union’s objectives and making subsidiarity arguments more convincing.107 However, 
complexity and inconsistency of the arguments proposed by the Commission in favor of Union action 
under the CIP, the very short period established by the Protocol for issuing reasoned opinions,108 the 
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absence of an obligation to amend proposals after negative opinions of the national parliaments,109 and 
the varying degree of trust of national parliaments in their own democratic systems,110 may undermine 
the capacity and willingness of national parliaments to examine subsidiarity in substance.  
Without adequate investment into the resources necessary to develop coherent and policy objectives, 
subsidiarity review along the classical EC law criteria is difficult to pursue; instead, the decision to act 
at Union as opposed to national level may fall victim to political passions in the Council and the 
Parliaments. Leaving policy objectives and subsidiarity unresolved may change the manner of 
establishing the federal equilibrium in the EU in unpredictable ways; it could also create increasing 
difficulties for the ECJ each time the Court must assess the “Community element” of a case in order to 
decide whether to rule on the case or not. With multiple players, meager resources and incoherent 
policy goals, the subsidiarity orchestra may need more than a change in review arrangements. 
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Abstract 
The ECJ case law based on the free movement provisions and relating to fields such as direct taxation, 
social security and personal status differs from traditional internal market cases. The common point of 
such decisions resides in the peculiarity of the disputes addressed to the Court. Indeed, they 
systematically involve Member States’ powers that are either not transferred to the European Union or 
for which the European constitutional arrangements do not allow the European Union to fully exercise 
its concurrent powers. Retained powers of states are, as such, subjected to an original and a specific 
legal framework. This paper shows that the ECJ approach is somehow schizophrenic since, contrary to 
the American Supreme Court, it has not done a clear choice between a dual or a cooperative 
interpretation of European federalism. 
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Introduction 
A few years ago, R. SCHÜTZE published a book entitled From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The 
Changing Structure of European Law111 in which he contends that European federalism is nowadays 
moving on from dual to cooperative federalism. In his view, Europe’s exclusive powers, as well as 
those of the Member States, are gradually declining while a form of European cooperative federalism 
is emerging and even constitutionalized112. He supports his claim by taking many concrete 
examples113. And yet, he does not refer to the European Court of Justice case law involving retained 
powers of Member States, such as direct taxation, social security and personal status. This case law 
comprises a certain range of decisions that are based on the free movement provisions and that differ 
from traditional internal market cases. The common point of such decisions resides in the peculiarity 
of the disputes addressed to the Court. Indeed, they systematically involve Member States’ powers that 
are either not transferred to the European Union114 or for which the European constitutional 
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arrangements do not allow the European Union to fully exercise its concurrent powers115. Retained 
powers of states are, as such, subjected to an original and a specific legal framework. The aim of the 
present paper is therefore to give particular focus to this issue and to assess whether the Court’s 
approach is closer to a dual or a cooperative interpretation of federalism by comparing it with the 
American Supreme Court case law. 
The comparison of the European Court of Justice and the American Supreme Court respective case 
laws will be based on the assumption that, as J. H. H. WEILER puts it, “a set of constitutional norms 
regulating the relationship between the Union and its Member States, or the Member States and their 
Union, has emerged which is very much like similar sets of norms in most federal states. There is an 
allocation of powers, which as has been the experience in most federal states has often not been 
respected; there is the principle of the law of the land, in the EU called Direct Effect; and there is the 
grand principle of supremacy every bit as egregious as that which is found in the American federal 
constitution itself”116. Regarding he specific issue relating to the allocation of powers, it is noteworthy 
that the American and European constitutions share significant structural similarities. Among them, 
both the American Congress and the European Union are subjected to the enumerated power 
principle117, according to which all powers not granted to the central governments remain within the 
states118. In addition, since in each case the judiciary asserted itself as the exclusive interpreter of the 
constitution, the Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice soon became the exclusive arbiters 
of constitutional disputes involving the division of powers. 
In particular, they have been faced with disputes involving the collusion between central government 
powers and retained powers of states. The latter are powers that can be abstractly defined as powers 
falling exclusively within the states and exercised, as a matter of principle, discretionarily. They are 
exclusive in the sense that the states are, de jure or de facto, the sole entities entitled to exercise them. 
As for their discretionary character, it stems from the fact that there is no, or very little, European 
legislation regulating specifically their exercise. Retained powers of states are subjected, in both the 
European and American legal order, to specific legal statuses and frameworks. On the one hand, when 
the European Court of Justice has to rule on cases that involve retained powers of Member States, it 
follows an original approach, which differ from traditional internal market cases in several respects. 
First, it almost systematically uses formulae in which it acknowledges that certain subject matters fall 
exclusively within the Member States – social security, taxation, personal status, etc. – while claiming 
at the same time that they must nonetheless comply with European law when exercising such powers. 
Second, it bases the applicability of European law to these fields on the effects produced by state 
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regulations119. Last but not least, at the justification stage, the Court admits singular justifications, 
some of which aim to protect economic interests120 while others tend to protect purely national 
interests121. As a result, this approach allows the Court to substantially broaden the scope of EU law 
applicability. In addition, it invites Member States to develop an original line of argument to defend 
their regulations, especially at the justification stage. The situation is, on the other hand, slightly 
different in the American legal order. Until the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
made a dual interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause122: it sought to clearly distinguish state 
and federal powers, on the ground that they were mutually exclusive. Since then, it has followed a 
different approach and has interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause according to a cooperative 
vision of federalism. The regulation of interstate commerce no longer falls within the exclusive 
powers of Congress, which means that states may, under certain conditions, operate concurrently with 
Congress. As a result, the Supreme Court’s scrutiny now primarily focuses on the question of “How 
are reserved powers of states exercised?” at the expense of the division of power issue. 
Since American federalism moved from the dual to the cooperative model, the analysis of the 
American Supreme Court regarding the dormant Commerce Clause will help to better understand the 
current approach of the European Court of Justice. Above all, it will allow to identify the nature of 
European federalism and to assess whether R. SCHÜTZE’s claim that it is moving towards the 
cooperative model is empirically verified or, on the contrary, refuted as far as Member States’ retained 
powers are concerned. Thus, the present paper aims to demonstrate, through a comparative analysis of 
the European and American federal experiences, that the American Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Justice have both set out limits on the theoretical free exercise of states’ retained powers. 
With regard to the European Court of Justice approach, it appears that since the Court recognizes the 
existence of separate spheres of powers, its approach may be formally compared with that of the 
Supreme Court during American dual federalism. However, a deeper scrutiny of its case law also 
shows that because it limits the exercise of Member States’ retained powers, its approach may also be 
compared with American cooperative federalism. 
Defining Terms: Dual Federalism v. Cooperative Federalism 
Before comparing the American and European legal orders, it is necessary to briefly define the dual 
and cooperative models of federalism. Regarding the first concept, it has been defined in the American 
context as “a concept of separate state and federal governments operating in distinct spheres with little 
significant overlap or significant ‘sharing’ of authority”123, where “each of the two sovereignties has 
its own exclusive area of authority and jurisdiction, with few powers held concurrently”124. E. S. 
CORWIN has famously described its four axioms as follows: 
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only. 2. Also, the purposes which it may 
constitutionally promote are few. 3. Within their respective spheres the two centers of government 
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are ‘sovereign’ and hence ‘equal’. 4. The relation of the two centers with each other is one of 
tension rather than collaboration.125 
Thus, the main feature of dual federalism resides in the idea that it is possible to identify two separate 
spheres of powers: one that belongs exclusively to the States and another that belongs exclusively to 
the general government. In each of these spheres, the centers of government may exercise their powers 
in their own way, without taking into account the interests of the other center. 
Cooperative federalism is generally contrasted with dual federalism. Unlike the latter, the cooperative 
model does not assume that the spheres of federate and federal powers are mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary, under this model, the powers of states and of the central government are viewed as being 
deeply intertwined: “the National government and the States are mutually complementary parts of a 
single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended to realize the current purposes of 
government according to their applicability to the problem in hand”126. Accordingly, the cooperative 
model constitutes an alternative to the “rigid ‘parallel function’ theory of dual federalism”127. In this 
regard, M. H. REDISH has suggested labeling it as ‘interactive federalism’: 
“a term more neutral than ‘cooperative’ and one that recognizes the inevitable intertwining of the 
state and federal systems as they both go about the business of governing. At times, this interaction 
will be combative in nature, where the governing decisions of one sovereign differ from the 
other’s and threaten the social and economic policies sought to be advanced by the other’s 
decisions. Yet, at other times the actions of the respective sovereigns will be supplementary or 
complementary to each other, combining to meet the same problem in different but not conflicting 
ways. At still other times the problems facing government will call for some form of cooperative 
action – either through direct joint action, or more indirectly, through the exchange of information, 
ideas and experience. There is no reason to believe that combative and cooperative federalism are 
mutually exclusive; both are manifestations of the dynamic interaction of the state and federal 
systems.”128 
Thus, dual and cooperative federalism models substantially differ from one another. The former is 
based on the assumption that the federal balance can only be preserved if powers are strictly and 
rigidly divided. Conversely, the latter is based on the idea that powers are intertwined and, therefore, 
that each level of government may regulate the same subject matters. Accordingly, the fundamental 
issue is no longer ‘Who has the power to exercise their powers?’ but ‘How are powers to be 
exercised?’ 
The Formal Recognition of Separate Spheres of Powers 
The present part of the paper focuses on the ‘dual dimension’ of the European Court of Justice case 
law in which retained powers of Member States are involved. To this end, it will be assessed to what 
extent the European Court of Justice approach can be compared with the US Supreme Court cases that 
were decided when American federalism was describes as ‘dual’. The first section begins by 
demonstrating how the European and American Courts have recognized the existence of separate 
spheres of powers within their respective legal orders. The second focuses more particularly on the 
criteria on which they have based the distinction between state and central powers. 
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The Recognition 
This section will first describe the American Supreme Court approach from 1787 through the first half 
of the twentieth century, the period where American federalism was interpreted according to a dual 
vision of federalism. It will then be compared with the current European Court of Justice case law. 
The Supreme Court Approach 
The American Supreme Court was called upon, from its earliest decisions, to settle disputes between 
the national and states governments regarding the division and the exercise of powers. This gave the 
opportunity to the Court to define the main features according to which American federalism was to be 
implemented. Opinions differ as to the basis on which the Court developed its first judicial theories 
regarding federalism. Some authors contend the Court genuinely respected the intentions of the 
Framers129. Others are of the view that “it does not appear that the Constitution on its face dictates the 
dual federalism model”130. The fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court initially opted for a dual 
interpretation of American federalism. Indeed, in McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall stated for the first 
time131 that,  
“[i]n America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Government of the Union and 
those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither 
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.”132 
This quotation clearly shows that, in Marshall’s mind, divided sovereignty implies dual federalism. 
Powers are strictly divided and belong to two mutually exclusive spheres. It also suggests that each 
center of government exercises its powers freely and independently from the other center. 
Accordingly, the idea of ‘peaceful’ or ‘fruitful’ interaction between the two spheres is excluded; this 
corresponds to Corwin’s fourth axiom that described the relation between such spheres as ‘one of 
tension’. Chief Justice Marshall reiterated his position in Gibbons v. Ogden, the first case involving 
the power to regulate interstate commerce133. He defined it as an exclusive congressional power: “[i]t 
is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This 
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, 
and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. (…) If, as has always 
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to 
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested 
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government”134. Once again, he made a dual 
interpretation of American federalism, by excluding any idea of concurrent power to regulate interstate 
commerce that could be shared between the national government and the states. He clearly 
distinguished it from “[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, 
and to govern its own citizens”135. The notion of ‘police powers’ gradually became a “linguistic means 
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of drawing the line between state and federal activities”136. In Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh 
Company137, for instance, Marshall decided that health, safety and the protection of public order were 
part of the ‘reserved powers’ of states, which meant that they were fully sovereign while exercising 
them – provided that this exercise did not interfere with congressional powers138. Thus, this first series 
of rulings marked the initial steps towards the enshrinement of dual federalism. As Lenaerts has put it, 
“[t]he State was regarded as being sovereign, with full powers within its sphere, i.e., possessing to 
their full extent all the powers not transferred to the Union by explicit grant or by necessary 
implication”139. Consequently, such line of reasoning compelled the Court to identify, on a case-by-
case basis, which matters fell within the national government or, alternatively, within the states. This 
approach endorsed by the Supreme Court prevailed until the 1930s. 
The European Court of Justice approach 
Similarly, the European Court of Justice was called upon, from the early days of the European Union, 
to decide cases relating to the issue of the division of powers between the European Union and its 
Member States. As far as the retained powers of Member States are concerned, the European judge has 
always rejected the absolute dual vision of federalism Marshall sustained in McCulloch v. Maryland or 
Gibbons v. Ogden. Even if the European Court has never formally denied the existence of separate 
spheres of powers in which the European Union and the Member States respectively operate, it has 
repeatedly taken the view that interferences and mutual influences between such spheres are 
conceivable. For instance, in the De Gezamenlijke Steenkolnmijnen in Limburg case, decided in 1961, 
the Court stated that certain Treaty provisions could “enable the jurisdiction of the Community to 
impinge on national sovereignty in cases where, because of the power retained by the Member States, 
this is necessary to prevent the effectiveness of the Treaty from being considerably weakened and its 
purpose from being seriously compromised”. The reference to ‘the jurisdiction of the Community’ and 
to ‘national sovereignty’ indicates that the Court recognizes the existence of two separate spheres. 
However, as P. PESCATORE has noted, “here the Court shows that the sovereignty of the Member 
States is affected beyond the scope of the exclusive powers that have been transferred to the 
Community”140. In another case, which also concerned a conflict between retained powers of Member 
States – the monetary policy (this case was decided in 1969) – and the powers of the Union, the Court 
expressly claimed that “the exercise of reserved powers cannot therefore permit the unilateral adoption 
of measures prohibited by the Treaty.”141 
Consistent with this initial approach, the European Court of Justice continues to recognize that 
Member States may operate within a distinct sphere of powers. This is supported by the fact that, 
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nowadays, as soon as a dispute involves retained powers of states, the Court systematically uses 
formulae, in which it acknowledges that specific powers fall within the scope of retained powers of 
Member States. The two examples drawn from the social security and taxation powers are good 
illustrations of the Court’s approach. As regards the former, the Court systematically states that: 
“Whilst it is not in dispute that Community law does not detract from the power of the Member 
States to organise their social security systems, and that, in the absence of harmonisation at 
Community level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions in 
which social security benefits are granted, when exercising that power Member States must 
comply with Community law, in particular the provisions on the freedom to provide services”142. 
As regards the latter, the Court systematically recalls that: 
“although direct taxation falls within their competence, Member States must nonetheless exercise 
that competence consistently with Community law.”143 
These formulae show that the idea of separate spheres of powers is not absent from the Court’s 
reasoning when it deals with retained powers of Member States: In the eyes of the Court, there exist, at 
least formally, distinct spheres of powers for which the States can solely exercise powers to the 
exclusion of the European Union. These formulae are not just rhetorical; they also find concrete 
resonance in the Court’s decisions. It is true that the Court recognizes that European law may 
sometimes limit the free exercise of retained powers (‘Member States must nonetheless exercise that 
competence consistently with Community law’). However, its approach does not challenge their 
existence. Indeed, the Court is indifferent to the question of ‘who exercised a power?’: it has never 
denied Member States their ability to exercise their retained powers. Instead, it focuses exclusively on 
‘how Member States’ exercise their retained powers?’. This means that the Court rejects implicitly a 
possible European action: when Member States do not comply with European Union law, it is not 
because they have occupied the European field, but rather because their have not properly exercised 
their powers. This idea is confirmed by the fact that the Court often imposes adjustment requirements 
on Member States144. Accordingly, in the same way the American Supreme Court used to recognize 
that some matters were to fall within the states’ spheres of powers by considering them as being 
almost states’ powers ‘per se’, the European Court of Justice acknowledges, nowadays, that a certain 
range of Member States’ powers belong to them exclusively. 
The Criteria for Distinction 
The enforcement of dual federalism requires that the Courts, as ‘umpires of the federal system’145, set 
out judicial criteria for distinguishing the different spheres of powers. This is all the more important 
that such spheres are subjected to distinct legal frameworks. For instance, states’ police powers under 
the American dual model of federalism implied that states could exercise them discretionarily and that 
the central government was precluded from intruding into such spheres – and vice versa. As for the 
European legal order, when the European Court of Justice recognizes that certain subject matters fall 
within the sphere of retained powers, this means that Member States, as a result, must develop a 
specific line of arguments to justify their measures. 
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The autonomous definition of retained powers of states 
Both American states and European Member States have tried to preserve their own sphere of powers 
in order to prevent too many encroachments from the central government by claiming that certain 
subject matters fall per se within their retained powers and that they should be entitled to an absolute 
freedom while exercising such powers146. In reply to this line of arguments, the Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Justice have both rejected the idea that the states could themselves decide which 
subject matters were to fall within their retained powers. Even under the Taney Court in the United 
States, which placed a major emphasis on the notion of police powers, it was solely for the Court to 
qualify a police power. Indeed, although it stated that “all those powers which relate to merely 
municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus 
surrendered nor restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is 
complete, unqualified and exclusive”, E.S. CORWIN has noted that “it did not signify that the States, 
acting through either their legislatures or their courts, were the final judge of the scope of these 
‘sovereign’ powers. This was the function of the Supreme Court of the United States, which for this 
purpose was regarded by the Constitution as standing outside and over both the National Government 
and the States, and vested with authority to apportion impartially to each center its proper powers in 
accordance with the Constitution’s intention”147. Similarly, the European Court of Justice also defines 
autonomously the content of the retained powers of Member States. Even though it has never 
comprehensively defined this concept, it has identified, on a case-by-case basis, via its formulae, 
which subject matters fall within the states’ sphere of powers. The Courts’ autonomous assessment of 
the scope of states’ retained powers has a significant impact on the enforcement of federalism. Indeed, 
if they were to allow the states themselves to decide over which subject matters they have exclusive 
jurisdiction, this would seriously undermine the uniformity of federal law. As a result, each of them 
could independently define the content of its retained powers and consequently encroach on the central 
government powers. 
The Supreme Court approach 
The American Supreme Court developed significant doctrines during the 19th century, and until the 
beginning of the 20th century, in the attempt of drawing a line between national and states spheres of 
powers. First, the Taney Court referred to the concept of ‘police powers’ of states to identify the 
matters for which the states had exclusive jurisdiction. Like the Marshall Court, it initially turned to a 
‘commerce/police’ test148 by looking at the purpose149 of a state regulation to decide whether it aimed 
to regulate commerce or, conversely, to regulate the state police. Never did the Taney Court elaborate 
a comprehensive definition of the notion of police powers. Rather, it defined it as follows: “it is not 
only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety, happiness and 
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation”150, 
admitting that police powers were “nothing more or less than that power of government inherent in 
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every sovereignty to the extent of its dominion, the power to govern men and things”151. The first 
years of the Taney Court were characterized by “little clarity or agreement”152 among the Justices. 
Some of them saw the regulation of interstate commerce as an exclusive power of Congress; thereby 
only state regulations of ‘police’ – unlike the regulations of ‘commerce’ – were constitutional. Taney 
followed a more balanced approach, according to which states could regulate commerce if their 
measures were not in conflict with the Constitution or a law of Congress153. The Court eventually tried 
to reach a compromise between the exclusive and concurrent doctrines in Cooley v. The Board of 
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia154. A different subject-matter test155 emerged, based on the 
distinction between national and local subjects: “Now the power to regulate commerce embraces a 
vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; 
some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United 
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that 
diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation”156. The Cooley rule has sometimes 
been described as ‘selective exclusiveness’: It allowed states to regulate commerce, but only to the 
extent that they would regulate local aspects of interstate commerce and as long as Congress had not 
exercised its power. Accordingly, Cooley recognized that commerce power was in some way 
concurrent. However, this does not mean that the Court gave up its dual approach. E. A. YOUNG has 
pointed out that, “[t]his inquiry (…) still contemplates a world of subject-matter enclaves. Some 
subjects are exclusively ‘national’; others are ‘local in nature’ and therefore left to the states”157. The 
pursuit of the identification of a borderline between the national and states spheres of powers led the 
Court to develop a final test, this time based on the direct or indirect effects of the state regulations158. 
Even though states regulations were upheld if their effects on commerce happened to be merely 
indirect, such way of reasoning is also based on a dual interpretation of American federalism. 
Referring to the direct-indirect distinction, Young contends that “[t]he Court’s distinction sought to 
maintain exclusive spheres for state and national authority by insisting on the viability of boundaries 
despite the interdependence of different markets and activities”159. This is confirmed by the fact that, 
when interpreting the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court continued to refer to the concept of police 
powers160. In Southern Railway Co. v. King, for instance, the Court recounted that “[i]t has been 
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frequently decided in this Court that the right to regulate interstate commerce is, by virtue of the 
federal Constitution, exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States. The states cannot pass 
any law directly regulating such commerce. Attempts to do so have been declared unconstitutional in 
many instances, and the exclusive power in Congress to regulate such commerce uniformly 
maintained. While this is true, the rights of the states to pass laws not having the effect to regulate or 
directly interfere with the operations of interstate commerce, passed in the exercise of the police power 
of the state, in the interest of the public health and safety, have been maintained by the decisions of 
this Court”161. 
It follows from these developments that, throughout the 19th century and until the beginning of the 20th 
century, the Supreme Court sought to elaborate judicial tests that would allow for a clear distinction 
between state and national powers. If it is true the Court gradually endorsed more flexible tests than 
the first commerce/police distinction, the Court ultimately aimed to isolate exclusive spheres for the 
benefit of states or, alternatively, of Congress. The Supreme Court upheld any state regulation if it fell 
within the internal police power of the state, was purely local or had no direct effect on interstate 
commerce. 
The European Court of Justice approach 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice has never attempted to give a comprehensive 
definition of the notion powers retained by Member States. Neither has it developed a specific test to 
identify the matters that fall exclusively within such powers. In other words, the Court simply states 
that a certain range of powers fall within the retained powers of Member States, without substantiating 
its position by demonstrating why such powers are subjected to a specific status. 
At first glance, it could be argued that, in accordance with the enumerated power principle, any power 
that has not been conferred to the European Union remains within the Member States. This is the case, 
for instance, of the rules governing a person’s surname162. However, the criterion derived from such 
principle is inadequate to explain the whole approach of the Court. To quote the examples mentioned 
above, it appears indeed that the Treaty empowers the Union to operate, to a certain extent, in the 
fields of social security163 and taxation164. Regarding the latter example, the Union has already used its 
powers and has adopted several directives in the field of direct taxation165. Why, then, does the Court 
subject such powers to a specific and distinctive legal framework instead of considering them as 
shared powers between the Union and the Member States? At least two hypotheses may be put 
forward. First, the Court’s decision to develop a distinctive approach when subject matters such as 
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social security or direct taxation are at stake may be explained by the fact that, as the Court recognizes 
itself, there is very little harmonization at the European level in these fields. Furthermore, it is often 
hard to implement the Union’s action: Suffice to think of the many years of negotiations that were 
necessary to adopt the Directive on Patients' Rights in Cross-border Healthcare166 or of the unanimity 
rule regarding direct taxation. This context requires that the Court be cautious: deregulating these 
fields could seriously undermine Member States’ autonomy. The second hypothesis that can be 
formulated is linked to the former and the notion of ‘essential State functions’ as mentioned in the 
Treaty on the European Union167. For L. AZOULAI, “‘retained powers’ are collective goods that the 
state administers to ensure social cohesion on its territory. This justifies that, in all of these areas, the 
state is empowered to act unilaterally, to the exclusion of the bodies of the European Union”168. To 
conclude, it may be argued that the European Court of Justice has not developed a comprehensive 
approach regarding the distinction between retained powers of States and the other spheres of powers. 
Accordingly, the notion of retained powers remains unclear since the definition of its contend and 
scope mostly depends on the Court’s discretion to subject certain domains to a specific legal 
framework and not to the traditional approach that it has developed in other fields of the internal 
market. 
The previous developments have attempted to show that the current European Court of Justice 
approach comprises, to a certain extent, a dual dimension as regards federalism. Indeed, the Court 
seems to take into account, at the starting point of its reasoning, the existence of separate sphere of 
powers, one of which being composed of the retained powers of Member States and being, as such, 
subjected to an original legal framework. Accordingly, it shares a certain range of similarities with the 
approach developed by the Supreme Court during the first era of American federalism. The main 
divergence between the two approaches lies in the fact that the European Court of Justice, unlike the 
Supreme Court, has never defined the notion of retained powers of Member States. Neither has it 
developed a specific test to distinguish these powers. However, not only does the European Court 
approach comprise a dual dimension. The Court shows at the same time a strong tendency to make a 
cooperative interpretation of European federalism, according to which the exercise of Member States’ 
retained powers must comply with European law requirements. 
The Recognition of EU Law Intrusions into Member States’ Retained Powers 
The evolution of American federalism experienced a tipping point during the first half of the twentieth 
century, when the Supreme Court reversed its previous dual interpretation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause by replacing its formal approach with a balancing-test approach. This is one of the factors that 
gave rise to the enshrinement of American cooperative federalism. The European Court of Justice also 
shows a trend towards an interpretation of European federalism from a cooperative perspective, in 
particular when it states that Member States must comply with European law even when they exercise 
their retained powers – such approach being reflected throughout the Court’s cases. To sum up, both 
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the American Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice nowadays follow a similar path, 
characteristic of cooperative federalism.The present developments aim to shed light onto the fact that 
the European Court of Justice approach, when it deals with retained powers of Member States, is far 
from being purely dual regarding federalism. To this end, it will be once again compared with that of 
the American Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court Approach 
The Supreme Court highly formal approach that derived from the Cooley rule started to be more and 
more criticized as from the 1920s. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stone considered that “the 
traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is 
direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from 
actualities, to be of value”. Referring to the Cooley distinction between direct and indirect 
interferences, he added that “it is clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be 
sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all 
the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the 
business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the 
regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining 
the freedom of commerce across state lines.”169 Stone thereby proposed to introduce a new approach, 
based on the balancing of state and national interests, that would replace what R. A. SEDLER has called 
the ‘allocation of powers’ approach170. The Supreme Court eventually abandoned the Cooley doctrine. 
Its modern decisions “have generally abandoned any attempt to apply categorical distinctions between 
exercises of ‘police’ and ‘commerce powers, between ‘local’ and ‘national’ subject matters, or 
between ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ effects.”171 In other words, the Court has departed from its dual vision 
of federalism and gradually turned to a cooperative interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Today, it may strike down state regulations on three grounds: 1) they overtly discriminate against 
interstate commerce; 2) they are facially neutral, but they have in fact protectionist effects; 3) they 
unduly burden interstate commerce despite the fact that they are facially neutral172. Under the latter 
test, the Supreme Court follows a balancing of interests approach, as defined in Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Arizona173: “matters for ultimate determination are the nature and extent of the burden which the 
state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and 
whether the relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make 
inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of commerce and its freedom from local 
restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce 
clause from state interference.”174 
It follows from these considerations that, nowadays, the Supreme Court accepts that states can regulate 
interstate commerce when Congress has not legislated if they do not discriminate, do not have 
protectionist effects and do not unduly burden commerce. As E. A. YOUNG noted, “[t]he abandonment 
of dual federalism has been most obvious – and probably least controversial – in the context of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. (…) we see a general prohibition on state regulation that discriminates 
against out-of-state business, regardless of subject matter. This sort of anti-discrimination principle is 
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a doctrine of concurrent power”175. Regarding the balancing of interests approach176, for instance, the 
Supreme Court has summarized it as follows: “[where] the statute regulated even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, 
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. [If] a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the 
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.”177 As a result, the Court now “requires state governments to regulate in an even-handed 
way, without limiting the subject matter upon which their regulation can operate”178: accordingly, the 
Court no longer prevents the states from regulating interstate commerce179. Instead, it places 
limitations upon the exercise of their powers: if they do not comply with the anti-discrimination rule, 
the Court will strike down their measures. But, if they adapt their regulations to the dormant 
Commerce clause requirements, they will be empowered to regulate interstate commerce. Conversely, 
the move from dual to cooperative federalism also had the effect of recognizing that Congress can 
legitimately intrude into chat was considered until then the reserved powers of states. As a result, the 
Supreme Court no longer seeks to draw the line between separate spheres powers in the way it used to 
under the dual model of federalism. Both the states and Congress have jurisdiction over certain same 
subject matters and can consequently exercise their powers concurrently. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court cooperative interpretation of federalism concerns just as well the division of powers as the 
exercise of powers. 
The European Court of Justice Approach 
The second part of the present paper has shown that the European Court of Justice formally 
distinguishes the sphere of powers of Member States from that of the European Union. However it 
also claims that Member States must nonetheless comply with European law requirements when they 
exercise their retained powers. Accordingly, the recognition of an exclusive sphere for the benefit of 
Member States does not imply that they can enjoy an absolute freedom when exercising their retained 
powers. First, states’ measures adopted in the exercise of retained powers are subjected to the same 
tests as measures adopted in the exercise of shared powers. Therefore, the European Court of Justice 
strikes down any Member State regulation that discriminates – be it overt or facially neutral. 
Furthermore, when faced with non-discriminating measures that have restrictive effects on the free 
movement principle, it also develops a balancing test approach. This test comprises three steps: first, 
the Court assesses whether state regulation amounts to a restriction to one of the four fundamental 
freedoms; if so, it secondly allows Member States to justify their measures by showing that they 
pursue legitimate aims; finally, if the Court accepts such grounds, it verifies that the measure is 
necessary and proportional. Thus, the European Court has developed similar tests to the contemporary 
tests of the Supreme Court. Second, when the Court concludes that a national regulation amounts to a 
restriction, it requires that Member States adapt their legislation in accordance with European law. The 
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example derived from cases concerning social security is in this respect significant. Regarding 
transborder healthcare, the Court places obligations of adjustment upon the states that are very 
burdensome. Referring to the condition to obtain prior administrative authorizations before being 
entitled to benefit from transborder healthcare that many Member States used to impose on their 
residents, the Court stated for instance that “in order for a prior administrative authorization scheme to 
be justified even though it derogates from such a fundamental freedom, it must, in any event, be based 
on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to 
circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily (…). 
Such a prior administrative authorization scheme must likewise be based on a procedural system 
which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorization will be dealt with 
objectively and impartially within a reasonable time and refusals to grant authorization must also be 
capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings."180 Consequently, the Court 
subjects Member States to substantial requirements – they must ensure that prior authorizations are 
based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria – as well as procedural requirements – they must 
set up a system of judicial review. As to the type of cooperative federalism that the European Court of 
Justice endorses, it may be argued that its approach tends to correspond to what Redish calls 
‘combative federalism’, “where the governing decisions of one sovereign differ from the other’s and 
threaten the social and economic policies sought to be advanced by the other’s decisions”181. Indeed, 
here, Member States welfare policies, such as healthcare systems, based on the territoriality principle, 
restrict the European competing interest derived from the free movement principle. In setting limits on 
the theoretical free exercise of Member States’ retained powers, the Court of Justice ensures that the 
European interests are not imperiled. 
Accordingly, the recognition of distinct spheres of powers does not mean, in the eyes of the European 
Court, that they are mutually exclusive. First, the Court acknowledges that they may come into 
conflict. Second, to settle such jurisdictional disputes, the Court does not seek to assess which of the 
European Union or the Member States is competent to regulate a subject matter – it constantly rules 
that Member States have exclusive jurisdiction. Instead, it attempts to reconcile competing state and 
European interests by focusing on how Member States exercise their retained powers. And it is 
precisely at the stage of the exercise of powers that the Court recognizes that European interests may 
intrude into Member States’ powers. This amounts to make a cooperative interpretation of European 
federalism. Indeed, not only does the Court attempt to distinguish between national and European 
spheres of powers. It also seeks to coordinate such spheres by enshrining European law intrusions into 
Member States’ retained powers. The result of this judicial trend is similar to that of the contemporary 
Supreme Court case law: retained powers of European and American states are more and more 
intertwined with those of the central government. However, the European and American approaches 
differ in at least one fundamental respect. Although the Supreme Court admits that the cooperative 
between the central and state governments concerns both the division and the exercise of powers, the 
European Court of Justice has, so far, only balanced competing national and European interests at the 
stage of the exercise of powers. In this sense, its approach can probably be best described as ‘a middle 
ground approach’. 
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Conclusion: The Middle Ground Character of the European Court of Justice Approach 
As a way of conclusion, it should be underlined that, as far as retained powers of Member States are 
concerned, the European Court of Justice approach stands halfway between the dual and cooperative 
models of federalism. It may therefore be described as ‘a middle ground approach’. It is true that its 
scrutiny over Member States’ measures consists primarily in setting limits on the exercise of retained 
powers, which is consistent with the cooperative model of federalism. And yet, it also shares a range 
of similarities with the dual model of federalism. Indeed, one of the main differences that distinguish 
the European and American Courts’ respective approaches lies in the fact that since the Supreme 
Court moved towards the cooperative model of federalism, it has recognized that the states may also 
regulate interstate. It has this acknowledged that the power to regulate interstate commerce is a 
concurrent power. However, at no stage does the European Court of Justice sustain that the Member 
States and the European Union share powers regarding the subject matters recognized as falling within 
national spheres of powers. In its eyes, retained powers of Member States remain distinct from the 
internal market. The example derived from Watts is in this respect significant: 
“Although Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organize their 
social security systems and decide the level of resources to be allocated to their operation, the 
achievement of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty nevertheless inevitably 
requires Member States to make adjustments to those systems. It does not follow that this 
undermines their sovereign powers in the field.”182 
This quotation synthesizes the twofold approach of the Court towards federalism. On the one hand, 
Member States have ‘sovereign powers’ in the sense that they have the sole jurisdiction to exercise the 
power to organize social security systems. On the other hand, they must cooperate while exercising 
their powers in order to take into account European interests, i.e. the rights derived from the free 
movement principle. What are, then, the implications of such an approach for European federalism? It 
seems that the Court’s approach, taken as a whole, seeks to achieve the right federal balance by 
protecting the authority of the European Union as well as that of the Member States. Indeed, the 
formal recognition of separate spheres of powers, even if somehow artificial, probably aims to 
counterbalance the quite intrusive judicial balancing test. However, in my view, the Court’s attempt to 
distinguish spheres of retained powers has several problematic aspects. The fact that it does not define 
the notion of retained powers and that it does not identify them through a comprehensive test leads to a 
lack of consistency: How can it be explained that a certain range of powers is subjected to a specific 
legal framework? The Court of Justice indeed uses a high degree of judicial discretion when it decides 
on a case-by-case basis which subject matters fall within Member States’ retained powers. The 
cooperative dimension of its approach causes some problems too. The examples of social security and 
taxation show how substantial the control of the Court is. When setting limits on Member States’ 
regulations, it almost turns into a legislator by giving detailed and meticulous instructions to Member 
States. To conclude, it may be sustained that the European case law involving retained powers of 
Member States constitutes an original way of ever more integrating national systems, in more and 
more various fields, and in accordance with European interests. Consistent with its previous approach, 
the European Court of Justice has been showing its ability to constantly complete the European 
integration with new means – and old tools – in order to now extend the scope of European law to 
sovereign matters such as direct taxation, social security and personal status. 
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RETAINED DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE INTEGRATED THIRD PILLAR:  
SAFEGUARDING MEMBER STATES’ COMPETENCES IN THE EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL LAW SPHERE 
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Abstract 
The incorporation of former third pillar provisions into the realm of supranational EU law under the 
TFEU has not led to an entire abolishment of intergovernmental features within the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Instead, the Treaty of Lisbon has preserved some of its distinctive characteristics 
in Title V TFEU in favour of Member States’ competences. However, non-Title-V provisions may still 
encroach upon those provisions available under Title V TFEU and thus jeopardise the latter’s 
application. Thus, in order to safeguard Member States’ competences from such a scenario special 
protection mechanisms may have to be established which can preserve the distinct character of EU 
criminal law after Lisbon. 
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Introduction 
For more than one and a half decades, EU law was shaped by the artificial concept of a three-pillar 
structure, introduced in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht. During the time of its existence, the pillar 
structure was amended twice, once by the Treaty of Amsterdam183 and once by the Treaty of Nice184. 
Throughout its existence, the system was flawed with certain deficiencies concerning uncertainty and 
inconsistencies in legal basis litigation; competence overlaps between the pillars, i.e. between the 
Community and the Member States; as well as a certain lack of clarity surrounding the distinction 
between the concepts of the European Community and the European Union.185 At first glance, it seems 
as if these problems have now been solved since the pillar structure has finally met its fate by formally 
being abolished under the Treaty of Lisbon. However, having a closer look at it, such a conclusion 
would be rather overhasty. The merger of the pillars does not in itself solve this kind of issues. 
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In general, it has been observed that with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon the Union has 
gained further competences, without any retrocession of Union competences to the Member States.186 
In particular, this can be seen concerning the incorporation of the third pillar into the general 
framework of the former first pillar. At the same time, and in order to make the Union more 
democratic, qualified majority voting has been extended throughout the Treaties as well as an 
enhanced influence of the European Parliament. It will be argued that, regardless of the fact that the 
area of freedom, security and justice has been formally incorporated into the TFEU under the new 
Title V, the area of criminal law has not been fully integrated and thus remains distinct from the other 
parts of the TFEU. The aim of this paper is therefore to identify and examine the special character of 
Title V TFEU. This is particularly significant since the preservation of differences between the 
previous policy areas may result in further legal basis litigation problems as well as a certain risk of 
competence overlaps. Further, with no protection mechanisms in place, Union law could continue to 
expand its influence by encroaching upon the intergovernmental characteristics which have been 
preserved in Title V TFEU, thus violating the integrity of Member States and ultimately rendering 
such provisions nugatory. This paper thus seeks to identify possibilities of safeguarding Member 
States’ competences in the EU criminal law sphere as a result of a retained distinctiveness in the 
integrated third pillar after the introduction of the Reform Treaty. 
To this end, this paper will first examine the integrated third pillar after Lisbon as regards the degree 
to which the provisions hereunder have remained distinct from the majority of TFEU provisions. 
Under the former first pillar, the courts have developed general principles in order to determine the 
correct legal basis for a proposed measure, such as the ‘centre of gravitiy’ theory or the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali principle. These principles may now be applied to the entire TFEU including 
Title V which could generate insufficient results concerning the protection of the special character of 
the provisions in the criminal law area. Thus, it will be argued that certain protection mechanisms may 
have to be established by the courts in order to remedy this situation. The second part will discuss such 
mechanisms and will illustrate how Member States’ competences can be safeguarded under the new 
treaty framework. However, uncertainties as to the exact delimitation of competences will remain 
unless and until the Court of Justice takes an early opportunity to clarify the relationship between 
Title-V and non-Title-V provisions of the TFEU in the interest of legal certainty in this area. Finally, 
some concluding remarks will summarise the findings in this paper. 
The Integrated Third Pillar after Lisbon 
With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and after a transitional period of five years,187 the existing 
third pillar provisions of the European Union will be fully integrated into the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), i.e. the former first pillar. This entails certain 
implications on the actual relationship between the different sets of provisions which are now being 
dealt with under a single framework. On the face of it, it appears as if general legal basis principles 
established under the first pillar now apply for the integrated area of criminal law as well as a unified 
set of legal instruments and legislative procedures. However, this would be a rather oversimplified 
picture of the reality. Instead, it is argued here that Title V TFEU has to a certain extent received a 
rather special role within the Lisbon Treaty. 
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The purpose of this section is thus not to provide an analysis of all the changes which mark the 
transition from the former pillar system188 before Lisbon into the integrated system of a merged first 
and third pillar after Lisbon. Instead, specific issues shall be discussed which are evidence of the 
special status of third pillar provisions and their preservation of intergovernmental characteristics in 
the Reform Treaty. To this end, this section will first look at the nature of the competence in Title V as 
compared to other parts of the TFEU Treaty. Second, there will be an analysis of the legal instruments 
available. Third, the differences in the legislative procedures will be discussed. 
The Nature of the Competence 
While under the previous treaty framework third pillar competences have mainly been reserved for 
Member States, the integrated third pillar after Lisbon has lost its intergovernmental character. Despite 
the fact that there is still a certain degree of Union protection in order to ensure “an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers”,189 the Lisbon Treaty applies shared competences 
between the Union and the Member States not only in former first pillar matters but also extends them 
to the new Title V TFEU.190 This means that while the third pillar has previously been protected from 
supremacy, direct effect191 and pre-emption, this has changed under the Lisbon Treaty. Shared 
competences between the Union and the Member States imply that Union law under Title V TFEU is 
capable to interfere with national laws in this area and may even repress Member States’ competences 
under certain circumstances.192 
With the thus accumulated competences under the TFEU the Union is now able to exercise a broader 
range of powers specifically conferred on it. In addition, Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 EC) can be 
applied to serve as a residual provision if the provisions under the area of freedom, security and justice 
do not provide the necessary powers. Such a practice has previously been held to go beyond the scope 
of Article 308 EC since this provision was considered to be applicable to EC powers only which did 
not include third pillar competences.193 However, with the integration of the third pillar such a 
restriction as to the scope of Article 352 TFEU concerning the application to former third pillar 
matters has ceased to exist. It could thus be argued that this development represents a threat which 
could ultimately jeopardise Title V TFEU provisions. 
On the other hand, while the third pillar has previously suffered from the expanding application of the 
Community method and the protection thereof by the use of Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU,194 such 
practice may even be reversed in future cases. With the integration of the third pillar into the realm of 
the newly defined European Union, general legal basis principles apply, such as the lex specialis 
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derogat legi generali principle. If the Court of Justice thus considers a provision under Title V TFEU 
more specific than another competing but more general provision (e.g. Article 114 TFEU), the former 
could serve as a legal basis for a proposed measure rather than the latter. One could assume that this 
could potentially widen the scope of provisions under the former third pillar which could be applied 
more frequently after Lisbon. However, even if this is highly desirable, such an outcome is rather 
unlikely before the Court of Justice due to the rather limited application of the lex specialis derogat 
legi generali principle. 
However, despite the explicit statement in Article 4(2)(j) TFEU that the competence to regulate in the 
area of freedom, security and justice shall be shared between the Union and the Member States, some 
provisions under Title V TFEU indicate that there may be a derogation from this general rule. For 
example, this is the case in Article 82(2) TFEU which provides for ‘minimum rules’ to be established, 
explicitly entitling Member States to adopting or maintaining more stringent measures. Similarly, 
Article 83 TFEU also refers to ‘minimum rules’ and, although there is no explicit statement as to 
whether Member States are allowed to adopt stricter rules, such a meaning could well be implied. 
Under the old legislative framework this was a clear indicator for the existence of complementary 
competences. However, under the Lisbon Treaty ‘complementary’ competences are being confined to 
a ‘supporting’ nature195 and any minimum harmonisation rules thus have to be considered to 
characterise shared competences.196 This classification of competences under the new treaty 
framework has been criticised on the grounds that this leads to an increased number of so-called 
“competence cocktails”, i.e. different types of competences within one policy area,197 which may have 
rather dramatic consequences for legal basis litigation. 
Legal Instruments 
Under the old framework, third pillar legal instruments were different to those under the first pillar. 
While Article 249 EC provided that the first pillar set of instruments included regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations, and opinions; Article 34 (Amsterdam) TEU allowed for the adoption of 
common positions, framework decisions, decisions, and conventions under the third pillar. This 
differentiation between first and third pillar instruments has been abolished with the introduction of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The entire set of third pillar instruments has disappeared and has been replaced 
with the instruments already available under the first pillar before Lisbon. Any instruments adopted 
under the new Title V TFEU now have to be in accordance with Article 288 TFEU which is similar to 
the former Article 249 EC. The latter has been amended slightly as regards the binding effect of 
decisions: According to the new Article 288 TFEU decisions shall, as a general rule, be binding in its 
entirety unless such decisions are addressed to someone specific in which case they shall be binding 
only on them. As regards the nature of the instruments available, the Lisbon Treaty distinguishes 
between legislative acts (Article 289 TFEU), delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU), and implementing 
acts (Article 291 TFEU).198 
Legislative Procedures 
Under the old Treaty framework, provisions on third pillar matters allowed for specific legislative 
procedures, different to those under the first pillar. The co-decision procedure was regularly adopted 
for first pillar measures (Article 249 EC); the Commission was equipped with a monopoly to submit 
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proposals subsequently to which the Council was acting by a qualified majority (Article 251(2) EC). 
In contrast to this, an initiative under the third pillar could also be made by any Member State upon 
which the Council was acting unanimously (Article 34 (Amsterdam) TEU); it was required to merely 
consult the European Parliament (Article 39 (Amsterdam) TEU). With the introduction of the Treaty 
of Lisbon the so-called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ has been introduced according to which 
legislative regulations, directives, and decisions shall be implemented (Article 289(1) TFEU). The co-
decision procedure now constitutes the rule, while consultation shall be sufficient only in specific 
circumstances (so-called ‘special legislative procedure’, Article 289(2) TFEU). Under the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ the Commission retains its monopoly for proposals (Article 294(2) TFEU) 
which is further supported by Article 293(1) TFEU providing that such proposals can only be 
amended by unanimous Council decisions save those exceptions listed in the provision. Qualified 
majority voting is being applied regularly (Article 294 TFEU). 
With the integration of the third pillar into the TFEU under Title V, it could generally be assumed that 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ applies equally to the provisions under this Title. However, it can 
be observed that certain exceptions are incorporated into the provisions under Title V which allow for 
derogation from the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’. According to Article 76 TFEU any measure 
concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters as laid down in Chapter 4, concerning police 
cooperation as specified in Chapter 5, as well as the administrative cooperation after Article 74 TFEU 
may not only be adopted on a proposal from the Commission (Article 76(a) TFEU) but also on the 
initiative of a quarter of the Member States (Article 76(b) TFEU). Thus, the Member States have 
managed to retain a certain degree of their right of initiative as regards these former third pillar 
measures without leaving it entirely up to the Commission to bring in proposals. It can further be 
observed that the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ is far away from constituting the regular procedure 
for provisions under Title V TFEU. Instead, the ‘special legislative procedure’, as way of derogating 
from the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, can be applied accordingly.199 Under this ‘special legislative 
procedure’ the Council shall act unanimously, while it is usually sufficient to merely consult the 
Parliament. It has been claimed by Hofmann that with the introduction of the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ far less legal basis problems will occur.200 This reasoning may only partly be supported 
here. While it could true that the introduction of the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ can bring about a 
greater unity for the legislative procedure amongst former first pillar provision, this does not apply to 
the integrated third pillar provisions. Instead, Title V TFEU could still be considered as distinctive in 
comparison to the other provisions under the TFEU. Therefore, legal basis problems are still likely to 
occur. 
Despite the European Parliament’s increased influence in the legislative procedure after Lisbon as 
regards the integrated third pillar, national parliaments retain certain responsibilities. In particular, 
national parliaments are responsible to ensure that proposed measures under Chapters 4 and 5 of Title 
V TFEU comply with the principle of subsidiarity (Article 69 TFEU). Another peculiarity of Title V 
provisions is the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Although the former Article 35 
(Amsterdam) TEU has been abolished, the new Article 276 TFEU still provides for an exceptional 
treatment of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V as regards operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Member States which can escape from scrutiny by the Court of Justice.201 It has been pointed out by 
Ladenburger that these provisions can be seen as a balance between the need to abolish the 
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“institutional weaknesses of the [former] Third Pillar” and the desire to maintain “some particularities 
of an area traditionally perceived as close to the concept of sovereignty of the national state.”202 
A further specificity of the provisions under Title V TFEU is the availability of emergency brakes and 
opt-outs which do not exist in most of the other TFEU provisions. Articles under Title V which allow 
for an emergency brake include Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU enabling the Member States to 
suspend the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ on the grounds that the proposed measure affects the 
criminal justice system fundamentally.203 Opt-outs are possible under Articles 86(1) and 87(3) TFEU 
which permit a certain amount of Member States being in favour of a proposed measure to go ahead 
with its adoption, while others do not. This facilitates differential integration204 in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Thus, it can be argued that it is in the interest of Member States to adopt measures 
on the basis of those Title-V provisions which leave it up to them to choose whether to participate or 
not. In particular, those Member States which would otherwise be outvoted in the Council, like for 
example Great Britain,205 can benefit from such provisions which provide for opt-outs and could 
oppose the application of other provisions under the TFEU.206 These exceptions are further evidence 
of the special character of Title V within the TFEU. The allegedly integrated third pillar has thus 
maintained a certain degree of distinction in legislative procedures in order to protect the integrity of 
the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
This shall be illustrated with a hypothetical example in legal basis litigation: Assuming that a third of 
the Member States proposes the adoption of a regulation establishing a European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office from Eurojust in order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union according 
to Article 86 TFEU. The Parliament, however, refuses to give their consent to the Council to adopt the 
measure under Article 86 TFEU, arguing that such a measure should rather be adopted on Article 325 
TFEU207 in accordance with the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ after consulting the Court of Auditors 
(Article 325(4) TFEU). In this hypothetical legal basis conflict the general legal basis principles which 
have been established under the first pillar will have to be applied as a result of the integration of the 
third pillar provisions under Lisbon. Most likely, the Court will apply the ‘centre of gravity’ theory. 
By emphasising the importance of Article 325 TFEU as a legal basis for the proposed measure the 
centre of gravity can easily be found in favour of the more general TFEU provision to the detriment of 
the criminal law competence, thus deterring Member States from their possibility of enhanced 
cooperation. Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the application of general legal basis 
principles on the provisions of the integrated third pillar could potentially have the effect of rendering 
certain Title V provisions nugatory due to their specific character.  
The only protection may flow from the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle which, however, 
could be considered as inferior to the more successfully applied ‘centre of gravity’ theory. In addition, 
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it could be argued that a provision can only be considered as lex specialis if it is compared with a more 
general legal basis, such as Article 114 TFEU or Article 352 TFEU. As a result, the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali principle cannot protect a Title V provision from other provisions under the 
TFEU than those just mentioned. Considering the eagerness of the European Commission to introduce 
new harmonising measures in the field of criminal law, it can be anticipated that the principle will 
soon be tested before the Courts. Another possible derogation from the application of Article 114 
TFEU may flow from the fact that criminal law provisions now already provide an option for 
harmonisation themselves.208 This may thus reduce the application of Article 114 TFEU to the area of 
freedom, security and justice,209 and therefore also the need to recall the lex specialis derogat legi 
generali principle. This, however, stands in contrast to the intergovernmental feature of mutual 
recognition between Member States in criminal matters which has been preserved in the integrated 
third pillar.210 The Lisbon Treaty is thus trying to strike a balance between cooperation mechanisms 
and harmonisation of criminal laws and to incorporate both in the TFEU. 
As has already been pointed out by White, this may prove to be rather problematic.211 Cooperation 
between Member States acknowledges their national identities to a greater extent, leaves them with a 
high discretion of choice, and does not prejudice their action. It can thus be argued that criminal law 
“reflects a piece of the national legal culture and is therefore a symbol of state sovereignty.”212 
Harmonisation mechanisms on the other hand, are being imposed from the Union on the Member 
States by a superior act which is directly effective, thus national differences will become blurred. 
However, it may also be argued that mutual recognition could be seen as a concealed harmonisation in 
the long term: While one Member States takes a judicial decision, others will have to follow and adjust 
their laws, eventually leading to a harmonised approach in that field. The question which thus arises is 
whether it is an inevitable development that mutual recognition mechanisms will ultimately be 
substituted by harmonisation. On any account, it can be observed that mutual recognition in a specific 
area leads to a certain level of harmonisation therein: Although the actual terms are defined by the 
initiating Member State taking a leading decision, other Member States are obliged to recognize this 
decision and to comply with it. Peers even argued that a basic requirement for mutual recognition 
should be the existence of a minimum level of harmonisation or at least the comparability of 
substantive laws in criminal matters. According to him, the tension between the two approaches can 
only be solved by a European Public Prosecutor “who will work according to fully harmonized rules 
on procedure and substantive law.”213 
Safeguarding Member States’ Competences 
A general Community competence to harmonise in the area of criminal law was consistently denied by 
the Courts,214 however, subject to certain exceptions. In the early Casati case, the ECJ pointed out that 
“criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are 
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still responsible.”215 This appears to suggest certain flexibility for subsequent cases, leaving an option 
for a possible transferral of such responsibilities into the sphere of Community competences. The 
Court further made it clear in Casati that 
Community law also sets certain limits in [criminal law] as regards the control measures which it 
permits the Member States to maintain in connection with the free movement of goods and 
persons.216 
This was affirmed in Cowan, in which the Court held that national “legislative provisions may not 
discriminate against persons to whom Community law gives the right to equal treatment or restrict the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law.”217 The Court, reaffirming the general rule of 
Member States’ responsibility, held that criminal law may indeed “be affected by Community law”,218 
however, remained silent as to the actual scope of such an EC interference. 
With the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the pillar structure has been abolished and the 
competences under the former third pillar have been brought within the ambit of supranational EU 
law. The same principles which have been established under the former first pillar in legal basis 
litigation could now apply to the provisions in the area of freedom, security and justice. This would 
even allow for the adoption of a dual legal basis for a measure which pursues a twofold objective since 
the new Article 40 TEU is not explicitly applicable to the area of the integrated third pillar. Thus, it 
could be argued that by abolishing the pillar structure the Treaty of Lisbon has also abolished the 
former difficulties which occurred in the course of the extension of former Community powers and the 
therefore arisen legal uncertainty as regards the delimitation of competences in cross-pillar matters. 
However, it could also be argued that due to the specific status of Title V TFEU, and its differences to 
other provisions under the TFEU as has been discussed above,219 this area also needs special 
protection mechanisms in order to ensure its integrity and proper application of the provisions therein. 
As has been pointed out by Peers, this is not to return to an entirely intergovernmental character of the 
criminal law sphere as was the case before Lisbon.220 Instead, this is meant as a modest attempt to 
divert from the rather absolute picture showing the flawlessly integrated third pillar, which certainly is 
not the case. 
The first case concerning a legal basis dispute between a Title-V and a non-Title-V provision of the 
TFEU has already been brought before the Court of Justice.221 Here, the Parliament seeks to have 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009222 annulled on the grounds that it has been based on an 
incorrect legal basis. The with this Council Regulation amended measure, Council Regulation (EC) 
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No 881/2002,223 was originally based on the triple legal basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC. The new 
Council Regulation has now been based on Article 215 TFEU (ex Article 301 EC) only. The 
Parliament has intervened arguing that the correct legal basis should have rather been Article 75 TFEU 
(ex Article 60 EC) which falls under Title V TFEU. Previously, these two provisions had the same 
procedural requirements involving the Council acting by a qualified majority on the Commission’s 
proposal. This allowed for a joint legal basis. However, the new provisions under the TFEU have 
procedural differences which may not permit a combined legal basis and which may have led the 
Parliament to bring this action before the Court: While Article 75 TFEU involves the Parliament to the 
extent that it can define the framework for measures falling under this provision jointly with the 
Council, Article 215 TFEU only provides for an obligation to inform the Parliament of the decisions 
taken by the Council. Another peculiarity is that Article 215 TFEU requires a joint proposal by the 
Commission and the High Representative. Article 75 TFEU on the other hand does not envisage the 
latter’s involvement in the legislative process. 
The differences between the two provisions in question concerning their substance are as follows: 
Article 75 TFEU may be applied as a legal basis for “measures with regard to capital movements and 
payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains” in order to fight terrorism 
and other organised crime as set out in Article 67 TFEU.224 In contrast to this, Article 215 TFEU 
concerns the adoption of restrictive measures “for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, 
of economic and financial relations”.225 Action under both provisions may be directed against natural 
or legal persons, groups or non-State entities. However, the overarching aim of Article 215 TFEU 
seems to target “relations with one or more third countries”,226 which is not the case with Article 75 
TFEU.  In its judgment, the Court of Justice could apply the ‘centre of gravity’ theory, thus looking at 
the aim and content of the proposed measure before making a decision for either of the provisions. It is 
explicitly stated in the proposed measure that the “purpose of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002” and thus 
also of Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 itself “is to prevent terrorist crimes, including terrorist 
financing, in order to maintain international peace and security.”227 Further, the Council Regulation 
provides in the replaced Article 2 for the freezing of funds and not making available of such funds 
concerning all persons, groups or entities listed in the annex.228 This indeed seems more congruent 
with the objectives set out in Article 75 TFEU rather than Article 215 TFEU. Applying the former 
instead of the latter provision as a legal basis for the proposed measure would further pay tribute to the 
specific nature of the area of freedom, security and justice. 
It may, however, also be plausible for the Court to consider the proposed measure in the light of the 
CFSP objective flowing from the Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP.229 Both Regulations 
have been based upon this Common Positions which allows for the European Community230 to take 
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the necessary action.231 Since this Common Position was based upon Article 15 (Amsterdam) TEU, 
thus falling within the CFSP area, any subsequent Regulation would have to have Article 215 TFEU 
as its legal base since Article 75 TFEU does not provide for the necessary ‘cross-pillar’ link. However, 
it still remains questionable whether this can be considered as the ‘centre of gravity’ rather than the 
objective to fight terrorism. Further, it is established in the case law that an amending measure does 
not necessarily have to be based on the same legal base as the amended measure.232 Lastly, the 
provisions falling under Title V TFEU could be considered to be more specific than other more 
general legal bases not falling under this area. Thus, if the Court does not reach a conclusion as 
regards the correct legal basis by merely applying the ‘centre of gravity’ theory it could additionally 
apply the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle. This could potentially favour Article 75 TFEU 
which could be considered a lex specialis to Article 215 TFEU. However, as has been argued above, it 
is questionable whether a provision such as Article 215 TFEU could be considered as a more general 
provision in comparison to Article 75 TFEU since the principle may help to derogate only from 
general legal bases such as Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Therefore, unless the Court declares the entire 
area of freedom, security and justice to be specific enough in order to trigger the application of the lex 
specialis derogat legi generali principle as a general rule to protect Title V provisions, this principle 
cannot be applied in the current case and, as a result, cannot protect any criminal law provisions from 
a potential encroachment. 
Thus, if the application of such general principles does not bring about the required solution in legal 
basis disputes between Title-V and non-Title-V provisions of the TFEU, or if the area of freedom, 
security and justice therefore suffers from encroachment, the need will arise for special protection 
mechanisms for the integrated third pillar. This may be justified with the distinct character which has 
been identified for the provisions in Title V TFEU,233 which, in turn, would uphold the continued 
validity of the Court’s statements in Casati and subsequent cases that certain responsibility for 
criminal law matters should remain with the Member States. It could thus be possible that the Court 
establishes a new principle specifically aimed at Title V provisions. This could be done in the shape of 
a non-affection rule similar to the one provided in the new Article 40 TEU for provisions in the area of 
common foreign and security policy. The result of such a non-affection rule would be a clear 
delimitation between EU criminal law and other areas under the TFEU as well as a possible splitting 
of measures in borderline cases. Admittedly, the new Article 40 TEU cannot be applied directly as it 
only concerns the relationship between CFSP and TFEU provisions. However, the Court may 
nevertheless establish a similar rule along these lines as regards the area of freedom, security and 
justice if it turns out that this would better guarantee the effectiveness and preservation of the 
distinctive character of the provisions available under Title V TFEU. 
Conclusion 
As has been observed, the Treaty of Lisbon has not achieved to fully integrate the former third pillar 
into the realm of supranational EU law. The picture of a homogeneous legal system under the TFEU 
cannot be supported here. Instead, the area of freedom, security and justice has preserved some of its 
former intergovernmental features which are evidence of its specific character. While the set of legal 
instruments has been adjusted to the one under the former first pillar, the nature of the competence and 
in particular legal procedures can be identified to shape this distinctive character of Title V TFEU. 
This includes the application of a ‘special legislative procedure’, the involvement of national 
parliaments, Member States’ rights of initiative, emergency brakes, opt-outs, as well as mutual 
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recognition mechanisms in criminal matters; neither of these elements can be found anywhere in the 
TFEU except for Title V. It can be assumed that such peculiarities have been included in Title V 
TFEU with the intention to protect the integrity of Member States and their distinctive role in the 
legislative process in criminal law matters. Therefore, by preserving a certain degree of distinctiveness 
for the area of freedom, security and justice and thus providing it with a special status within the 
TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty still grants Member States a preferential treatment in this area. 
This paper has further argued that the application of general legal basis principles may not be 
sufficient in order to ensure the effectiveness and proper application of Title V TFEU provisions. 
While the ‘centre of gravity’ theory may be politically prejudiced or even random in border-line cases, 
the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle can only be applied under certain circumstances. 
Further, general provisions, such as the residual competence under Article 352 TFEU, could serve as a 
legal basis for a measure concerning criminal matters for which no such power is provided for in Title 
V TFEU, thus resulting in a continued expansion of supranational EU law into the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Title-V provisions are therefore endangered to suffer from encroachment from 
other non-Title-V provisions under the TFEU unless specific protection mechanisms are being 
established which can safeguard Member States’ competences in the EU criminal law sphere. It has 
been suggested in this paper that a possible protection mechanism may be established in the shape of a 
non-affection rule, similar to the one provided in the new Article 40 TEU, which could be specifically 
targeted at Title V TFEU. This would lead to a better delimitation of competences between the area of 
freedom, security and justice and the other areas provided for in the TFEU. Further, this practice could 
result in a splitting of measures in cases where no single legal basis can be agreed upon. Overall, a 
clear answer from the Court of Justice in this case will be highly appreciated in the interest of legal 
certainty in criminal law matters. 
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Abstract 
As a matter of fact, vertical division of powers does not seem to give full satisfaction as a safeguard of 
federalism in the European Union, especially given the fact that it is superseded by the unity-oriented 
idea of integration. Here will be tested the hypothesis under which respect for national constitutional 
identity could qualify as a new safeguard of the balance between unity and diversity, thereby 
enhancing federalism together with constitutionalism in Europe. 
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Federalism is one of these blurred concepts of public law that are highly difficult to grasp. Most 
people will have only intuitions about its meaning; they will fail explaining what it is exactly about. 
Such a gap could probably remain unproblematic if the concept at stake was a minor one. However it 
is not. We seem indeed to be witnessing a large-scale phenomenon that could be referred to – in a 
slightly excessive fashion – as “federalization of the world”. There is in fact an increasing trend to 
advocate and set up federal-like solutions for a broad range of situations. For now we may just think of 
the calls for fiscal federalism in Italy or the setting up of a federal regime in Iraq. In many respects, 
federalism seems to be nowadays the ideal political form. In this context, scholars have to tackle the 
issue by examining what federalism actually means and implies. Several factors have contributed to 
the present state of uncertainty as to the messy concept of federalism. This situation derives from the 
overuse and often misuse of the federalist language. A fair understanding of federalism is indeed 
fraught with difficulties pertaining to its focus, its perception and its methodology.  
First of all, federalism is confronted with its multiple functions and focuses. It pursues indeed different 
aims which range from economic efficiency, accommodation of cultural diversity or vindication of 
state rights to limiting power and creating a community of feelings. Its focus would then evolve 
between the individual and the polities as federalism can be grasped both from an individualistic or 
holistic perspective, depending on whether it is inspired by a liberal or a communitarian philosophy. 
Secondly, federalism has also to face perception-related difficulties. The mere word drags indeed 
different meanings from one country to another. We all know how much the “F-Word” is taboo in the 
EU context. Its very use was already extremely controversial at the time of the foundation of the 
United States: the so-called “Federalists” were actual proponents of a strong central authority whereas 
those who were in favour of strong state rights were named “Anti-Federalists”.234 The same strict 
dichotomy strikingly also applies in the EU although federalism is essentially about unity and 
diversity. That is the reason why it is hard today to use a discredited narrative which is embroiled in 
partisan quarrels. In any scientific debate on federalism, the scholar will therefore always have to raise 
a disclaimer in order to escape accusations of ideological bias.  
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Thirdly, there is a general lack of epistemology of federalism235 whereas there is a pressing need to 
have one. In fact, we tend to rely on a priori or historically-rooted definitions to apprehend the 
“federative phenomenon”236 without asking whether such an approach is adequate to grasp a concept 
which is so elusive and unstable in several regards. Not only does that impoverish and constrain the 
thought on federalism, but it questions the very relevance of an institutionally-oriented definition of a 
phenomenon that might be better understood as a process. 
From this set of hurdles originates a situation of path dependency that prevents us from an accurate 
understanding of federalism, especially in the EU context. It turns out therefore to be necessary to 
deconstruct federalism, that is to get rid of the numerous preconceived ideas about federalism by 
relying on Descartes’ doute méthodique or Derrida’s theory or rather practical epistemology. 
According to the latter, there is no direct relation between signifier and signified and the meaning of 
the signifier does not result from a priori categories but is the outcome of experience. We should 
therefore make tabula rasa of our preconceptions and discover meanings in an inductive manner. 
When it comes to federalism, we suggest examining first legal arrangements to ascertain its features.237 
Our reasoning will be based on a single and straightforward assumption that is supposedly the 
common und unchallengeable thread of federalism: federalism is about striking a fair balance between 
unity and diversity. Several leading scholars insisted on what may be seen as the backbone of 
federalism. According to Daniel Elazar, “federalism has to do with the need of people and polities to 
unite for common purposes, yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities. It is rather 
like wanting to have one’s cake and eat it”.238 The same idea was conveyed by Pierre Pescatore for the 
EC: “federalism is a political and legal philosophy which adapts itself to all political contexts (…) 
wherever and whenever two basic prerequisites are fulfilled: the search for unity, combined with 
genuine respect for the autonomy and the legitimate interests of the participant states”.239 Therefore, 
genuine technical and political safeguards of federalism will need to account for the tension between 
unity and diversity. 
I will examine through these lenses the emerging narrative of national constitutional identity in the 
European legal space. As a matter of fact, it seems as if vertical division of powers does not give full 
satisfaction as a safeguard of federalism in the European Union, especially given the fact that it is 
superseded by the unity-oriented idea of integration. I would like to test the hypothesis under which 
respect for national constitutional identity could qualify as a new safeguard of the balance between 
unity and diversity. I will eventually examine the lessons that follow in terms of federalism and 
constitutionalism in the EU. 
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Division of Powers as a Rather Unsatisfactory Safeguard of Federalism in the EU 
Acknowledging the fact that vertical division of powers is one of the classical features of federal 
polities, the EU treaties now present a clearer catalogue of competences. In the light of the US 
experience and with regard to the structure of the EU, such a list will however be hard to enforce. 
Division of Powers after Lisbon 
Most accounts on federalism set out two main safeguards, namely participation of local entities to the 
decision-making process240 and autonomy241 through division of powers.242 Built as a functional polity, 
the EC did not initially bother about division of powers. It was meant to reach broadly-defined 
objectives. To that end, the European institutions did not hesitate to use and overuse the different 
available instruments. In fact, the issue of division of powers has started becoming salient only since 
Maastricht but the dramatic shift took place in the past decade in the follow-up to the Declaration of 
Laeken attached to the treaty of Nice. Heads of States and Governments then required among other 
things a clear division of powers between the supranational and the national levels.  
Following the recommendations of the Group on Complementary Competences within the 
Convention, the Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty anchored the principle of conferred 
competences (art. 4 § 1 TEU; art. 5 § 1 and 2 TEU; art. 6 TEU) and distinguished three types of 
competences (art. 2 TFEU), namely exclusive competences of the EU, shared competences and 
complementary competences. Like most federal systems based on conferral of powers, the treaties do 
not expressly provide for competences reserved to Member States: although article 4 § 2 TEU states 
that that “the Union shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security”, it does not 
explicitly grant powers to the Member States; in addition, it would be inaccurate to talk about reserved 
competences when it comes to areas where “the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to 
support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States” (art. 2 § 5 and art. 6 TFEU). At 
best, these are “retained” powers on which EU law will have an impact. In any case, by clarifying the 
issue of competences, the Lisbon Treaty has made a valuable effort in order to safeguard unity and 
autonomy for all political actors. However, it is doubtful that the Court of Justice will start enforcing 
the relevant provisions any time soon. 
Enforcement Difficulties in the Light of the American Experience and of the EU Integrationist 
Ideal 
Enforcement of the provisions regulating division of powers in the EU may turn out hard to enforce 
for reasons peculiar to federalism (as illustrated by the US example) as well as for reasons peculiar to 
EU integration. 
Comparative analysis shows that division of competences is not always stringently enforced in federal 
polities. In the United States, under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, “the powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively or to the people”. Despite this provision dating back to 1791, the Supreme Court 
has proved reluctant to strike down pieces of federal legislation adopted under the Commerce Clause 
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which would be impinging on the states’ sphere of autonomy. It did so for the first time in forty years 
in 1976 in the famous National League of Cities case.243 Since the New Deal policy and up to this 
date, the Supreme Court had taken a very extensive stance on the Commerce Clause, thereby allowing 
the Congress to legislate in matters – especially social matters – which may have been primarily 
regulated by the states.  In this decision taken shortly after the advent of the federalist-minded Burger 
Court – as opposed to the human rights-minded Warren Court, the Supreme Court hold 
unconstitutional, as violating the limitations imposed on the scope of the federal commerce power by 
the Tenth Amendment, national legislation making the 1938 Fair Labour Standards Act provisions for 
overtime pay applicable to virtually all state and local employees. Some five years later, the Court 
refined its case-law and came up with four requirements that had to be fulfilled in order for a State not 
to be subject to federal legislation based on the Commerce Clause:244 among them, federal acts could 
not regulate areas pertaining to attributes of state sovereignty or directly impinge upon states’ power to 
freely organize activities corresponding to traditional governmental functions. It seems as if the 
Supreme Court was at that time quite eager to enforce the Tenth Amendment even at the expense of 
social breakthroughs.  
However, this attempt was rather short-lived as the Court reversed its case-law in 1985 in the 
landmark Garcia ruling.245 In this case, the abovementioned Fair Labour Standards Act was again at 
stake. The question – this time dealing with minimum wage – was whether employees of a local public 
transportation company would benefit from the federal legislation. Relying on the Hodel test, the 
employer argued that transportation came under the category “traditional state function” and, 
therefore, that the company would not fall within the scope of application of the federal act. Yet, the 
Supreme Court strongly criticized the state sovereignty approach and decided to jettison the recently-
designed test. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court did not only ground its judgement on the lack 
of objective criteria to determine what would qualify as a “traditional state function” but it also 
emphasized the futility of a priori definitions of state sovereignty, especially in a context where 
federal law and institutions have become so prominent. The Court concluded that  
“any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in 
the procedural nature of the basic limitation [that the Constitution imposes to protect the States] 
and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather 
than to dictate a sacred province of state autonomy”. 246 
Still, such an approach is quite striking as it entirely disregards a priori division of powers as being an 
inadequate safeguard of federalism. It is all the more noteworthy that, before the Civil War, “dual 
federalism” and “state rights” used to be paramount in the US as a consequence of the American 
conception of separation of powers. Any average undergraduate law student knows that, as opposed to 
Europe, a rigid separation of powers prevails in the US. That does not only hold true for the horizontal 
dimension but it does also for the vertical one. Still nowadays, the Supreme Court shows respect for 
the states by enforcing the Anticommandeering rule247 or ensuring state sovereign immunity.248 It even 
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hold in 1995 that the Congress could not have relied on the Commerce Clause in order to adopt the 
Gun Free School Zones Act that made a federal offence “for any individual to possess a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows is a school zone”.249  
The way the Supreme Court now tends to frame its argument is quite telling. It seems to be reluctant to 
ground its decisions on the Tenth Amendment or state sovereignty and prefers reasoning in terms of 
limitations to the use of the Commerce Clause or to Congress’s powers. This inversion is in my view 
illustrative of the fact that what used to be the exception has become the rule: division of powers may 
still be enforced to a certain extent in the US without it being any longer an actual safeguard of 
federalism. 
As to the European Union, it seems structurally at odds with an effective enforcement of distribution 
of competences: the EU is placed in a situation of path dependency in this respect. First of all, in the 
past, the ECJ has struck down a piece of EU legislation on one occasion only, in the tobacco cases.250 
In a way, that is no surprise in a functional polity which used to be – and is still – organized around 
objectives. Unlike other federal polities such as Germany (art. 93 I 4 Fundamental Law) or 
Switzerland (art. 189 Constitution), we still cannot find any provision in the Lisbon treaty empowering 
the ECJ to enforce the division of powers between the Member States and the European Union. 
Secondly, as opposed to the US, there has never been such a thing as dual federalism in Europe 
because of the integrationist telos of the EU. The EU has to face structural constraints that impede it to 
sanction effectively vertical division of powers. These constraints have to do with the parent ideas of 
integration, “ever closer union”, integrative federalism and acquis communautaire. The mere concept 
of integration underlines indeed a centripetal force251 leading to the grant of new powers to the 
European Union, such an attribution of competences being meant to be definitive as emphasized by 
the Costa v. Enel ruling.  
It would not be very useful here to present in detail the numerous devices that have been used by the 
ECJ in order to create new powers for the EU and to broaden the scope of application of EU law 
beyond the strict ambit of EU competences. The very extension of EU powers – better known as 
“creeping competences” – seems virtually so limitless that a high-profile scholar and practitioner of 
EU law even stated that there was “simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member State can invoke 
as such against the Community”.252  
It is however plain that while division of powers is theoretically speaking an adequate safeguard of 
diversity, the EU gives more weight to integration, i.e. to a safeguard of unity.253 With the latter 
principle pulling into another direction and despite the recent evolutions of the law, it is hard to see 
how division of powers can become – in the short run at least – an adequate safeguard of federalism in 
the EU as it is not strong enough to counterbalance integration in order to reach some kind of 
equilibrium. Last but not least, one should not be mistaken by the subsidiarity principle. It is by no 
way a means of vesting powers to the Member States but it is merely a flexible tool regulating the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
248
 Alden v. Maine 527 US 706 (1999). 
249
 United States v. Lopez 514 US 549 (1995). 
250
 See Koen Lenaerts, « L’encadrement par le droit de l’Union européenne des compétences des Etats membres », in 
Chemins d’Europe. Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Jacqué, Dalloz, 2010, p. 421. 
251
 According to an important neofunctionalist, integration is « the process whereby political actors in several, distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess and demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states » (Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe : 
Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57, Stanford UP, p. 16). 
252
 Koen Lenaerts, op. cit., 1990, p. 220. 
253
 Armin Von Bogdandy, « Constitutional Principles », in Armin Von Bogdandy, Jürgen Bast (ed.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, Modern Studies in European Law, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 3. 
François-Xavier Millet 
58 
exercise of EU competences aiming at ensuring efficiency of political action. We must then look at 
alternative safeguards that could strike a balance between unity and diversity. 
Respect for Member State Constitutional Identity as an Alternative Safeguard of 
Federalism 
In the context of the European Union, if division of powers is not the adequate tool for preserving 
federalism, we may wonder which alternative safeguards are available. The whole European project 
seems to be unity-oriented to such an extent that one might doubt finding adequate substitutes. 
However, we have observed in the past ten years the emergence of a new and rather unusual narrative 
in the European legal space, which may turn out to be an efficient and effective political and judicial 
safeguard of federalism embracing both unity and diversity. 
A New Narrative in the European Legal Space 
A new discourse known as “constitutional identity” is gradually emerging both in the EU and in some 
domestic legal orders, such as France, Germany or Poland. Initially referring to a European identity 
founded on Habermassian constitutional patriotism, it has started being applied to the Member States 
by national courts but also, to a lesser extent, by the ECJ. Even if the concept is still undetermined, it 
seems to include all national rules, values and principles of constitutional significance deemed worth 
of respect by contradicting EU norms. 
The narrative of constitutional identity can be traced back to the national identity clause featuring in 
the Treaty on the European Union since Maastricht. Originally, article F § 1 EU (which became art. 6 
§ 3 EU in Amsterdam) was quite straightforward mentioning that the EU should respect the national 
identities of the Member States. Falling outside the scope of competences of the ECJ, the Luxemburg 
Court referred to it only once when it described the preservation of national identity as a “legitimate 
aim”.254 Under the Lisbon Treaty, “constitutional” identity has started to take shape as article 4 § 2 EU 
now reads: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government ». It is most likely this convoluted wording – which, incidentally, 
was taken from the Constitutional Treaty – that led the French, German and Polish constitutional 
courts255 to coin the concept of constitutional identity. In a way, that was quite cunning on their part as 
they relied on a EU notion that transpires from the treaty in order to set a limit to the action of the very 
EU institutions. We will see further down the implications for the EU.  
Interestingly, the ECJ itself seems to be incrementally resorting to art. 4 § 2 EU even though the very 
concept of constitutional identity has been only used by a few advocate generals. First, in the Sayn-
Wittgenstein judgment,256 the Court referred to “national” identity as some second order reason to 
restrict freedom of circulation in virtue of the prohibition of nobility titles by the Austrian 
Constitution. In Runevic-Vardyn,257 the Court decided that protection for Lituania’s national official 
language flowed from article 4 § 2 EU. Second, the narrative of constitutional identity was put forward 
by a handful of advocate generals in their opinions. The most elaborate version is to be found in 
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Miguel Poiares Maduro’s opinion in the Michaniki case.258 After explaining that respect for 
constitutional identity dated back to the origins of the European construction, he called for qualified 
respect of the most important principles of domestic constitutions subject to a proportionality test. 
Thirdly, even where the notion of constitutional identity is absent, the ECJ does anyhow take into 
account national constitutional provisions, although it usually bypasses the hurdle by delivering a 
decision formally based on other grounds.  
Even though “constitutional identity” will most probably not always have the same meaning in EU 
law and in domestic law, what is crucial in an account on the safeguards of federalism is that the same 
expression is being used in both spheres. It could qualify therefore as a gateway between both legal 
orders and could then be apt to safeguard federalism, i.e. to reach a balance between unity and 
diversity.  
A Political and Judicial Safeguard of Federalism in the EU 
When it comes to the EU, the subsidiarity principle is usually seen as the best candidate in order to 
safeguard federalism.259 I take here the view that respect for constitutional identity of the Member 
State is better equipped for this purpose. 
Even if the subsidiarity check was substantially improved in Lisbon, we still may have doubts as to its 
effectiveness. First of all, its scope is limited to shared competences. Therefore, it should theoretically 
not impact on EU exclusive competences nor, a fortiori, on the scope of application of EU law. 
Secondly, numerous hurdles should be overcome before the decision is taken of brushing aside a draft 
EU legislative act for breach of subsidiarity: one third of national parliaments have to raise such a 
breach in a reasoned opinion sent to the EU institutions. It is ultimately up to the Commission to 
withdraw, amend or maintain the text.260 Thirdly, subsidiarity as it is designed seems to be more 
concerned with economic efficiency, rational choice and – to a certain extent – democratic legitimacy 
than with respect for specific national characteristics. Such a respect does not indeed necessary entail 
the exercise of a competence by the Member States while subsidiarity is essentially about that. 
Furthermore, a specific feature cannot be effectively taken into account by a control mechanism which 
requires a qualified minority of national parliaments. 
Against this background, respect for national constitutional identity is more apt to be a political and 
judicial safeguard of federalism. To start with, its scope is quite broad. Indeed, il flows from the very 
wording of article 4 EU that it virtually encompasses all areas of competences of the European Union, 
including exclusive competences. It will therefore regulate the exercise of EU powers. Moreover, it 
can be seen as an interpretive principle in the broad scope of application of EU law, requiring 
constructions of EU norms in conformity – or at least compatibility – with constitutional identity.261 It 
will therefore be put forward not only against secondary EU acts but equally against primary law and 
domestic implementation measures. 
As a political safeguard, it can be raised at different stages of the decision-making process. We can 
very well imagine a Member State Government raising claims pertaining to constitutional identity 
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during negotiations of a secondary norm in the Council.262 Constitutional identity would then serve as 
a legal version of the Luxemburg compromise. As a judicial safeguard, the ECJ is likely to enforce it 
after entering into dialogue with the other main actors of identity, namely national courts. Such a 
dialogue is made necessary by the dual use of the concept of constitutional identity. Unilateral claims 
would not make sense as they would undoubtedly lead to a conflict. Therefore, I contend that 
constitutional courts have been using the latter concept with a cooperative purpose. 
Now, we might object that respect for constitutional identity will only serve diversity and not unity 
and, therefore, will not qualify as a genuine safeguard of federalism. Here comes the crux of the 
argument on constitutional identity as a safeguard of both unity and diversity. As paradoxical as it may 
seem, it would not be only a way of enhancing diversity in the EU but it would contribute to find a fair 
balance. Indeed, constitutional identity will serve unity in a formal and a substantive way. As to the 
formal side, it can be considered as a full-fledged principle of EU law. It is already part of it and it 
does not disrupt the whole European project (cf. idea of “Europeanization of counter-limits”) even if it 
probably qualifies an absolute approach to primacy. Speaking in substance, “constitutional identity” is 
not merely national identity as reflected by the domestic constitution. From an EU perspective, it is 
much more about elements of identity serving the whole constitutionalist project which especially 
transpires from the statement of founding common values in article 2 EU. Those values relating to 
human rights, dignity, democracy and the rule of law set an hermeneutic framework comparable to 
homogeneity clauses in federal states, within which national constitutional identities can blossom. 
Incidentally, such an approach turns out to be absolutely in line with post-modern conceptions of 
constitutionalism. It leads us to rethink the European Union as a federal union with constitutionalism. 
Which Lessons for the Legal Nature of the EU: Federalism with Constitutionalism? 
Constitutional and EU scholarship has recently have come up with new theories elaborating on the 
legal and political nature of the EU. A strand of academics have extensively written on “constitutional 
pluralism”263 or have attempted at building up a theory of the federation distinct from traditional 
theories of federal states or confederations.264 Trying to build a theory from the practice, I contend that 
a full-fledged recognition of respect for constitutional identity in the EU could have far-reaching 
consequences for the nature of the European Union as that would strengthen both its constitutional  
and federal dimensions. 
The EU as a Constitutional Union 
Prima facie, we might argue that enhancing constitutional identity would take place at the expense of 
constitutionalism and would benefit intergovernmentalism. It is striking that most accounts on 
European constitutionalism stress unity-oriented principles to describe it and, therefore, to set apart 
constitutionalism and intergovernmentalism. They will invariably address primacy and direct effect, 
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effet utile, the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights. It seems as if the autonomy of the EU 
legal order would be enhanced if the EU were to declare its independence from the Member States.  
In my view, such an approach reflects a one-sided conception of constitutionalism. It embodies to a 
large extent the voluntaristic and centripetal approach specific to French and American 
constitutionalism: building up a people through the universal ideals of the rule of law.265 Yet, such a 
conception is probably outdated since the demise of the Constitutional Treaty which seems to have put 
an end to the revolutionary idea of the “constitutional moment”, the constitutional “grand soir”. 
Nevertheless, that does not mean that constitutionalism in Europe has been buried for good, the former 
concept having always taken different forms.266  
When it comes to the EU, we can identify a specific type of constitutionalism which, in a way, has 
seemingly drifted from its Franco-American form to a more British aspect. First of all, there is no 
single document called “Constitution of the European Union” but a great deal of constitutional norms 
making up a “composite constitution”267 or a Verfassungsverbund as German scholars would put it. 
According to Ingolf Pernice, “Europe already has a “multilevel constitution”: a constitution made up 
of the constitutions of the Member States bound together by a complementary constitutional body 
consisting of the European Treaties ».268 Unlike the competing notion of Staatenverbund,269 this 
concept adequately describes the fact that the European Union does not have only to rely on Member 
States’ enforcement machinery (puissance publique) but also on the Member States constitutions in 
order to ensure its functioning and its legitimacy. Obviously, it does not indistinctly recognize all 
provisions of the domestic constitutions but it will take into account the most crucial and significant 
ones: not only does EU law formally do so when it comes to constitutional identity, but also when it 
comes to treaty revisions or protection of fundamental rights (see art. 53 Charter). Secondly, the EU 
has gradually become a constitutional polity through fundamental rights. Initially missing in the EU 
treaties, the ECJ started to protect them as general principles of EC law. In the Amsterdam Treaty, 
their status was significantly enhanced as they became “founding principles” of the EU and were 
subject to a sanction mechanism in case of serious breaches. The EU has now a specific and 
enforceable Charter of fundamental rights. Thirdly, with the recognition of national constitutional 
identities, the EU would mix common and specific constitutional traditions. Yet, we know that, across 
the Channel, constitutionalism is the result of incremental sedimentation of traditions. In the European 
case, it is still unclear whether state constitutions are to be then interpreted only in a backward-looking 
manner. The answer is probably no as it would otherwise hallow entrenched conceptions of identity 
that may be at odds with the European ideals.270  
One might object that constitutional identity could still run against constitutionalism in its liberal 
acceptation, i.e. a set of values and principles aiming at ensuring limitation of power through law. 
Such a possibility is most accurately expressed in German with the words “konstitutionnelle 
Verfassungsidentität”. This expression clearly conveys the feeling that the identity of the Constitution 
could be unconstitutional in a way. What about the new Hungarian Constitution? What about Turkey 
after its eventual accession to the EU if its Constitution still needs reforming? That is the reason why, 
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in accordance with its post-modern definition, constitutional identity has to be truly constitutional 
from the EU perspective. This  certainly opens up threats of conflicts in the European legal space as 
respect for state identity is subject to respect for the common constitutional values set out in article 2 
TEU. It is however the price to pay so that constitutional identity can enhance constitutionalism 
together with federalism in the EU.  
The EU as a Federal Union 
In a context where constitutionalism is strengthened through constitutional identity, what kind of 
federalism does the latter account for? In my view, it strikes a middle ground between liberal and 
communitarian philosophies and tends to set aside traditional concepts such as sovereignty and 
vertical division of powers. 
First, respect for constitutional identity of the Member States cannot be entirely understood from 
either an individualistic or a holistic point of view. Against the first perspective, its identity dimension 
will naturally underline the specific past and present features of a community. Against the second 
perspective, its constitutional dimension will naturally underline the place of the individual. In fact, 
constitutional identity will be about the homme situé271 and is therefore very much in line with theories 
of liberal nationalism272 and the like.273 Although the unity component of federal States is usually very 
strong, it is noteworthy that they sometimes take into consideration the constitutions of their member 
states not only in the case of a better protection of human rights274 but also in order to take into 
account some of their specificities, notably in religious and moral matters.275 This accounts for 
diversity of belonging in federal polities and it should therefore a fortiori inspire the EU. 
Second, I also claim that a European Union founded on constitutional identity brushes aside the issue 
of sovereignty. In EU law, words definitely matter since the construction of a new legal order needs 
symbols to enhance its legitimacy and find some roots.276 Now, it is striking to note that the narrative 
of sovereignty is absent on the European plane whereas it is still paramount in domestic law and 
international law. We can easily understand such an astounding silence since (absolute) sovereignty 
has always been blamed by the founding fathers for encouraging warfare. The sovereignty rhetoric is 
therefore not particularly welcome in Europe.  Yet, does the narrative of constitutional identity 
smuggle in sovereignty through the back door? I see both concepts as essentially different. On the one 
side, sovereignty still tends to be associated with absolute power, primacy of politics over law, of the 
collective over the individual. On the other side, constitutional identity carries opposite values: 
limitation of power, reign of law, primacy of the individual over the group. This is entirely in line with 
constitutionalism but also with liberal-national federalism.  
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Several authors have insisted on the fact that sovereignty and federalism collided.277 Most of them did 
so on the basis of Bodin’s absolute and indivisible conception of sovereignty. They saw a mere 
technical or formal incompatibility where there is arguably a structural problem. Carl Friedrich – 
whose theory of federalism, inspired by Althusius, I entirely subscribed to when it comes to 
understanding the EU – stressed on its part the antinomy between federalism and unity-oriented, 
hierarchy-minded sovereignty: « there is federalism only where a set of political communities coexist 
and interact as autonomous bodies united in a common order that is itself autonomous. There can be 
no sovereign in a federal system. In such a political order, autonomy and sovereignty are mutually 
exclusive (…). No one has the « last word » ».278 
The reader may object that we could equally deconstruct sovereignty in order to make it fit with 
federalism.279 I actually doubt it since the interpretation of sovereignty has to face textual and 
etymological constraints. I hold the view that sovereignty will necessarily be therefore a concept 
referring to political ultimate power, eventually exercised in a revolutionary or semi-revolutionary 
way by one person or a group of people that decide to call the shots. The European Union does then 
exist only to the extent that sovereignty is not akin to its very definition. Against this background, the 
new narrative of constitutional identity embodies a paradigmatic shift that admirably matches with 
what the EU is meant to be about: ensuring peace through law and trade, not politics. 
By the same token, the erosion of the distribution of competences underlines new practices of 
federalism calling for new theoretical approaches.280 In a pluralist legal space characterized by 
intertwined and overlapping legal orders, we can hardly revive a dualist approach281 and we should 
instead rely on new remedies. Nowadays, it is extremely difficult to determine ex ante who should 
exercise a competence X or Y and legal tools such as subsidiarity are highly valuable to the extent that 
they guarantee flexibility ex post. The key issue nowadays is how to exercise the competence X or Y. 
It is here interesting to note some parallel moves: on the one hand, the Union is to exercise its powers 
with due regard and respect for constitutional identity of the Member State; on the other hand, the 
Member States should exercise their own powers with due regard and respect for EU law as illustrated 
by the retained powers.282 
Both situations clearly show that there is a need for mutual loyalty in the European legal space. 
Comparing the US, the EU and Germany, Daniel Halberstam distinguished between an entitlements 
approach and a loyalty approach.283 The former “takes a federal constitution as granting each level or 
unit of government a set of regulatory tools that may be used without regard to whether the exercise of 
these powers serves the system of democratic governance as a whole »  while the latter « insists that 
each level or unit of government must always act to ensure the proper functioning of the system of 
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governance as a whole ».284  In the context of the European Union, the entitlements approach seems to 
coincide largely with the division of powers doctrine whereas the loyalty approach fits particularly 
well our thesis. Interestingly, Halberstam’s stated preference for loyalty over entitlements echoes very 
much the Cilfit case285 where the ECJ made clear that interpretation of EU law should be conducted 
“in the light of the provisions of community law as a whole”. Such a conception underlines the fact 
that the EU and the domestic legal orders cannot be regarded either in a dualistic or in a monistic-like 
hierarchical way: there is a European legal space in which every judge, be it national or supranational, 
is part of a community of interpreters who are required to take into account the existence of competing 
principles and rules, above all those embodying the identity of the respective legal orders.286 
For those who yearn for order, it would certainly be more satisfactory to adopt a dualist approach. 
However, this is no longer possible, nor even appropriate. Even the national judges for whom division 
of powers was paramount have started minimizing it, the best illustration being Germany. In fact, in its 
Maastricht ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court had insisted that it would not refrain from striking 
down EU acts that would be deemed ultra-vires. If it repeated its stance in its Lisbon judgement, the 
Court qualified it to a large extent in the Honeywell ruling287 under which a breach of Member States 
competences on the part of the European bodies will be punished only it is sufficiently qualified and 
leads to a structurally significant shift to the detriment of the Member States. 
The late evolutions in EU law seem to confirm Carl Friedrich’s earlier prophecies on nascent forms of 
federalism which can lead both to integration and differentiation. As he himself anticipated it, such a 
differentiated integration will not take place through an a priori vertical division of powers but, 
pragmatically, through mutual respect in the very exercise of those powers. 
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Abstract 
The subject matter of this paper is to unravel the ‘federal’ nature of proportionality in Union law. Does 
the principle of proportionality work as a safeguard of federalism or is it merely a legal tool for the 
Court to further market integration beyond the limits of the Treaty? If federalism refers to how powers 
are balanced and allocated between the central government and its constituent parts, i.e. the Union and 
its Member States, the simple answer to this question is that the principle of proportionality imposes 
limits on the regulatory freedom of the Member States in forming their national policies. In order to 
provide a more comprehensive response to this question this paper closely reviews the case-law of the 
CJEU and analyses how different standards of proportionality review may influence the allocation of 
power between the Member States and the Union. 
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Introduction 
In the seminal article on proportionality drafted by Gráinne de Burca, the author argues that where a 
(member state) ‘measure is seen to be primarily within the competence of the state, the Court is likely 
to be reluctant, unless a very important Community interest is adversely affected, to examine the 
proportionality of the national measure too closely’.288This assertion of de Burca concerning the 
underlying reasons behind the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (the ‘CJEU’ or the ‘Court’)  
standard of proportionality review reveals the ‘federalist’ dimension of proportionality and the subject 
matter of this paper, which is to unravel the ‘federal’ nature of proportionality in Union law. Does the 
principle of proportionality work as a safeguard of federalism289 or is it merely a legal tool for the 
Court to further market integration beyond the limits of the Treaty? If federalism refers to how powers 
are balanced and allocated between the central government and its constituent parts, i.e. the Union and 
its Member States, the simple answer to this question is that the principle of proportionality imposes 
limits on the regulatory freedom of the Member States in forming their national policies. 290 In order to 
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provide a more comprehensive response to this question it is however necessary to closely review the 
case-law of the CJEU and analyse how different standards of proportionality review may influence the 
allocation of power between the Member States and the Union. 
Prior to this, it is nevertheless useful to restate the ‘proportionality test’ as this is framed by the Court. 
According to the Court’s standard formula, restrictions to the fundamental freedoms must: i) be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest,ii) be suitable for securing the attainment of 
the objective which they pursue (the suitability test), iii) not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it (the least restrictive measure test, ‘LRM’291), iv) be applied in a non-discriminatory manner 
and not constitute arbitrary discrimination, v) and take into account equivalent restrictions that may 
have been imposed by other Member States.292 This proportionality formula appears to be a formal 
legal classification which says very little on how proportionality review is undertaken in a specific 
case concerning an alleged infringement of the free movement rules by a Member State or a private 
party.293 Proportionality is in fact very context-depended in that its actual scope or meaning is 
conditioned on the specific circumstances of the case.294 Proportionality as a legal classification is 
used to categorize a large number of cases concerned with the balancing of private and public interests 
and the balancing of Union interests and Member State interests.295 These cases have sometimes very 
little in common and may concern completely different areas of law. The only common denominator is 
that they involve a proportionality assessment.  Instead, the relevant matter is with what level of 
intensity the CJEU applies the ‘suitability’ test and the ‘LRM’ test and what factors are decisive when 
the Court determines the intensity with which it will undertake the proportionality test.296  
What is meant by rigorous proportionality review? Even though it is admitted that judicial review of 
restrictions to the fundamental freedoms takes place on a sliding scale between very marginal review 
and extremely close scrutiny of the Member States’ choice, I will in order to clarify the discussion in 
the paper, broadly distinguish between ‘rigorous’ or ‘lenient’ proportionality review in the law of free 
movement. 297 A ‘rigorous’ application of the proportionality test implies that the CJEU closely 
reviews whether the measure undertaken by the Member State is genuinely suitable for achieving the 
stated legitimate objective and if so, whether the Member State undertook the least restrictive measure 
for intra-community trade in order to achieve the stated legitimate objective.298In this regard, the Court 
may even go so far as to suggest alternative measures which according to it are equally appropriate for 
achieving the stated legitimate objective and thus take on the role as judicial policy maker.299 As 
exemplified by the Caixa Bank case, the CJEU closely considered whether the French prohibition on 
the use of sight accounts was the least restrictive measure to achieve the objectives of consumer 
protection and the encouragement of medium and long term saving. The Court found that the 
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prohibition was contrary to the free movement of services since it considered that this prohibition was 
disproportionate in relation to the objectives of protecting consumers and the encouragement of 
medium and long term saving. 300 ‘Lenient’ application of proportionality implies on the other hand 
implies that the CJEU gives the Member States discretion when choosing the less restrictive measure 
without closer scrutiny or engages in very marginal review without applying the LRM test .301 As 
exemplified by the Santa Casa case the CJEU will thus only intervene if the measure chosen by the 
Member State is manifestly disproportionate, given the facts of the case, for achieving the stated 
objective.302  
In the attempt of establishing a relationship between proportionality and the federalism conception, it 
is recognised that a rigorous application of the principle of proportionality by the Court is susceptible 
of furthering the fundamental freedoms at the cost of national regulatory freedom.303 Lenient 
application of proportionality in relation to national measures restricting the fundamental freedoms is 
on the other hand liable to lead to a preservation of Member State powers to regulate the national 
market in the area concerned to the detriment of the fundamental freedoms.  
This paper intends to analyse why the CJEU undertakes a rigorous review of proportionality in certain 
cases and wherefore the CJEU carry out a less rigorous proportionality review in other cases in the law 
of free movement. It will also be discussed how proportionality is applied to impose restrictions on the 
Member States’ regulatory freedom and to what extent a specific standard of proportionality review 
maintain respectively undermines national discretion in deciding on how their national market should 
be regulated. The paper unfolds as follows. The first section of the paper will discuss under what 
circumstances that the CJEU undertakes a strict review of proportionality. This section also 
endeavours to explain the underlying reasons behind the CJEU’s rigour review of proportionality in 
this type of cases. The second section of the paper examines under what conditions and why the CJEU 
apply proportionality in a lenient manner giving discretion to the Member States’ policy choice. This 
section will particularly review cases concerned with sensitive national public policies and national 
fundamental rights concerns. The final part of the paper, will summarize the findings of the paper.  As 
to the limitations of the paper it is recognised that the case-law on proportionality and fundamental 
freedoms is substantial and hence it has not been possible to review all cases. Instead of attempting to 
cover all cases, a selective but in-depth approach has been the chosen methodology. Consequently I 
have endeavoured to select cases which are controversial or arguably, because they were decided by 
the Grand Chamber of the Court, had a large impact on the development of the CJEU’s case-law.304  
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Judicial Review of Restrictions to Fundamental Freedoms: The Federalist Dimension of 
Proportionality 
Strict proportionality review- Union regulation of the area concerned, markedly discriminatory 
effects on firms and citizens endeavouring to exercise their fundamental freedoms and no sensitive 
national public policy at stake 
As a point of departure, it is recognised that restrictions to the fundamental freedoms are, as a rule, 
reviewed closely in the law of free movement. This is not surprising given that the four freedoms 
constitute the cornerstones of Union law and the European integration project.305 Thus, the CJEU tend 
to analyse closely whether the national restriction to the fundamental freedom at stake is suitable for 
achieving the stated objective and if that is the case, the Court subsequently apply the LRM test 
without giving discretion to the Member States in forming their policies.306 The cases discussed in this 
section, Laval307 and Caixa Bank, are both illustrating examples of a rigorous review of both the 
justification offered by the defendants and the proportionality of the restriction to the fundamental 
freedoms. 
Laval – strict justification review in the field of posted workers 
I will commence my examination with discussing the Laval case, since this is a recent expression of 
the Court’s stringent assessment of the ‘suitability’ test. The case was essentially concerned with the 
issue whether collective actions undertaken by Swedish trade unions, aiming to require a non-domestic 
service provider to sign a collective agreement which provided for more worker protection than 
Swedish mandatory legislation and the Posting Workers Directive308, and which simultaneously 
intended to require the non-domestic service provider to enter into pay negotiations with the trade 
unions, was contrary to the Treaty rules on free movement of services. The relevant factual 
background was that, Laval un Partneri Ltd (‘Laval’), a company incorporated under Latvian Law and 
with registered office was in Riga (Latvia), had, in early May 2004, posted several dozen workers 
from Latvia to work on Swedish building sites. The works were undertaken by a subsidiary company, 
L&P Baltic Bygg AB (‘Baltic Bygg’). The work included the renovation and extension of school 
premises in the town of Vaxholm, in the Stockholm area. Laval, had signed, in Latvia, collective 
agreements with the Latvian building sector’s trade union but was not bound by any collective 
agreement entered into with any Swedish trade union. In June 2004, contacts were established between 
a representative of Laval and of Baltic Bygg on the one hand, and, on the other, a delegate of local 
trade union branch No 1(‘Byggettan’) of the Swedish building and public works trade union 
(‘Byggnadsarbetareförbundet’). Negotiations were commenced with Byggettan with a view to 
concluding a tie-in to the collective agreement for the building sector, signed between 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and the Swedish building employers’ association (‘the 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet collective agreement’). Byggettan also required that Laval should 
guarantee the Latvian workers an hourly wage of SEK 145. However, no agreement was 
reached.309Subsequently, collective action by Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Byggettan was initiated 
on 2 November 2004 following advance notice of a blockade of all work at all Laval construction 
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sites. As from 3 December 2004, the Swedish electricians’ trade union (Svenska Elektrikerförbundet) 
(‘the SEF’) joined in as a solidarity action. All electrical work being carried out on the Vaxholm 
building site was thus halted. After the work on that site had been interrupted for some time, Baltic 
Bygg became the subject of liquidation proceedings and the Latvian workers posted by Laval to the 
Vaxholm site returned to Latvia. 310 In December 2004, Laval commenced proceedings before the 
Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labour Court) seeking inter alia a declaration as to the illegality both of 
the collective action by Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Byggettan, and of the solidarity action by the 
SEF. Arbetsdomstolen referred to the CJEU the issue whether the collective actions undertaken by the 
Swedish trade unions, were contrary to Article 12 EC and Article 49 EC. 311 
In terms of the restriction, the CJEU held that the right of trade unions of a Member State to take 
collective action by which undertakings established in other Member States may be forced to sign a 
collective agreement- certain terms of which depart from the legislative provisions and establish more 
favourable terms and conditions of employment as regards the matters referred to in the PWD, and 
other matters not referred to in there–constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services.312The CJEU thereafter considered the justification and stressed that the right to take 
collective action for the protection of the workers of the host State against possible social dumping 
could constitute an overriding reason of public interest, which in principle could justify restriction of 
one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. However, as regards the specific 
obligations, linked to the signing of the collective agreement for the building sector, which the trade 
unions sought to impose on Laval and Baltic Bygg by way of the contested blockading action, the 
CJEU found that this obstacle could not be justified with regard to such an objective. 313As regards the 
negotiations on pay which the Swedish trade unions sought to impose, by way of the contested 
collective actions against Laval and Baltic Bygg, the CJEU opined that Community law certainly did 
not prohibit Member States from requiring such undertakings to comply with their rules on minimum 
pay by appropriate means. However, the CJEU found that the collective actions could not be justified 
in the light of the public interest objective, where the pay negotiations which the contested collective 
action sought to require Laval enter into formed part of a national context characterised by a lack of 
provisions, of any kind, which were sufficiently precise and accessible that they did render it 
impossible or excessively difficult in practice for Laval to determine the obligations with which it was 
required to comply as regards minimum pay. Consequently, the restriction was contrary to Community 
law.314 
If we enter into a more detailed scrutiny of the Laval case, it can first be discussed whether this case 
really was about proportionality or whether this case was primarily concerned with the scope of the 
justification invoked by the trade unions. In my opinion, it appears that the case is predominantly 
concerned with the justification and the basic issue whether collective actions, serving to impose 
conditions not provided for by Swedish mandatory legislation, on foreign employers can be justified in 
the light of the legitimate objective of protecting posted workers. Laval is however relevant from a 
proportionality perspective in the sense that it demonstrates how the Court applies the suitability test 
and how strictly it scrutinize whether certain measures from private actors, namely collective actions, 
are considered suitable for attaining the legitimate objective of protection of workers. 
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The CJEU’s approach must be considered as a ‘rigorous’ justification review for two reasons.315 
Firstly, the CJEU did not consider, within the scope of the proportionality test, whether the Latvian 
workers were subject to similar or essentially similar requirements in Latvia as to minimum wage and 
collective agreements, as was suggested by Advocate General Mengozzi. 316 If the Court had examined 
the protection provided by the Latvian collective agreements and found that the protection provided by 
the Latvian collective agreements were substantially lower than the protection provided for by 
Swedish statutory legislation and the Swedish collective agreements, it could be argued that the Court 
should have considered the collective actions as justified in order to protect Latvian 
workers.317Secondly, the CJEU did not even consider whether the objective pursued by the Swedish 
trade unions, protection of Swedish workers, could have been achieved by any less restrictive 
measures. Since there were no mandatory Swedish rules on minimum pay it is possible to agree with 
Advocate General Mengozzi that the collective actions serving to establish a minimum pay was indeed 
suitable for the protection of Latvian workers and to avoid social dumping to the detriment of Swedish 
workers.318 Nevertheless, the Court did not accept this approach whereas it found that the collective 
actions, pursued with the intent to require Laval to sign all the terms of the ‘Byggnads collective 
agreement prior to enter into pay negotiations, was not an appropriate means for securing the 
protection of workers. Since the collective action at stake was not suitable for the protection of 
workers it was not even necessary for the Court to consider less restrictive measures.319 
It is further noticeable that that the trade union’s justification was not assessed in the light of the free 
movement of services and Article 49 but assessed primarily in the light of the PWD.320 The rigorous 
review of the trade union’s justification can therefore primarily be explained by linking it to the 
implications following from the PWD and the absence of national minimum rules on wages.321In this 
respect, it is argued that the PWD in essence is a Directive which primarily intends to enhance the 
cross-border provision of services.322 In this respect, the PWD must be considered as a concrete 
manifestation of the principles expressed in Article 49 EC. This assertion is based not only on the aim 
of the Directive but also on the fact that the dual legal basis for the Directive was found in the Chapter 
of the Rome Treaty concerning free movement of services and establishment, namely 57(2) and 66 EC 
(now after amendment Article 53(1) TFEU and Article 62 TFEU).323 It is therefore logical that the 
restriction imposed by the collective actions are interpreted in the light of the PWD whereas PWD 
provides a clear limit on what restrictions that Member State can impose on the cross-border provision 
of services.324 Thus, the PWD gives detailed normative guidelines on how restriction to the free 
movement of services protected by Article 49 EC should be assessed. The PWD basically implies that 
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the host state can impose their mandatory rules on foreign employers and that the host state can 
impose collective agreements on foreign employers if the collective agreements have been made 
universally applicable.325 When it comes to the protection of workers, the PWD’s focus is on posted 
workers and their terms and conditions of employment, and not on workers in the host state and their 
protection against social dumping.326The Court’s approach to the justification offered by the Swedish 
trade unions is also based on a very restrictive interpretation on how collective actions can serve the 
protection of workers. Protection of posted workers is in this regard considered by the Court as 
accomplished if the foreign undertaking respects the host state’s core of minimum rules provided for 
by the PWD.327  
Based on these premises, the obvious inference is that the PWD therefore prohibit the imposition of 
conditions and requirements for the protection of posted workers in matters which are not covered by 
the PWD.328 Given that that the ‘Byggnads’ collective agreement had not been made universally 
applicable pursuant to the PWD and given that the ‘Byggnads collective agreement’, imposed 
obligations on Laval, which went further than the PWD, e.g. additional pecuniary obligations in the 
form of an obligation to pay additional insurance premiums, building supplements and a premium for 
pay review, the Court deemed the collective actions serving to impose this collective agreement as 
clearly disproportionate.329 Further, whereas Sweden lacks rules on minimum pay, and whereas the 
pay negotiation obligations which the collective actions served to impose were not provided for by 
Swedish mandatory legislation and whereas the pay negotiation obligations did not constitute 
requirements on ‘minimum pay’, the Court came to the conclusions that these obligations also were 
disproportionate.330 
Caixa Bank France- strict application of the LRM test in the field of financial services 
Another illustrating example of a rigorous review of proportionality is the Caixa Bank case which 
concerned the issue whether French legislation which prohibited a credit institution from remunerating 
sight accounts in their own currency was contrary to the free movement rules. Having established that 
the French legislation constituted a restriction to the freedom to provide services, the CJEU considered 
whether this restriction could be justified. The French Government argued that that the prohibition on 
remuneration of sight accounts was justified on the basis of consumer protection and the 
encouragement of medium and long-term saving and that the prohibition was necessary for 
maintaining the provision of basic banking services without charge.331The CJEU did not consider the 
argument proposed by the French Government convincing and held that although consumer 
protection, invoked by the French Government, was a legitimate objective that could justify 
restrictions from the fundamental freedoms, the prohibition at issue even supposing that it ultimately 
presented certain benefits for the consumer, constituted a measure which clearly went beyond what 
was necessary to attain that objective. Even if the Court recognised that the removal of the prohibition 
against sight accounts entailed for consumers an increase in the cost of basic banking services, the 
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possibility might be envisaged that consumers were allowed to choose between an unremunerated 
sight account with certain basic banking services remaining free of charge and a remunerated sight 
account with the credit institution being able to make charges for banking services previously provided 
free, such as the issuing of cheques. In relation to the justification based on encouragement of medium 
and long-term saving, the CJEU observed that, while the prohibition of remuneration on sight accounts 
was indeed suitable for encouraging medium and long-term saving, it nevertheless remained a measure 
which went beyond what was necessary to attain that objective.332  The French legislation prohibiting 
remuneration of sight accounts was thus disproportionate and contrary to Article 43 EC. 
Why is Caixa Bank an instructive example of rigorous proportionality review? Even if the CJEU 
admitted that the French legislation was a suitable means for protecting consumers, it considered that 
there were less restrictive measures to achieve this objective, namely providing consumers with a 
choice between remunerated and unremunerated sight accounts. As to the encouragement of long-term 
saving, Advocate General Tizzano suggested that measures such as the setting of a maximum ceiling 
on interest rates on sight accounts or the creation of incentives for medium- and long-term investments 
were adequate alternatives for encouraging long term saving.333The CJEU did however take an 
uncompromising stance and simply found that the prohibition against the use of sight accounts was 
disproportionate in relation to the pursued objective, without justifying why that prohibition was 
disproportionate.  
Consolidated analysis of Laval and Caixa Bank- what are the common reasons for strict justifications 
review? 
If we are trying to make a consolidated analysis of Laval334 and Caixa Bank there are two common 
explanations why the CJEU was engaged in a rigorous proportionality/justification review in these 
cases. First, the rigorous proportionality review in Caixa Bank and Laval can be explained by the fact 
that the measures imposed by the French Government and the Swedish trade unions had very adverse 
effects on the affected undertakings.335 In the case of Caixa Bank, the French measure deprived Caixa 
Bank of its competitive advantage over French undertakings in the provision of financial services in 
the French market.336 In Laval, as stated above, the collective action by the Swedish trade unions 
effectively implied that Baltic Bygg and Laval were completely stopped from performing any work at 
the worksite and subsequently entailed that Baltic Bygg went into bankruptcy.337 In addition, the 
collective actions entailed that the Latvian workers lost their temporary employment in Sweden338. 
Secondly, it is argued that that the intense review of proportionality in Caixa Bank and Laval can be 
explained based on the assumption that the restrictions in these cases were of a particularly 
‘protectionist’ nature in that they constituted indirectly discriminatory measures harming foreign 
undertakings more than domestic undertakings.339 It is reasonable to assume that the CJEU regarded 
the national measures in Caixa Bank as measures designed to insulate its own producers and 
undertakings from foreign competition and the measures from the trade union in Laval as a means to 
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protect the trade union’s established position on the Swedish labour market, domestic workers and 
domestic undertakings to the detriment of non-domestic service providers and non-domestic 
workers.340  
Lenient Proportionality Review 
Measures infringing the fundamental freedoms in a policy area where the Member States’ derogation 
from the fundamental freedoms is related to fundamental rights and constitutional identity concerns 
This section discusses the basic tension between market freedoms and fundamental rights. In this 
regard, is submitted that fundamental rights as a valid justification from derogating from the 
fundamental freedoms must be concerned with the core aspects of fundamental rights; i.e. individual 
autonomy, democracy and human dignity.341 In addition, if a Member State’s derogation shall be 
considered as a fundamental right it needs to be protected by the national constitutions and the relevant 
international human rights instruments.342  
Since the case is the most recent expression of the CJEU’s sensitivity to national fundamental rights 
concerns it is appropriate to illustrate the fundamental rights case-law with the Wittgenstein case. The 
case was concerned with whether the Austrian law on the abolition of nobility which prohibited 
Austrian nationals to bear any title of nobility, was contrary to the Union rules on citizenship. 343The 
appellant in the case, Illonka Sayn Wittgenstein, an Austrian citizen, was born Ilonka Kerekes in 
Vienna in 1944 (‘Mrs Sayn Wittgenstein’). In October 1991, her surname was however recorded as 
‘Havel, née Kerekes’ due to an adoption under German law by a German citizen, Lothar Fürst von 
Sayn-Wittgenstein, which was formalised by decision of the Kreisgericht (District Court) Worbis 
(Germany). When she wished to have her new identity registered with the authorities in Vienna, those 
authorities wrote to the Kreisgericht Worbis in January 1992 for further particulars and that court 
subsequently issued a supplementary decision specifying that on adoption her birth surname became 
‘Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein’, the feminine form of her adoptive father’s surname. The Viennese 
authorities thereupon issued Mrs Sayn Wittgenstein with a birth certificate on 27 February 1992, in the 
name of Ilonka Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein. 344On 27 November 2003, the Austrian 
Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) nevertheless gave judgment in a case whose 
circumstances were similar to those of Mrs Sayn Wittgenstein and ruled that the Law on the abolition 
of the nobility precluded an Austrian citizen from acquiring, through adoption by a German citizen, a 
surname composed of a former title of nobility.345Sometime after that judgment, the registration 
authorities in Vienna took the view that Mrs Sayn Wittgenstein’s birth registration was incorrect and 
consequently, on 5 April 2007, they notified her of their intention to correct her surname in the birth 
register to ‘Sayn-Wittgenstein’. On 24 August 2007, despite her objections, they confirmed that 
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position. Her administrative appeal against that course of action having been dismissed, Mrs Sayn 
Wittgenstein sought to have the decision overturned by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Constitutional 
Court, Austria) arguing that it would be an interference with her rights of freedom of movement to 
require her to use different surnames in different Member States.346The Constitutional Court 
subsequently referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
The CJEU found that the refusal, by the authorities of a Member State, to recognise all the elements of 
the surname of a national of that State as determined in another Member State, in which that national 
resides, and as entered for 15 years in the register of civil status of the first Member State, was a 
restriction to the exercise of the Union rules on citizenship.347 The CJEU thereafter considered the 
justification and held that in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the abolition of 
the nobility, as an element of the Austrian national identity, should be taken into consideration when a 
balance was struck between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons recognised 
under Union law.348 The CJEU then held that the justification based on the constitutional status of the 
Law on the abolition of nobility was related to public policy and that objective considerations relating 
to public policy were capable of justifying, in a Member State, a refusal to recognise the surname of 
one of its nationals, as accorded in another Member State. The CJEU stressed that the specific 
circumstances, which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy, may vary from one 
Member State to another and from one era to another. The Austrian Government argued that the Law 
on the abolition of the nobility constituted implementation of the more general principle of equality 
before the law of all Austrian citizens. The CJEU reaffirmed, by referring to the Charter of 
fundamental rights that the Union legal system undeniably sought to ensure the observance of the 
principle of equal treatment as a general principle of law and that there was no doubt that the objective 
of observing the principle of equal treatment was compatible with Union law.349The CJEU further held 
that it was not indispensable for the restrictive measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to 
correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the 
fundamental right or legitimate interest in question was to be protected and that, on the contrary, the 
need for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted were not excluded merely because one 
Member State had chosen a system of protection different from that adopted by another State.350 The 
CJEU then referred to Article 4(2) TEU, and emphasised the Union’s obligation to respect the national 
identities of its Member States, which included the status of the Austrian State as a Republic. The 
CJEU concluded that by refusing to recognise the noble elements of a name, the Austrian authorities 
responsible for civil status matters did not go further than was necessary in order to ensure the 
attainment of the fundamental constitutional objective pursued by them and the restriction was 
consequently proportionate.351 
Wittgenstein firstly pronounces that, the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, 
in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a 
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement of goods. The Wittgenstein 
judgment further follows the path of the case-law in Schmidberger, Omega, and Dynamic Medien and 
the ruling consequently reinforces the perception that in cases where the Member States’ justification 
from derogating from the fundamental freedoms is related to a genuine fundamental rights concern, 
the CJEU is ready to confer the national authorities with a broad discretion as to decide whether a less 
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restrictive measure could have been adopted to achieve the pursued objective.352 The Wittgenstein 
judgment also reinforces the Omega rationale in that it displays the Court’s willingness to accept that 
Member States can invoke the necessity to respect fundamental rights as respected in their 
constitutions, to broaden their margin of appreciation under an express Treaty derogation of public 
policy.  
The reasons for lenient proportionality review in these cases is that the CJEU perceives that genuine 
fundamental rights concern is a matter of sensitive national policies, philosophical, moral and 
constitutional concerns.353 Fundamental freedoms shall not compromise those political values which 
are essential to protecting human dignity, autonomy and equality.354 The Court have thus indicated, as 
mentioned above, that it may review proportionality less closely if the derogation is related to human 
dignity (Omega), principle of equality (Wittgenstein), freedom of assembly (Schmidberger), and the 
protection of child/human dignity (Dynamic Medien) . It may thus be argued that Member States are 
free to take measures to protect the central interests, symbols and values of their societies in the legal 
frame of ‘fundamental rights’ and that the Court in such cases only engages in marginal review.355  
If we revert to the discussion above in Laval, it is interesting to contrast this ruling with the rulings in,  
Schmidberger, Omega and Wittgenstein given that all these cases concerned the balancing of 
fundamental freedoms with fundamental rights, given that the fundamental right invoked by the 
defendants was recognised as a fundamental right in Union law and had constitutional protection in 
the Member State concerned and despite this the CJEU adopted a more intense review of 
proportionality in Laval than in the other cases.356 In my opinion, the different standard of 
proportionality review can be explained on the basis of the factual circumstances of the cases and the 
nature of the invoked justifications.  
Firstly, in Schmidberger, Omega and Wittgenstein, the national practice or rule was related to a 
genuine fundamental right concern. It is doubtful whether this was the case in Laval as it seems that 
the Swedish trade unions primarily was concerned with protecting their position on the Swedish labour 
market and the protection of domestic workers and undertakings.357The Court thus seems to perceive 
that the collective actions at stake did not serve to achieve the legitimate objective of protection of 
posted workers. In this regard, it was however argued by the Swedish trade unions that the 
enforcement of the fundamental freedoms infringed the ‘essence’ of their right to take collective 
action, particularly given that the collective actions undertaken by the Swedish trade union was 
considered legal by the Swedish authorities and the Swedish Labour Court.358 
As discussed above, the free movement rules and proportionality do not imply that trade union’s right 
to take collective action is negated.359 From the viewpoints of collective autonomy of trade unions and 
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federalism, free movement and proportionality essentially entails that trade unions need to consider 
whether collective actions have excessive negative effects for foreign undertakings, imposes duplicate 
requirements which the service providers are already bound by in the home Member State or whether 
the collective agreements which the collective actions intend to impose on foreign undertakings does 
go further than the mandatory rules of the host state.360 In this regard, it is not difficult to foresee 
circumstances where collective actions would be considered perfectly legal under the proportionality 
test. First, there should be a limit in time and scope of the collective action. In Laval, the collective 
actions seemed to be of unlimited nature and the scope of the action was substantive given that also 
SEF joined in for a solidarity action. Laval was consequently stopped from performing work anywhere 
in Sweden.361 It is argued that a collective action which for example only lasted for a week or did not 
in fact stop the foreign undertaking from performing work is much more likely to be considered 
proportionate. It is also reasonably to foresee a situation where the collective actions only served to 
require the non-domestic undertakings to accept the minimum rules in the host country as required by 
the PWD or a pre-existing collective agreement regarding the minimum rates of pay. Such a collective 
action is more likely to be considered proportionate than a collective action serving to impose 
obligations which clearly goes further than the host state’s minimum rules for the protection of posted 
workers and collective actions that serve to impose pay negotiations on the foreign employer wherein 
the outcome of the negotiations is completely unpredictable. In sum, it the enforcement of the 
fundamental freedoms in Laval did not infringe the “essence” of the right to take collective action362. 
Secondly, Laval was concerned with a policy area that had been subject to Union legislation by means 
of the PWD whereas this was not the case in Schmidberger, Omega and Wittgenstein363. Despite that 
the PWD is not a substantive harmonisation measure as it does not harmonise working conditions, the 
PWD provides for a maximum harmonisation in relation to what rules that can be imposed a foreign 
employer.364 As mentioned above, the PWD and the absence of national minimum rules had a decisive 
impact on the Court's ruling and standard of proportionality review in Laval whereas the PWD and the 
free movement rules prohibit the imposition of conditions and requirements for the protection of 
posted workers in matters which are not covered by the PWD.365 
Constitutional identity, different values of fundamental rights and proportionality 
There is a further difference between Schmidberger, Omega, Wittgenstein on the one hand and Laval, 
which may have contributed to the different standard of proportionality review. This difference is 
concerned with the controversial concept of constitutional identity and the values of the fundamental 
rights concerned.366 There is no room here to give an exhaustive discussion on this concept but I will 
recount the concept as it has been understood in Union law and by the CJEU. The point of departure 
for the discussion is Article 4(2) TEU which provides that: 
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‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government…...’   
Based on Omega, Michaniki367, Wittgenstein, the Court has spelled out quite clearly the limits of 
Article 4 (2) TEU and under which circumstances the Member State can invoke national constitutional 
concerns as defense for derogating from the fundamental freedoms. In Michaniki, the Court held that a 
national constitutional provision which established a system of general incompatibility between the 
sector of public works and that of the media had the consequence of excluding from the award of 
public contracts public works an entire category contractors who were also involved in the media 
sector on account of a connection as owner, main shareholder, partner or management executive, 
without affording them any possibility of showing, with regard to any evidence advanced, for instance, 
by a competitor, that, in their case, there is no real risk of the type referred to above. Therefore the rule 
went beyond what was necessary to achieve the claimed objectives of transparency and equal 
treatment and was incompatible with Community law.368 In Wittgenstein, The CJEU did not refer to 
legitimate objectives when justifying the proportionality of the Austrian rule in Wittgenstein but went 
further and introduced the term ‘fundamental constitutional objective’.369 It may be argued that 
‘fundamental constitutional objectives’ is a more serious concern for the state, than mandatory 
requirements, which can be invoked when Member States imposes non-discriminatory restrictions to 
the fundamental freedom. Whereas the Court explicitly referred to Article 4(2) TEU, it is contended 
that the restriction, if it is to be characterised as furthering a ‘fundamental constitutional objective’, 
must mirror the core of the national constitutional identity. But what is meant by a fundamental 
constitutional objective? 
The Greek constitutional rule in Michaniki thus being mainly concerned with public procurement law 
was arguably not concerned with fundamental values of the Greek state or the Greek constitution nor 
immediate concerns for democracy, individual autonomy or human dignity. Therefore, it did not have 
any decisive on influence the CJEU’s proportionality assessment in providing more discretion to the 
Member State, when derogating from the fundamental freedoms. In Wittgenstein, on the other hand 
the rule on abolishing nobility names was an expression of the Austrian Republic and its constitutional 
identity. Accordingly, the Court was ready to give more discretion to the Austrian authorities when it 
implemented its public policies on use of different surnames. Likewise, in Omega, the rule prohibiting 
sale of ‘simulated killing games’, was a direct expression of the principle of human dignity which 
forms the basis of the German Basic law.370 Therefore, the CJEU found that the national authorities 
had a wide discretion in implementing their policies on how human dignity should be protected. 
Consequently, as argued by Advocate General Maduro in Michaniki the case-law implies that more 
insignificant provisions of national constitutional law – those which do not form part of the 
constitutional identity of the Member State – may not work as a strong defense when the state is 
derogating from the fundamental freedoms. Article 4(2) TEU and the Union’s obligation to respect the 
constitutional identity of the Member State do not entail an absolute obligation for the CJEU to defer 
to all national constitutional rules. In this case, I agree with Advocate General Maduro that the 
principles of effectiveness and uniform application of Union law entails that the CJEU must be able to 
review the compatibility of national constitutional rules in the light of the Treaty freedoms. 371 If 
Member States could, without qualifications, use their national constitutions to derogate from Union 
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law, the supremacy of Union law would be endangered and this would in the end threaten the 
consistency and foundations for the European legal order.  
In Laval, it is suggested contrary to Achtsioglou that the Swedish rules on the right to take collective 
actions cannot be said to constitute an expression of the Swedish constitutional identity372. Achtsioglou 
considers that the right to take collective action is a part of the constitutional identity of Sweden based 
on inter alia the assertion that it is an expression of the Social State Model. I do not believe that her 
views are entirely persuasive. Even if the right to strike is an expression of the Social State Model this 
does not imply that the right to take collective actions is a part of the Swedish constitutional identity. 
The basic reason for this is that classical political individual rights have a stronger constitutional 
protection than social rights both in the Swedish legal order and in the Union legal order. 373   From a 
purely national perspective it appears that the right to take collective actions provided for in Chapter 2 
Article 14 of the Swedish Constitution can be limited by agreement while laws only can delimit other 
political rights as the freedom of expression, human dignity or the right to equality.374 This limitation 
on the scope of the right is in my opinion a sufficient reason to consider that the ‘right to strike’ does 
not enjoy a very strong protection in relation to other classical individual political rights. Even if the 
Swedish rules on collective actions would from a purely national perspective be considered as a part of 
the Swedish constitutional identity there are further reasons why the Court in Laval was not willing to 
give the trade unions a broad margin of discretion. Consistent with the argumentation above,  the 
scope of ‘constitutional identity’ cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member State but must be 
determined by the Court, taking into account the level of protection to the right granted by 
international and European human rights instruments. The argument here is that a ‘fundamental 
constitutional objective’ or a ‘fundamental right’ for a state must also be recognised at the European 
Union level to be successfully defended by the state as a valid derogation from the fundamental 
freedoms. 
It is here argued that the ‘right to take collective action’ is not a right of such a fundamental character 
that it gives trade unions discretion in how these rights are enforced against the free movement rules. 
In both the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSRW)  and the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) there appears to be a notable distinction drawn 
between the individual freedom to associate and other aspects of trade union association, such as 
collective bargaining and the right to strike. The right of the worker to join or refuse to join an 
association is treated as an unqualified right in both Charters. By way of contrast, rights to negotiate, 
conclude collective agreements and engage in collective action are made explicitly subject to national 
laws and practice.375 For example, Article 28 of the EUCFR does not so much allow scope for 
exceptional protection of the right to strike, but rather suggests that entitlements under national law 
may be struck down by the CJEU to the extent that they are inconsistent with the fundamental 
freedoms. The right to take collective action, as provided by Union law is therefore a right which can 
be limited both by Union law, i.e. the fundamental freedoms, and by national law and practices.376 In 
this regard, it is strongly argued that the choice of method and intensity of judicial review depends on 
what level of protection the fundamental right or the rule expressing the state’s constitutional identity 
has in international and European human rights instruments and in the national legal order.377 This 
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seem to reinforce the perception the right to take collective action is a fundamental right of an inferior 
value than classical civil and political rights and thus a weaker ground as defense for derogation from 
the fundamental freedoms.378 Therefore, the right to take collective action do not mirror ‘fundamental 
constitutional objectives’. This also implies that a defence based on the right to strike is not likely to 
be accepted by the CJEU as a reason for marginal proportionality review granting a wide margin of 
discretion to the trade unions when enforcing their rights against the fundamental freedoms. 
Fundamental rights, federalism and proportionality 
The key conclusion from the case law on fundamental rights, i.e. Schmidberger, Omega, Dynamic 
Medien and Wittgenstein, is that the CJEU review national measures infringing the fundamental 
freedoms less intensively if the former could be defined as a fundamental right or as an expression of 
the state’s constitutional identity.379 From the federalist lens it may be said that the CJEU have 
reasserted a pluralistic policy in the fundamental rights case law where fundamental rights and 
constitutional values of the Member States is placed on par with the fundamental freedoms, provided 
these rights and values also are protected on Union level.380In contrast to the main rule in the law of 
free movement, proportionality does not, if the national regulation or policy is based on a genuine 
fundamental rights concern, require that Member States accommodates all their policies and practices 
to a transnational context nor that they take into account every interest of foreign firms and Union 
citizens when designing their policies. Nevertheless, proportionality still requires that Member State 
ensure that such policies do not affect foreign undertakings more than domestic producers and that 
such policies they are not manifestly disproportionate to the pursued aim. If it is obvious that there 
exist measures which are less restrictive to intra-community trade and such measures are appropriate 
to achieve the pursued aim, the Member State cannot successfully invoke fundamental rights to 
derogate from the Treaty freedoms. 381 
Measures Infringing the Fundamental Freedoms in a Sensitive Policy Area which has not been 
subject to Union Harmonisation 
Sensitive national policies - public order, public morality, national security and public health 
In this section, it will be discussed how the CJEU undertakes judicial review of proportionality in the 
situation where the Member State has imposed a restriction of the fundamental freedoms but invokes a 
justification, which is based on sensitive public policies. First, I will however discuss the ambiguous 
concept of ‘sensitive national policies’.  
In fact, it can be contended that justifications based on national fundamental rights concern or 
justifications based on constitutional identity which was discussed in the previous section fall within 
the concept of ‘national sensitive policies’. However, in order to clarify the discussion in the paper I 
have decided to distinguish between justifications based on ‘fundamental rights’ and justifications 
based on measures that intend to attain the objectives of ‘public order, public morality, national 
security and public health’. In this regard, the argument can be made that the justifications based on 
fundamental rights also falls within the scope of ‘public morality’. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between justification based on ‘ public morality’ and ‘fundamental rights’ can be justified given that 
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‘public morality’ is more concerned with the local national collective view on ‘public morality’ while 
fundamental rights justification in the end is concerned with enforcing individual rights such as 
freedom of expression, equality and human dignity. In this respect, ‘public morality’ should be 
understood in a narrow sense aiming at measures which primarily are concerned with protecting the 
state’s view on what services and products that should be banned or regulated due to their offensive or 
obscene characteristics.382 
Based on Article 36 of the TFEU, it can be inferred that ‘sensitive national policies’ essentially can be 
defined as policies/measures which aim to uphold public morality, public health, national security and 
public order.383In terms of public morality, sensitive national policies are policies where moral, 
religious and cultural factors play an important role in deciding the policies pursued by the Member 
State. These are areas which are sensitive ideologically for the state.384  Moral values differ from state 
to state and public morality in the current state of European law is clearly an area where there is no 
consensus among the states. The harmonisation among the Member States in terms of public morality 
is minimal and that therefore it will be at the best a basic agreement between the states at the European 
level, leaving considerable scope for divergence between the Member States. Moral values differ from 
state to state. Consequently, different Member States will take different views on how as to what 
should be regulated and banned and as to what will threaten its particular concept of public 
morality.385The Member State’s choice should not be interfered with merely because there was another 
measure which a different state might have chosen instead.386 Within the scope of the conception 
‘national sensitive policies’ are also included measures that serve to ensure that public order and 
national security is preserved, i.e. the supply of services that are necessary for the government or its 
territory.387 Such policies aim to safeguard the government machinery that enables protection of public 
order and national security.388 
Due to these considerations, it is not difficult to understand that the Member States feels that the Court 
should be careful in substituting the judgment of the national legislator in relation to sensitive national 
policies.389 This is however not the approach adopted by the Court generally which rather departs from 
the assumption the rules of the free movement are fundamental rights and that any derogation 
therefrom will be strictly scrutinized by the Court to see if such derogation is necessary to achieve the 
purported aim.  In this respect, it is argued that national sensitive policies can only be a valid defence 
if the national rule actually intends to achieve the public national interest in a consistent manner.390 If 
the national rule discriminates against foreign firms or citizens or is intended primarily to safeguard 
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the financial interests of the state it is not likely that that the state successfully can plead the 
justification on the basis of a sensitive national policy.391 Even if this sounds like a strict 
proportionality test it will be seen below that the Court clearly takes into account the nature of the 
national justification when it reviews proportionality.392 
Gambling, public morality, public order and proportionality 
In this respect, there have been several cases in the field of gambling, an area closely related to public 
morality393, where the CJEU have displayed a Member State friendly approach to national measures 
giving national authorities discretion as to how they implement gambling policies. I will illustrate this 
point with the Santa Casa case, which concerned the issue whether Portuguese legislation394 that had 
conferred exclusive rights to operate games of chance in Portugal to a public body, Departamento de 
Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa (‘Santa Casa’) was consistent with the fundamental 
freedoms.395 The background to the dispute was that Bwin International Ltd (Bwin), an on-line 
gambling undertaking which has its registered office in Gibraltar but no establishment in Portugal, had 
decided on 18 August 2005 to enter into a sponsorship agreement with Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
Profissional (Liga), a private-law legal person, which is made up of all Portuguese clubs taking part in 
professional football in Portugal, for four playing seasons starting in 2005/2006. This agreement made 
Bwin the main sponsor of the First Division of Portugal and made it possible for Bwin and Liga to 
jointly offer gambling services to consumers in Portugal and in other States. Subsequently, in 
exercising the powers conferred on them by the Decree-Law, the directors of the Gaming Department 
of Santa Casa adopted decisions imposing fines on Liga and Bwin in respect of administrative 
offences committed under the Decree-Law, for offering bets and advertising them. The Liga and Bwin 
brought actions before the national court for annulment of those decisions, invoking, inter alia, that the 
decisions was contrary to Community law and the Tribunal de Pequena Instância Criminal do Porto 
(Local Criminal Court, Oporto) subsequently referred the case to the CJEU for preliminary ruling.  
Having established that that the Portuguese legislation constituted a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services the CJEU considered the justification offered by the defendants.396The CJEU 
observed that the legislation on games of chance is one of the areas in which there are significant 
moral, religious and cultural differences between the Member States. The CJEU therefore held that in 
the absence of Community harmonisation in the field of gambling, it was for each Member State to 
determine in accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that the 
interests in question are protected.  The CJEU further stressed that the fact that a Member State had 
opted for a system of protection which differed from that adopted by another Member State did not 
affect the proportionality assessment. 397The CJEU admitted that, the justification invoked by the 
Portuguese Government, the fight against crime with the purpose of protecting consumer against fraud 
constituted an overriding reason in the public interest that was capable of justifying restrictions in 
respect of operators authorised to offer services in the games-of-chance sector.398 The CJEU 
acknowledged that the grant of exclusive rights to operate games of chance via the internet to a single 
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operator, such as Santa Casa, which was subject to strict control by the public authorities, could 
confine the operation of gambling within controlled channels and be regarded as an appropriate means 
for the purpose of protecting consumers against fraud on the part of operators. 399As to whether the 
system was necessary, the CJEU stressed that the sector involving games of chance offered via the 
internet had not been the subject of Community harmonisation. Portugal was therefore entitled to take 
the view that the mere fact that an operator such as Bwin lawfully offered services in that sector via 
the internet in another Member State, in which it was established and where it was in principle already 
subject to statutory conditions on the part of the competent authorities in that State, could not be 
regarded as amounting to a sufficient assurance that national consumers would be protected against the 
risks of fraud and crime. The CJEU concluded that there was no breach of the proportionality principle 
and that the restriction could be justified on the basis of Article 49 EC.400 
Santa Casa is a case decided on the basis of a consistent case-law of the CJEU in Schindler401and 
Läärä402 and Zenatti403 showing sensitivity for national discretion in the field of gambling. Consistent 
with Schindler, it was emphasised in Santa Casa that in the field of gambling the Member States are 
free to determine in accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that 
the interests in question are protected and in setting their policy objectives. The Court did also in Santa 
Casa, consistent with the mentioned case-law, demonstrate its respect for national diversity in by 
stressing that it is not decisive for the proportionality of the national measures whether a Member State 
has opted for a system which differs from the other Member States.404In the field of gambling it is 
suggested that Member States have been provided with a margin of discretion by the CJEU to decide 
whether gambling activities should be totally prohibited, partially prohibited or only restrict them and 
decide on the design of their authorisation system, as far as the Member State do not manifestly 
exceed their discretion.405When several alternatives are at hand, it lies within the discretionary 
assessment of the Member State to choose which one, as long as the alternative is not disproportionate 
in relation to the pursued objective. 406 
In addition, it is material to observe that the home state control principle do not apply within the frame 
of the proportionality test in the field of gambling. Therefore, it seems irrelevant for the CJEU whether 
a non-domestic service provider have been subject to a license requirement or authorisation in another 
Member State, when determining the suitability of the national restriction.407Why is the lenient 
approach undertaken by the CJEU in cases concerning national gambling regulation? In relation to the 
policy field at stake, it may be argued that the limited judicial review of proportionality could be 
explained partly by the fact that there is no substantial Union harmonisation in this field.408 Apart from 
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the differences in operating systems, there are exceptions to the general prohibition where it exists, 
and the definition of ‘games of chance and gambling’ and the scope of the national legislations are not 
uniform over the Union.409Further, national gambling regulation is clearly related to ‘public order’ and 
‘public morality’. Gambling legislation often express cultural, moral, religious and societal values as 
to how consumers should be protected from excessive gambling.410 Whereas national gambling 
legislation is intended to protect the Member State’s fundamental values and interests the Court give 
them larger margin of discretion to form such policies.411 
There are, however, limits to national discretion. In the Gambelli case, the Court introduced a 
requirement that restrictions based on consumer protection and the prevention of fraud and on the need 
to preserve public order must be suitable for achieving those objectives, in the sense that they must 
serve to limit betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner. The CJEU is thus ready to 
declare incompatible with the Treaty manifest excesses of national discretion, which involve 
obviously discriminatory or disproportionate measures, or alternatively provide national courts with 
detailed guidelines on how proportionality should be assessed. 412 
Restrictions on selling and importation of liquor, public health, public morality and proportionality 
In terms of examining the CJEU’s case law on sensitive public policies and fundamental freedoms it is 
also appropriate consider the field of national regulation on the advertisement sales promotion and 
selling of liquors and the public health and public morality justification.413 Gourmet, which concerned 
the issue whether a Swedish legislation entailing a general prohibition of alcohol advertising was 
compatible with the Treaty, is an illustrative example of a lenient proportionality assessment. 414 In this 
decision, the CJEU held, that the decision as to whether the Swedish legislation was proportionate, and 
in particular as to whether the objective sought might be achieved by less extensive prohibitions or 
restrictions or by prohibitions or restrictions having less effect on intra-Community trade, called for an 
analysis of the circumstances of law and of fact which characterised the situation in the Member State 
concerned, which the national court was in a better position than the CJEU to carry out.415The CJEU 
therefore opined that the Treaty did not preclude national legislation entailing a general prohibition of 
alcohol advertising, unless it was apparent that, in the circumstances of law and of fact which 
characterised the situation in the Member State concerned, the protection of public health against the 
harmful effects of alcohol could be ensured by measures having less effect on intra-Community 
trade.416 
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Why is Gourmet an example of a lenient proportionality review? Even if the CJEU discussed less 
restrictive measures in Gourmet, it is clear that the national measures must be manifestly 
disproportionate for being declared disproportionate by the national courts (“unless it is apparent”).417 
In addition, the Court provided very concise guidelines to the national court as to how they should 
assess proportionality.418 Based on the case-law in Gourmet, Aragonesa and Loi Evin, it appears that in 
the field of alcohol regulation, the Court is more focussed on reasonableness between the measures 
and the pursued aim rather than the existence of less restrictive alternative measures and therefore 
gives discretion to the Member States in applying the LMR test.419Thus, in the absence of 
harmonisation, Member States are free to adopt national measures aimed at preventing people from 
drinking alcohol, even where these measures have a negative impact on the fundamental freedoms, as 
far as the restriction is not manifestly disproportionate to its stated objective or implies a substantive 
adverse effect on the fundamental freedoms.420 
Why is this soft approach to proportionality undertaken in the field of national liquor regulation? In 
relation to the policy field at stake it may be argued that the limited judicial review of proportionality 
could, similar to the case of national gambling legislation, be explained by reference to the fact that 
there is no Union harmonisation or European consensus in this field. Different Member States have 
different ways of dealing with abuse of alcohol and in this respect the CJEU is concerned to give the 
Member States discretion as to how they wish to protect public health and what is required to achieve 
the level of protection sought by the Member State.421 In this regard, it is clear from the case-law that 
the fact that one Member State imposes stricter rules to combat alcohol abuses than another Member 
State does not mean that the formers’ rules are disproportionate.422 
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Sensitive national policies, proportionality and federalism 
What effects does the national sensitiveness on behalf of the CJEU in the cases concerning gambling 
regulation and national liquor regulation produce from a federal point of view? 423 In terms of 
allocation of powers, it is suggested that this approach is likely to preserve diversity in the application 
of Union law. Member State will therefore be able to maintain their regulatory freedom and choose 
their own standard of protection without having to take into account the standard of protection in other 
Member States.424 Nevertheless, national policy makers need to think ‘federal’ and make sure that 
their national policies is appropriate for attaining the public health or the public morality objective and 
do not have excessive adverse effects on cross-border trade.  The CJEU will therefore intervene if 
national authorities manifestly exceed their discretion, which involve obviously discriminatory or 
disproportionate measures.425 In the field of gambling regulation, national legislator need to ensure 
that their national policies in a systematic and consistent manner contributes to achieve the objectives 
of protecting consumer, fighting crimes and ensuring public order. As far as the policies are pursued in 
a systematic manner, does not discriminate against foreign undertakings and not primarily aims to 
strengthen the state’s financial resources, the Member State have a wide discretion in how they form 
their national policies. In terms of alcohol regulation, it should be recognized that broadly-focused 
policies have more difficulty in passing proportionality tests, implying that national policymakers 
should recognize that even a slight targeting of a generally broad policy could make a significant 
difference.426 Policies should therefore be targeted on health and social concerns and not on the 
safeguarding of national financial interests or targeted at protecting domestic undertakings.427 
Proportionality is therefore in these policy fields applied both to protect diversity and unity in the 
application of Union law and may therefore be a safeguard of federalism. 428 
Strict review of proportionality and federalism 
From a federal perspective both Laval and Caixa Bank are examples of a standard of proportionality 
review which imposes strict limits on the Member States’ and private parties’ regulatory freedom. 
Even though this proportionality standard does not entail that Union competences takes over national 
competences in the policy area at stake, proportionality requires that national regulators and private 
parties need to accommodate and evaluate their policies to a transnational context and take into 
account not only national interests but also interests of firms and citizens from other Member States, 
when suggesting legislation which have a cross-border effect. 429 Subsequent to Laval, trade unions 
may be required to consider whether the imposition of collective agreements may have serious adverse 
effects on foreign undertakings intending to provide cross-border services, whether the collective 
agreements goes further than national mandatory legislation and whether such undertakings are 
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already subject to similar requirements in their home country.430 The possible effect of Caixa Bank is 
that national regulators in their turn need to contemplate whether a prohibition on certain marketing 
methods in the financial services sector may affect service providers from other Member States more 
than domestic producers and whether such restrictions are strictly necessary for the protection of 
consumers or for the encouragement of long term or medium term saving. 
Conclusions 
This paper intended mainly to examine two issues: 
i. Explain why the CJEU undertakes an intense review of proportionality in certain cases 
concerning restrictions to the fundamental freedoms and why the CJEU undertakes a less 
intense review in other cases. 
ii. Evaluate if proportionality can provide a safeguard of federalism and to what extent a specific 
standard of proportionality review influences the national policy maker’s regulatory freedom. 
On the basis of the undertaken examination several factors have been identified which influence the 
CJEU’s proportionality assessment in the law of free movement. The determination of the intensity of 
review is done through a complex interplay between these factors and it is therefore necessary to 
consider the specific facts in every case to decide whether a national measure complies with the 
Treaty.431 The relevant intensity-determinative factors are the following. 
i. If the measure from the Member State falls within an area which is primarily within the 
competence of the Member States suggesting that Union legislative measures in the area 
concerned gives Member States less discretion when derogating from the fundamental 
freedoms,432 
ii. the policy area at stake and the nature of the national interest and European interest suggesting 
that sensitive national policies such as gambling regulation and liquor regulation which are 
clearly related to public health, public order and public morality may inspire the CJEU to 
review proportionality less intense, particularly if such measures lies within the primary 
competences of the Member State,433 
iii. whether the national rule or private practice genuinely contribute to achieve the legitimate 
objective invoked by the state or private actor assuming that the CJEU is suspicious to 
inconsistent national practices which involves indirect discrimination or intends to achieve 
another objective than the invoked legitimate objective,434 
iv. whether the Member State can invoke a genuine fundamental rights concern, provided that the 
right is protected both by the national constitution and the Union legal order, suggesting that 
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such a fundamental right concern gives the Member State more discretion when derogating 
from the Treaty freedoms,435 
v. the circumstances of the case suggesting that excessive negative effects for the undertakings 
concerned exercising their free movement or serious protective effects may provide an 
incentive for the CJEU to review the defence to the fundamental freedoms more closely.436 
It was firstly argued in the paper that Laval and Caixa Bank is evidence that restrictions to the 
fundamental freedoms as a rule are reviewed closely in the law of free movement. Proportionality is 
thus mainly applied in the law of free movement to promote the fundamental freedoms at the loss of 
national regulatory freedom. This does not mean that Union competences will take over national 
competences and regulate the policy area at stake but rather that national regulators and private parties 
need to accommodate their policies to a transnational context and take into account not only national 
interests but also interests of firms and citizens from other Member States, when suggesting legislation 
which have a cross-border effect. 
However, it was subsequently shown that there are several examples in the case-law of the CJEU 
demonstrating a more lenient review of proportionality which shows concern for national sensitivity 
and a more pluralistic policy from the CJEU when reviewing national measures in the light of the 
fundamental freedoms. In contrast to the main rule in the law of free movement, proportionality does 
not, if the national regulation or policy is based on a genuine fundamental rights concern, require that 
Member States accommodate all their policies and practices to a transnational context and that they 
take into account every interest of foreign firms and Union citizens. There are however limits to the 
national discretion. If the national rule or national practices which are justified on the basis of 
fundamental rights, have excessive negative effects for the affected undertakings, the CJEU may strike 
down the national rule or national practice. Consequently, it may be suggested that proportionality has 
been applied in the fundamental rights case law to safeguard federalism by both protecting national 
diversity and uniform application of Union law. Proportionality may also be reviewed less strictly if 
the Member State invokes a genuine justification, such as consumer protection or the fight against 
fraud and crime, which is related to sensitive policy fields such as public health or public morality. 
The more lenient approach to proportionality in the cases national liquor regulation and national 
gambling regulation is to a certain extent amenable to preserve diversity in the application of Union 
law, implying that Member States are given certain discretion as to how they decide to regulate the 
national market. There are however limits to national discretion. The CJEU will therefore intervene in 
case of manifest excesses of national discretion, which involve obviously discriminatory or 
disproportionate measures. Proportionality in these policy fields is therefore applied both to protect 
diversity and unity in the application of Union law and may therefore be a safeguard of federalism.
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Abstract 
This paper contributes to a growing body literature that uses comparative federalism as a framework to 
analyze the European Union. The main argument put forward is that, by and large, most previous 
studies have adhered to an overly formalistic or “positivistic” (in an epistemological sense) concept of 
federalism. I argue that these studies’ narrow focus on, allegedly, “objective” features of federal 
systems (including the distribution/separation of competences) misses an important essence of the 
EU’s nature—its inherent contentedness and ambiguity. I suggest that shifting focus from the analysis 
of competences towards the study of discourses and disputes over competences allows for insightful 
comparisons of the EU with other federal systems. Theoretically and methodologically, I primary 
draw on insights from political science whereas the discourse I study contains a great deal of legal 
reasoning. 
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This paper** contributes to a growing body literature that uses comparative federalism as a framework 
to analyze the European Union. The main argument put forward is that, by and large, most previous 
studies have adhered to an overly formalistic or “positivistic” (in an epistemological sense) concept of 
federalism. I argue that these studies’ narrow focus on, allegedly, “objective” features of federal 
systems (including the distribution/separation of competences) misses an important essence of the 
EU’s nature—its inherent contentedness and ambiguity. I suggest that shifting focus from the analysis 
of competences towards the study of discourses and disputes over competences allows for insightful 
comparisons of the EU with other federal systems. Theoretically and methodologically, I primary 
draw on insights from political science whereas the discourse I study contains a great deal of legal 
reasoning. 
I will proceed as follows; firstly, I will discuss some of the ways in which federal theory has been used 
to make sense of European integration. I will then suggest a non-teleological federal framework on the 
basis of which the debates and discourses over federal competences can be studied. In a second step, I 
will put this framework into practice. Thereby, I will compare the debate over the nature of the EU 
with the (historic) nature of the Union debate in the US. More specifically, I will use the debates over 
sovereignty as a proxy/showcase for the overall debate in both cases. I hold that the essence of EU 
federalism is to be found in its fundamental contentedness rather than in any objective, clearly 
definable stature. Finally, in a third part I suggest that the EU’s constitutional “state of limbo” need 
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not be seen as a flaw or pathology of the EU. I conclude that further research is needed to determine if 
the contentedness of a federal system can serve as a stabilizing factor and a safeguard against 
unchecked centralization. 
What is the EU and How to Address this Question? 
The questions “What is the European Union?” and “What is the end or purpose of European 
integration?” have been a key focus of scholars trying to make sense of the EU (and its 
predecessors)437 ever since the ratification of the Rome Treaties. During this period, an increasingly 
complex body of literature—“European integration theory” (cf. Wiener & Diez 2009; Pollack 2005; 
Rosamond 2000)—has been devoted to the study of these questions. However, despite all scholarly 
efforts for clarification, the academic (as well as the political) debates over the “nature of the beast” 
(Risse-Kappen 1996) and its finality remain.  
My point of departure is that the various theories of European integration offer quite a different—if 
not opposed—interpretation of the very same empirical “facts”. For instance, from an 
intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik 2001) or an international law perspective, the EU is considered to be 
(and predicted to stay) an international organization of sovereign states. A federalist perspective, on 
the other hand, will most likely find that the EU is a nascent federal state or at least stress the federal 
characteristics the EU already possesses (McKay 2001). In either words, there is neither a consensus 
what the EU is nor a consensus what would be the appropriate framework to study it. Innumerable 
characterizations for the EU have been proposed—quasi-state, Staatenverbund, consortio, 
condominio, regulatory state, market polity, empire, hybrid, multi-level government/governance, 
demoi-cracy, and many more. At the same time, it is widely held that the EU is a system without 
precedent for which reason the EU is often labeled a sui generis system. 
It is hardly surprising that the limited success in trying to identify the “true” nature of the EU quickly 
led to fatigue with addressing the big questions of European integration theory and to some 
considering it obsolete (Haas 1975; 1976). Instead, it was proposed to focus on smaller, more 
manageable areas of research, like looking into specific modes of policy-making. Despite a renewed 
interest in general theory of European integration from the mid-1980s onwards, the mainstream 
literature clearly still endorses “going empirical” (Jupille et al. 2003: 16) on a smaller scale in order to 
evaluate the explanatory power of the different theories.  
Yet, while going empirical has certainly contributed greatly to our understanding of the inner 
workings of the European Union, one can hardly argue that we have come closer to any sort of 
agreement on what the EU in its entirety should be characterized as. From relativist/constructivist 
perspective (c. e.g. Kratochwil 2007) it is indeed very unlikely that this process of micro-level 
“testing” of competing theories of the EU will ever transpire into an answer (or an ultimate grand 
theory) about what the EU is. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, scientific observations can’t—at 
least from such a constructivist epistemology—ever be truly “objective” or independent from theory 
but are rather greatly influenced by it. Thus, it is not hard to see why an 
intergovernmental/international law perspective creates fundamentally different results from those 
based, for instance, on a federal/constitutional perspective, even when both theories are supposedly 
looking at the very same “objective facts” regarding the EU. Secondly, if we accept that there can’t be 
any “secure knowledge [that could] be based on field-independent and timeless methodological 
procedures” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil 2009: 702) the process of gathering micro-level knowledge 
about the EU simply cannot add up over time until we eventually come up with a universally accepted 
“truth” about what the EU is. 
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Therefore, I propose a shift in focus. Instead of trying to find out what the European Union “really is” 
I suggest to instead ask whether there might not be other examples of systems with analogous nature 
of the Union debates. I further argue that it is a modified comparative federalism framework, which is 
the best suited for a comparative study of this sort. 
European Integration Theories and the Return of Federal Theory—A Brief Overview 
While comparative federalism is certainly not the only framework that allows for a comparison of 
different nature of the Union debates, it certainly one that immediately comes to mind as federal 
theory operates right at the edge between the domestic (comparative politics/constitutional law) and 
the international (international relations/international law) dimension of politics and law. At the same 
time, the term “federalism” still carries a strong (negative) connotation; therefore, some elaboration 
and conceptual clarification is needed. 
Ideas to overcome the so-called Westphalian system and to replace it with a federal arrangement at the 
European level can be traced back at least to the 19th century (c. Tortarolo 1993: 28 ff.). After the 
Second World War, federal ideas were again promoted by a so-called “federalist movement”, to which 
many of the founding fathers of the European Union belonged. What united this diverse group of 
thinkers and politicians was their adherence to a normative understanding of federalism as a tool to 
replace the existing European nation-states with a supranational (state-like) federation. Another shared 
assumption of these early federalists—as well as that of later ones like Spinelli (1972)—was that a 
federal Europe in their view had to start out with a Constitution by the people of Europe, which was 
seen as a prerequisite for the project rather than the end of a gradual process (Glencross 2009). 
However, a gradual, sectional approach was eventually chosen for the European integration project, an 
approach that soon found its “quasi-official” theory in functionalism (Mitrany 1976), later to be 
refined as neo-functionalism (Haas 1958; cf. Rosamond 2000: 59 ff.). 
Yet, it wasn’t long until events like de Gaulle’s infamous policy of the “empty chair” led to the rise of 
intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966) as the predominant theory of European integration, as neo-
functionalist theories struggled to explain the continuing dominance of the Member State governments 
in the integration process. As a matter of fact, even its former champions suddenly claimed the 
“obsolescence” of functionalism if not integration theory as such (Haas 1975). However, after Europe 
had overcome “eurosclerosis” in the mid-80s, integration theory made a comeback. Today, (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism and functionalism continue to be at the very core of European integration theory 
(Wiener & Diez 2009), which remains a vital field of research. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it is a particular revival of federalist thought (rather than the 
renewed interest in integration theory in general) which is crucial. This novel appeal of applying 
theories originating from the field of comparative federalism (Burgess 2006) to the EU is on a new 
perspective that regards the EU polity as a multi-level system of government/governance (Marks et al. 
1996; Hix 1994) an thereby as a (quasi)-federal entity. 
Based on this view it is held that federalism should no longer be rejected as a normative concept (or 
even a political ideology in disguise) aimed at the creation of the “Federal States of Europe” but that it 
can rather serve as a powerful “theoretical framework” (Pollack 2005: 28) that allows for a structural 
analysis of the EU. To be sure, applying federalism to the EU is still fiercely rejected by 
intergovernmentalists like Moravcsik (2001: 163 f.) who argues that federal theory can’t be applied to 
the EU since “(t)he EU constitutional order is not only barely a federal state; it is barely recognizable 
as a state at all.” Against this, the point has been made that the European Union, although not a state, 
can already be understood as a federal system in a structural sense.438 From this perspective, the 
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features of the EU polity fits all the criteria comparative federalism generally ascribes to federations 
(Watts 2008; Riker 1975): 
  Powers are divided (even sovereignty is divided, or “pooled” as some argue) between the 
supranational level and the Member States and—in some of them—the regional level; 
  EU decisions and—under certain conditions (c. European Court of Justice 1963)—even directives 
may have a direct effect (effet direct) on “EU citizens” and thus establish a direct link of the 
supranational layer with the people of the EU Member States; 
  even more apparent than in federal states, the EU Member States (in this sense the sub-units of the 
EU polity) have retained competences they exercise autonomously; 
  Member States (the sub-units) are prominently represented (compared to other federal systems, 
maybe even overrepresented) at the central level through the council and thus participate in 
supranational-level decision-making; 
  last but not least, the European Court of Justice is regarded as the “functional equivalent” to 
constitutional courts in other federal states (Höreth 2008: 51). 
The Shortcomings of Current Federal Theory 
All in all, this new federal perspective has enabled scholars to apply theories of comparative 
federalism to the EU in an analytical way while leaving aside some of the normative connotations of 
the original federalist agenda. Numerous comprehensive comparisons have been carried out since the 
mid-1980s, with the USA being a (if not the most) popular object for comparison with the EU. Often, 
these studies have explored the subject multidisciplinarily in an attempt to bring together a political 
science and (constitutional) law perspective with historical accounts (s. e.g. Cappelletti et al. 1986; 
Howse & Nicolaïdis 2001). Strikingly, all major compendiums of federal systems (Watts 2008; 
Burgess 2006; Hueglin & Fenna 2006; McKay 2001) now seem to include the European Union, even 
when otherwise restricted to federal states. 
Yet, while federal theories have left behind a lot of their normative baggage and have become more 
widely accepted, the application of federalism to the European Union still suffers from what I refer to 
as a teleological bias. Scholars of federalism today are rarely as naive as to think that federal systems 
have to start with a “big bang” constitutional revolution, thereby creating some sort of prefabricated 
federal arrangement that once and for all resolves all issues at stake (Glencross 2009). Instead, 
especially with regard to the EU, proposals for a (gradual) “federalization” (Trechsel 2005) or 
“constitutionalization” (Rittberger & Schimmelfennig 2007) of the EU have come to incorporate a lot 
of the ideas originally attributed to functionalism, particularly a focus on process. However, what 
remains puzzling is that—despite a supposedly purely analytical conception of federalism—the 
(nation) state appears to remain the point of reference according to which European integration is 
ultimately judged.  
Accordingly—though rarely stated explicitly (but s. Howse & Nicolaïdis 2001: 8 ff.)—it is usually the 
current US federalism (or other federal systems as they exist today) that the EU is compared to. This 
type of comparison perceives, for instance, the US as a fully-fledged federal state that was created by a 
(preexisting) single demos (“We, the people...”) with the ratification of the US Constitution (Scharpf 
2001: 355).439 In contrast to this narrative, the EU with its gradual and sectoral integration logic is 
usually regarded as an “unfinished” or partial federation (Hallstein 1979).440 Surprisingly, this 
description seems to unite scholars who generally favor further European integration but try to point 
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out (what they perceive as) crucial differences between the USA and the EU (Scharpf 2001) and other 
scholars, who invoke what Weiler (1995) has coined the “no-demos argument” to argue that the EU 
cannot follow the US example since the existence of a single European people is seen as a 
precondition for a democratic United States of Europe (GCC 1993; Kirchhof 2003). 
Granted, some scholars have recently begun to “take history seriously” and, thus, to compare the 
European Union not only with today’s federal systems but rather with the full historic experience of 
federalism (s. inter alia Bellamy 1996; Goldstein 2001). For instance, Fabbrini (2007) and Glencross 
(2007) have found striking similarities in the structures of what they perceive as the “compound 
republic” of the antebellum United States and today’s European Union. Still, given that there is 
certainly no lack of contemporary literature on US Constitutional history it is quite surprising that, 
until recently, federal theories of European integration have paid little attention to the US nature of the 
Union debate. Yet, if either a consolidated federal state or a failure of the whole project are seen as the 
only possible outcomes history holds for us, finding analogies with the EU in the past of federal 
systems again only reaffirms the traditional teleological assumptions. According to such a view, the 
European Union is an unfinished federal state and will remain to be an odd, sui generis case if it 
doesn’t manage to become a “proper” federation. 
Towards a Discursive, Comparative Federalism Framework 
To overcome the teleological assumptions of many studies resorting to federal frameworks I propose a 
change. Rather than judging federal disputes by their outcomes (or even focusing solely on present-
day federations), I will comparatively analyze historic nature of the Union debates in an 
unprepossessed way. In other words, I will attempt not to let hindsight bias or skew my empirical 
study. Such a change in perspective of federal theory demands some changes on the epistemological 
and the methodological level as well. Based on the premise that the European Union is by no means 
the only historical example of a federal system whose character (or nature) is contested, I will use 
these discourses—and not a fixed set of criteria—as the basis for my refined framework of 
comparative federalism. 
So far, comparative federalism is precisely based on structural comparisons that make use of a wide 
range of typologies (s. for example Erk 2008). As helpful as typologies may be in many contexts, in 
order to be able to analytically grasp the contestedness of federal structures, they certainly have their 
limits. The main problem is that for every criterion there is, naturally, only tow answers; yes or no. It 
follows that even the most sophisticated list of criteria for a federation/confederation typology is of no 
use when virtually all of the features of the system—or all criteria on the list—are essentially 
contested. Therefore, a coherent approach is needed that allows the discourses over the federal 
structures to be moved to the center of attention. Here, meta-theoretical insights drawn from 
constructivist approaches relying on speech act theory (Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989) and discourse 
particularly qualify. Based on its perspective that humans produce and reproduce their world through 
the practices of social interaction (Koslowski 1999: 566), a formalistic definition of federalism can be 
replaced by a broader conception, which acknowledges that federalism is not exhaustively captured by 
“a particular set of institutions but in the institutionalization of particular relationships among the 
participants in political life.” (Elazar 1987: 12). Looking at nature of the Union debates from this 
theoretical perspective, a number of issues can be raised that would otherwise be incomprehensible. 
Still, a constitutional debate as such—an certainly not one as multilayered and complex as one over 
the nature of the beast—cannot simply be analyzed or compared to other discourses in toto but rather 
needs to be operationalized and to be broken down into manageable units. For the broader context of 
my thesis, I have identified the following key elements to be some of the most important sub-
discourses of the overall debate: 
  Sovereignty or what unit should have the “final say” is the first (if not the most) essential element 
that comes to mind when thinking about nature of the Union debates. 
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  Disputes concerning the hierarchy of legal and the “final judicial arbiter” can be seen as anther 
key element (c. Mayer 2000; Ackerman 2005: 163 ff.). 
  The question of seceding or exiting from a federal arrangement (c. Mann 2010) is also a 
characteristic discourse within the context of nature of the Union debates. 
  Finally, questions of (federal) citizenship and fundamental rights are linked in manifold ways to 
the discourse over the nature of the respective systems (c. Lacorne 2001; Wouters et al. 2009). 
In the context of this paper, I will use the key element of sovereignty as an empirical showcase. First, I 
will briefly summarize the well-known EU debate and then turn to the (historic) US case. 
Sovereignty in the European Union – Who Are the “Masters of the Treaties”? 
The EU controversy focuses on the question of whether the Member States of the European Union are 
still sovereign or whether some parts of their sovereignty have been transferred to or pooled at the 
supranational level. While the debate is a diverse one, often highly legalistic and fragmented, two 
main positions can be identified. 
A first view holds that the European Union is a separate legal entity whose existence is autonomous 
from that of its Member States as EU law has been “detached” from its roots in international law 
(Ipsen 1972). According to this view, the Treaties as well as primary EU legislation are either believed 
to already present a “European Constitution” or to be in a phase of “constitutionalization” (Weiler 
1999). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) can be identified as the main driving force behind this 
concept along with the European lawyers who have supported and refined this doctrine. While the ECJ 
(1963) initially referred to the European Union as “a new legal order of international law”, the Court 
later stressed that what was by then referred to as supranational law had constitutional quality (ECJ 
1978). Going even further, the ECJ (1986) “explicitly qualified the European Treaties as a 
constitution” (Peters 2006: 50). 
Two distinct arguments were brought up by the ECJ and European lawyers in substantiating this 
concept of a European Union autonomous from its constituent parts: 
  The first argument stresses the quantity as well as the quantity of the competences that have been 
“transferred” to the supranational EU level, being combined with the extension of qualified 
majority voting to a wide range of policy fields (Bogdandy 1993: 116 ff.), backed by a legal 
system that closely resembles the structure and performance of those to be found in classic federal 
states (Abromeit 1998: 3). 
  Secondly, the direct effect (effet direct) of EU legal acts towards individual European citizens that 
in turn create individual legal rights—enforceable before national courts—for those individuals. 
Applied to the sovereignty problématique, this legal concept can be understood as a system in which 
sovereignty is divided between the supranational and the Member State-level, each of the two to 
possessing and exercising a set of powers independently from each other (Bogdandy 1993: 116). 
Accordingly, the Member States can no longer be regarded as being the “masters of the treaties” (or 
possessing the legal Kompetenz-Kompetenz), at least not in those areas in which the European Union 
has established its own authoritative rights (Ukrow 1995: 95 f.). 
Opposing views regarding the question of sovereignty comes in two flavors. The first one resembles a 
traditional intergovernmental understanding of European integration (Hoffmann 1966; Joerges 1996: 
75) and thus deals with the European Treaties solely in the categories of international law. 
Congruously, the Member States are seen to remain the sovereign entities of the international system 
as well as the ultimate “masters of the Treaties”. Yet, the more interesting variant—which can easily 
be overlooked or misunderstood—is a concept developed and championed above all by the German 
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Constitutional Court (GCC).441 According to this concept, the EU is understood to be “autonomous by 
recognition”, meaning that the European Union—or rather its legal order—is considered as being 
distinct from domestic and international law. However, this autonomy is not believed to be 
independent from the Member States but rather thought to be conditional on the national legal orders’ 
recognition. Therefore, the autonomy—and, for that matter, the supremacy—of EU law only exists 
because (and insofar as) it is sanctioned by the domestic legal orders and the Member States’ 
constitutions in particular (GCC 1993; Kirchhof 1994: 66). 
Again applying this view to the sovereignty problématique, the autonomous by recognition concept 
claims sovereignty to still reside will the Member States. While acknowledging that some “sovereign 
powers” have (temporarily) been transferred to the supranational level, the Members States—
remaining the masters of the Treaty—can ultimately revoke these delegated powers and thus retain 
their full sovereignty (Isensee 1995: 585 ff.; Huber 2001: 220). 
The United States—Union of a Single People or Compact of (the) States? 
While, as noted above, scholars have started taking into account the complex constitutional history of 
the US, it is still widely believed that the US example cannot be used as an analogy for European 
integration since there is, allegedly, a fundamental difference. This widely held concern can be 
exemplified by the following statement: 
But the great difference between Europe and the US—and for that matter all other federal states—
is that the European construct does not presuppose the supreme authority and sovereignty of a 
single constitutional demos. (Howse & Nicolaïdis 2001: 12, original italics). 
Indeed, the omnipresent “American way of life” makes it hard to question the notion of a single US 
American demos with a shared identity. Yet, what is often overlooked when referring to this alleged 
stability and “organic” development of the US federal system (Kommers 1986: 604 f.) is the fact that, 
on closer inspection, matters look quite different. Many scholars of EU integration will be surprised by 
the fact that the US were comprised of nor more than eleven States when the Constitution came into 
force in 1789 and the first US president took office. Furthermore, it will not be an exaggeration to say 
that the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of 
1777 and finally the 1789 ratified Constitution of the United States accounted for more than minor 
changes regarding the relations of the former Thirteen Colonies (Amar 2005: 6 ff.) and can therefore 
be seen as big steps in a process of gradual integration. 
Also, what is often portrayed as homogeneity, common identity or at least a basic coherence 
throughout the American Colonies might rather be the creation of historians, blinded by the “tricky 
tool” of hindsight and engaging in “after-the-fact appraisals of how it [the American Revolution] could 
possibly have turned out so well” (Ellis 2002: 5 ff.). What often gets lost in this narrative that presents 
the fight for independence as a nationalist movement is the fact that the size of the territory and the 
heterogeneity of its people were the main arguments raised by the so-called anti-federalists against the 
ratification of the constitution (Beer 1993: 237). Admittedly, English existed as a common language, 
which is indeed an important difference to the EU case,442 still, only a tiny elite existed on the Union-
level (Ellis 2002: 8), a level that was only gradually politicized and democratized, initially with 
disintegrating effects (Elkins & McKitrick 1993: 257 ff.; Ackerman 2005: 16 ff.). 
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the US: “Tedious, indeed is our Business. Slow, as Snails. Fifty Gentlemen meeting together, all Strangers, are not 
acquainted with Each other’s Language, Ideas, Views, Designs. They are […] jealous of each other—fearful, timid, 
skittish.” (Quote taken from Cappelleti 1986: XI). 
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These preliminary considerations about the state of the early US should allow for a better 
understanding of the rivaling concepts regarding the locus of sovereignty. Here, like in the case of the 
EU, the diverse views can be divided into two main theories. 
The United States as a System of Divided Sovereignty 
The first of the two concepts can clearly be considered to be the mainstream view of the US (c. US 
Supreme Court 1995, Justice Stevens, Opinion) and also reflects the established perception of the US 
by Europeans. According to this view, the United States (under the Constitution of 1789) are 
considered to be a proper, true federal state based on a single American demos. Thus, it is the people 
as a whole (“We, the people”) that are considered to be the only true carrier of sovereignty. Leaving 
aside the horizontal separation of powers, the American people—according to this theory—have 
delegated parts of their sovereignty to the federal government while the remaining powers are reserved 
for the state level.443 
This concept results in a division of sovereignty (“divided sovereignty”) in which the citizens of the 
US are direct subjects to two distinct, yet fully-fledged legal spheres (“dual sovereignty”).444 Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney as well as James Madison have both provided classic definitions for this rather 
dialectic concept: 
[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised 
within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and 
independently of each other, within their respective spheres (US Supreme Court 1859). 
[T]he Constitution was made by the people, but as embodied in the several States that were parties 
to it, [...] one people, nation, or sovereignty for certain purposes [but] not so for others (letter by 
James Madison to Daniel Webster, as quoted in McCoy 1989: 149). 
While all adherents to the theory of divided sovereignty seem to agree on the fact that today’s United 
States are based on a single people, they differ on when and how this unity came about. Arguably the 
most heroic conception is that of Abraham Lincoln who famously stated that “[t]he Union is older than 
any of the States; and, in fact, it created them as States” (Lincoln 1953: 434). According to this view, 
the colonies didn’t experience a sovereign existence independently from the Union since they had first 
been British colonies and subsequently—as a “collective body, which thereby succeeded to the 
sovereignty formerly held by the king” (Lincoln 1953: 433 f.)—declared their independence jointly 
(Farber 2003: 30). Under the Articles of Confederation Lincoln also saw sovereignty resting in the 
people as a whole and not with the people of the individual States since “[n]ot one of them ever had a 
State constitution independent of the Union. Of course it is not forgotten that all the new States framed 
their constitutions before they entered the Union, nevertheless dependent upon and preparatory to 
coming into the Union.” (Lincoln 1953: 433 ff.). 
A more widely held view among the divided sovereignty proponents is usually referred to as the 
transformational view. Rather than dating back the division of sovereignty to the Declaration of 
Independence, this theory considers the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 as having effectively 
transformed the nature of the United States. The Declaration of Independence’s introductory wording 
“[t]he unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America” serves as evidence that this text 
was not (yet) based on a single American people but rather represented a form of cooperation between 
“the good People of these Colonies”, as the document refers to them, who are believed to have 
                                                     
443
 In this context it is highly controversial whether the “reserved powers”, enshrined in the Tenth Amendment of the US 
Constitution, are powers of the State governments (“police powers”) or remain with the respective State peoples (c. 
Farber 2003: 32). 
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 The concept of dual sovereignty has gross practical implications, i.e. regarding the “double jeopardy” principle (US 
Constitution, Fifth Amendment; s. also Amar & Marcus 1995). 
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retained their sovereignty (Becker 1958: 191). Though already using the words “united States”,445 the 
right of the aforementioned “to be Free and Independent States” who “have full Power to levy War, 
conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which 
Independent States may of right do” (Becker 1958: 192) is seen as a proof for the States to retain their 
sovereignty under the Declaration of Independence. 
Pointing to the States as parties to the contract as well as to an explicit guarantee in the text,446 the 
proponents of the transformational view believe sovereignty to still rest with the individual States 
under the Articles of Confederation of 1781 as well. It is only in the 1789 adopted Constitution of the 
United States in which they see a transition to a system of divided sovereignty as the text no longer 
refers to “the States” but rather to individuals (“the People”). Additionally, the text of the Constitution 
is believed to underscore this constitutive act by explicitly stating “We the People of the United States 
[...] do ordain and establish this Constitution” (US Constitution, Preamble, emphasis added). 
In a nutshell, what characterizes all divided sovereignty theories is the concept of the federal level 
being directly based on a single US American people. This demos is, however, served by two agents—
the State and the federal government—who are both held to have a directly link to the people and to be 
sovereign within their respective spheres (c. Supreme Court 1819). 
States’ Rights Doctrine and Compact Theory of the United States 
Today, compact theory—and States’ rights doctrine as its core element—is a highly contested concept 
(s. e.g. Sellers 1963: 16 ff.), not least because it has been used by Southern slave states. However, as 
discussed in the theoretical section above, I seek not to judge theories by their outcomes or by the 
circumstances of their uses; I rather attempt to focus on the theoretical foundations of the concepts.  
To begin with, the term States’ rights needs some clarification since in the context of compact theory 
it is not captured by the so-called “reserved powers” (US Constitution, Tenth Amendment) but rather a 
broader reading of the term that is usually implied. Opposing the notion of a divided sovereignty,447 
compact theory posits the individual States to have a higher, more direct legitimacy than the federal 
level on the basis of which they then—as will be discussed in great detail when dealing with the key 
element of the hierarchy of norms in my thesis—can ultima ratio interpose federal laws by nullifying 
them. The main assumptions of compact theory can be best exemplified by the quotes by John C. 
Calhoun, the champion of States’ rights thought: 
I go on the ground that this constitution was made by the States; that it is a federal union of the States, 
in which the several States still retain their sovereignty (Calhoun 2003b: 434). 
[T]he people of the several States […], taken together, form a federal community;—a com-munity 
composed of States united by a political compact;—and not a nation composed of individuals 
united by, what is called, a social compact (Calhoun 2003a: 90). 
[I]t is the government of a community of States, and not the government of a single State or nation 
(Calhoun 2003a: 63, original emphasis). 
As can easily be seen, compact theory implies that the United States are to be considered a Union of 
the several people of the States (State peoples) rather than a Union based on a single US people. 
Accordingly, the ultimate, undivided sovereignty is believed to still rest with the individual peoples of 
the States. It is hard to subsume compact theory under the conventional categories of federal state and 
confederation. While, especially in the German literature, John C. Calhoun’s theory is usually believed 
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 The lower case spelling of the word “united” is believed to be a mere typo (Becker 1958: 185 ff.). 
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 “Each state retains it sovereignty, freedom and independence [...].” (Articles of Confederation, Art. II). 
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 “Sovereignty is an entire thing;—to divide, is,—to destroy it.” (Calhoun 2003a: 81). 
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to regard the United States under the Constitution of 1789 as a confederation or Staatenbund (Usteri 
1954: 194), matters are more complex. 
Though also referring to Calhounian compact theory as a “confederacy of sovereign states”, Farber 
(2003: 32) claims that this does not imply that what is referred to as a “compact” is meant to be a mere 
“intergovernmental treaty” between state governments—he suggests that the term State rather refers to 
the State people in this context. Indeed, on closer inspection one finds that Calhoun carefully 
distinguishes the “federal government” of the US from a conventional, intergovernmental 
confederacy, but also from that of a consolidated, national government (c. Forsyth 1981: 125 ff.). Even 
though based on a confederacy, the US Constitution of 1789, Calhoun argues, establishes a true 
government with regard to the powers delegated to it: 
To be more full and explicit;—a federal government, though based on a confederacy, is, to the 
extent of the powers delegated, as much a government as a national government itself. It 
possesses, to this extent, all the authorities possessed by the latter, and as fully and perfectly. The 
case is different with a confederacy; for, although it is sometimes called a government,—its 
Congress, or Council, or the body representing it, by whatever name it may be called, is much 
more nearly allied to an assembly of diplomatists […]. (Calhoun 2003a: 91). 
The proponents of compact theory base their claims primarily on the so-called Virginia (1798) and 
Kentucky Resolutions (1799) drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson themselves. Also of no 
surprise, the fact that the Constitution was ratified in separate state conventions—instead of a single 
one—is commonly referred to. Less apparent and quite remarkable, States’ rights advocates also argue 
that the Preamble of the Constitution would back up their reasoning. Rather than being the 
proclamation of a contrat social for a single people, the use of the words “We the People of the United 
States” in the compact theorists’ reading is due to the fact that a pragmatic solution was needed to the 
problem that it was highly uncertain which of the States would be able to ratify the Constitution and 
become part of the US. Indeed, as Farrand (1940: 190) affirms, earlier drafts of the Preamble still had 
explicitly mentioned all states. The genesis of the Preamble, backed up by semantic considerations,448 
is thus believed not to be in conflict with compact theory. 
In sum, compact theory regards the United States a (con)federation sui generis,449 which is based on a 
compact of the separate people of the states, which thereby establish a government for limited 
purposes; sovereignty is retained by the parties to this compact, the States (or their people 
respectively). It is them who—according to compact theory—are the sovereign masters of the US 
“constitutional treaty”. 
Concluding Remarks and Prospect 
Having analyzed only one key aspect (sovereignty) and only two cases (EU and USA) in this paper, it 
would certainly be mistaken to already expect seminal findings from these empirics. Even so, the 
preliminary empirical findings regarding the discourses are quite remarkable—not only where 
analogies and similar patterns in the debates over sovereignty can be found but also where differences 
exist.450 What is most interesting is the fact that discourses about the “locus” of sovereignty and the 
discussions about the relationship between the (Member) States and the Union evolve out of what 
prima facie seem to be quite different bases; what would appear to be a constitutional document in the 
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 “In the Constitution, after all, ‘the United States’ is consistently a plural noun.” (Supreme Court 1995, Justice Thomas, 
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 “Our system is the first that ever substituted a government in lieu of such bodies. This, in fact, constitutes its peculiar 
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US case and an international treaty in the case of the EU. Yet, in both cases we find one opinion that 
posits the existence of an independent “supra-level”, directly linked to the individual citizen as the 
main proof for a divided sovereignty. Again, a rivaling view sees the individual peoples of the 
(Member) States (to continue) to be the ultimate source of legitimacy and thus considers sovereignty 
to rest with the individual States in both cases. Here, however, though commonly presented as 
resembling a confederal/intergovernmental understanding of the US, Calhoun’s compact theory 
proved to be much more nuanced. Thereby, even the tentative empirical findings presented in this 
paper can already give a clear indication of the complexity and contentedness of the nature of the 
(early) US, which is so often portrayed as an uncontroversial case. By analyzing additional key 
elements and addition cases the overall “patterns of contestedness” should become more refined and 
nuanced. 
On the theoretical side, the findings are quite be promising as well, as the here proposed discursive 
comparative federalism framework seems to be able to contribute to at least two aspects to the study of 
the nature of the EU. Firstly, the prevailing idea that the EU’s unresolved nature and competence 
claims are an exceptional and necessarily disastrous feature of the European Union can be rebutted (or 
at least put into perspective) by showing that analogous “states of limbo” are rather the rule than the 
exception in (early) coming together federations. To that effect, the view that—while acknowledging 
that some degree of constitutional “ambiguity” might be helpful—federal arrangements are sustainable 
only, if they (constantly) manage to bind together diverse demands under one shared understanding 
(Erk 2007; Behnke & Benz 2009) can be questioned. 
Secondly, the here proposed perspective allows not only taking into account the blessings of 
ambiguity but also its risks and limits. Unlike theories such as (radical) legal pluralism (c. inter alia 
Besson 2009) that tend to regard EU legal pluralism as a novel, sui generis phenomenon, my 
framework allows the question the question “how much ambiguity and contestation of its foundational 
principles can a system take before it runs risk of breaking down?” to be addressed from a 
comparative, historical perspective.451 
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